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Abstract
This dissertation is an attempt to approach psychopathology from a broadly Levinasian
perspective. I do so by situating concerns and insights raised by Emmanuel Levinas relative to
phenomenological and “4e” (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approaches to
psychology, cognitive science, and psychopathology. There has been some recent take-up of
Levinas by these approaches, but it has remained somewhat superficial or otherwise inaccurate.
It is my position that Levinas’ concepts of expression as a fundamentally social, ethical, and
asymmetric relation, embodiment as sensitive exposure to and enjoyment of the world, and
subjectivity as the substitution of one’s own existence for the other, can deepen our
understanding of intersubjectivity, ethical experience, and pathology phenomena.
In Chapter 1, I demonstrate that phenomenology relies on similarity in its articulation of
interpersonal understanding, and that this becomes problematic in the context of
psychopathology, where difference becomes thematic. In Chapter 2, I articulate Levinas’
conception of expression, which presupposes difference rather than similarity and accomplishes
an interpersonal relation that is fundamentally ethical. In Chapter 3, I show how such a
conception can contribute to understanding by considering the ways that expression can direct
one’s attention to that which was not previously known. I do so by considering the theory of
natural pedagogy and dynamical systems approaches in psychopathology. In Chapter 4, I present
some underlying assumptions of 4e approaches to psychopathology, specifically focusing on
enactivism, and consider enactivist accounts of ethics and ethical experience. It is my contention
that these accounts fail to make sense of the possibility of overcoming self-interest, and
accordingly of various forms of ethical experience. However, bolstering these accounts with a
Levinasian concept of expression produces a powerful understanding of the production of
understanding across difference. In Chapter 5, I apply Levinasian insights to interpreting specific
v

pathology phenomena associated with depression, narcissism, and schizophrenia. Finally, I
address the applicability of concerns raised in Chapter 1 to my own account.
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Introduction
This dissertation is an attempt to approach psychopathology from the perspective of the
ethical metaphysics of Emmanuel Levinas. My goal is to put Levinasian concepts into
communication with problems and insights in psychopathology, particularly from the
perspectives of phenomenology and enactivism. My thesis is that these two areas of work can
contribute to one another. Specifically, Levinas’ concept of expression can help us to better
understand intersubjectivity and provides a novel approach to the problem of
incomprehensibility and the nature of so-called “self-disturbances” in psychopathology; on the
other hand, enactivism provides us with an account of how it is that we arrive at mutual sense,
particularly across seemingly radical difference. Phenomenological and enactivist
psychopathology heavily draws on classical phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty. It is only recently that some have begun to incorporate certain of Levinas’
insights, but this remains piecemeal and somewhat misrepresentative of the fundamental
dimensions of his work.
I stress the importance of the ethical dimension of human intersubjectivity for making
sense of other persons (and thus for any theory of interpersonal sense-making, too), and
especially the asymmetry of the ethical relation. I support these Levinasian insights by appealing
to (and reinterpreting) a naturalistic theory of learning (the theory of natural pedagogy), and go
on to apply Levinas to the approaches in philosophy of cognitive science and psychopathology
known as interaction theory and participatory sense-making. I then demonstrate certain
limitations in current enactivist accounts of ethics and offer Levinasian correctives. Finally, I
draw out the implications of Levinas’ concepts of embodiment, sensibility, and expression for
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our understanding of the self in relation to self-disturbances in pathology phenomena, e.g.,
schizophrenia.
Psychopathology is a field that attempts to understand the other person across differences
that have, at times, seemed incomprehensible. Phenomenology strives to make positive sense of
that which it studies, that is, it aims to say what some given phenomenon is, not merely what it is
not in relation to a network of other, better known phenomena. Phenomenological
psychopathology, then, attempts to make positive sense of the other across difference. Emmanuel
Levinas, who embraced the spirit if not the letter of Husserlian phenomenology (Derrida, 1978,
p. 107; Levinas, 1981, p. 183) took more seriously the question of the subject’s relation with an
irreducible other than do the phenomenologists who act as touchstones in psychopathology.
Beginning with Husserl, phenomenology is first an egology, an endeavor on the part of
the philosopher who, reflecting on their own experience, purports to discover general structures
of consciousness. On such an approach, intersubjectivity is the question of the presence of others
within experience, i.e., the appearance of others to or for consciousness. Enactivism, inspired by
a diverse host of philosophical and scientific thought (including the phenomenology of Husserl,
but also that of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists, as well as biology,
neuroscience, dynamical systems theory, and cognitive science), first gained attention in
conjunction with the theory of autopoiesis, according to which all organisms sensitively navigate
their environments in terms of what matters for sustaining their own existence. All organismic
life is therefore cognitive, in the sense of sense-making, and also affective, since sense-making
refers to the way the environment affects the organism in terms of organismic values. For the
enactivists, sense-making begins with the organism, though enactivism has now turned to
seriously consider interactions between organisms.
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There are three major questions of intersubjectivity within the domains specified above.
First, how is it that I know or understand the other person as a person? Put in phenomenological
terminology, how does the other person appear to me in experience as precisely an other person,
distinct from myself and my own consciousness? Second, how is it that I know or understand the
particular states of the other person, that is, how do I know or understand that the other person is
undergoing a certain experience, e.g., happiness, anger about X, and so on? Third, how do
relationships with others condition or structure my cognitive-affective processes in general? That
is, how is my understanding of not only the other but also of myself, the world, and worldly
things conditioned by others?
These questions have primarily been considered in terms of constitution and
epistemology, appearance and understanding. Phenomenology and enactivism also remind us –
as do other traditions within cognitive science, at times – that such things extend beyond
categories of mind traditionally conceived as cognitive, e.g., propositional thought, reasoning,
categorical identification of phenomena, to also include affective forms of sense-making: we
understand the world, in part, by how the world affects us in terms of emotions, moods, feelings,
and even organismic desires and needs. We understand in terms of what matters to us. It is my
claim that the answers to all three of these questions depend not only on appearance and
understanding – not just on my own cognitive/affective activity – but also on an ethical
relationship with others, making front and center not what matters to me but rather what matters
to others, even despite my own activity and self-interest.
It is not as if phenomenology and enactivism have not broached the topic of ethics.
Indeed, ethics was a major concern for Husserl and other phenomenologists (De Warren, 2017;
Donohoe, 2004). Though, for Husserl, ethics was seen as emerging from the general principles of
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knowledge and rationality, and referred primarily to norms and values. Enactivism, too, has
shared this emphasis. The bulk of enactivist thought on the topic of ethics has been contributing
to an understanding of the generation of values and norms, not only for an individual but also at
a societal level, and the ways that such things feedback on the cognitive/affective processes out
of which they arise. (Participatory sense-making, developed by De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, is
a good example of this, as are Colombetti & Torrance, 2009, and Varela, 1999. They all show
how normativity arises through social relations (or the stronger claim, that meaning itself is
normative), and correspondingly constrain the further production of meaning.)
Levinas, however, has a different idea of ethics. Ethics describes a primary relationship
with another person characterized by an asymmetric responsibility. It is primary because it
describes the social relation par excellence; it describes contact with another person even before
ever coming to understand her. The other person, simply by expressing herself to me, makes a
demand that I always must respond to in some way or other. This demand is a responsibility
independent of whether the other will reciprocate any response I issue. Levinas goes as far as to
argue that we are responsible even for the other’s responsibility. This extreme, asymmetric
responsibility is at the core of ethics for Levinas, and is prior to and, more importantly, better
than any value or norm that I myself participate in; not only is it a source of values and norms,
but it is only through an asymmetric responsibility that I can put my own concerns aside and
even act against norms (which, it must be noted, can themselves produce and sustain violence)
for the other.
Not only does Levinas’ formulation of ethics help us to understand ethical experience in
general, and especially phenomena such as extreme altruism, but it also helps us to understand
understanding others, in the more common cognitive/affective sense. It is due to the other
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mattering to us independently of ourselves that we are forced to reckon the world and bestow
upon our perceptions an intersubjective signification. Indeed, it is the other who first introduces
the possibility of a significance beyond myself. Although this is somewhat in line with other
major phenomenological thinkers, Levinas’ insight is that this process already bears an ethical
significance and furthermore that responsibility for the other is the ultimate justification of any
objective claims; the other can always disrupt my understandings and call me to answer for them.
A Levinasian approach finds as an ally the theory of natural pedagogy, according to
which we learn general kinds by being addressed by others (Gergely & Csibra, 2009). The
intersubjective relationship, then, is not only an ethical relationship but, due to the exigence of
that relationship and its motivation of significance, it is also an asymmetric teacher/student
relationship: I learn from the other as she directs my attention to the world. This phenomenon is
well supported by the philosophical-scientific literature on infant learning and expression. Of
especial interest are the concepts of primary and secondary intersubjectivity, which I reinterpret
in making the argument for the primacy of ethics.
This account of asymmetric responsibility co-implicates a novel theory of embodiment.
Within phenomenological and enactive approaches to cognition and psychopathology, the body
is primarily understood by reference to certain couples of opposing terms, e.g., object body/lived
body, body image/body schema. Irreducible to these formulations is the body as sensitive
vulnerability, as the very condition of our being, beyond but conditioning any thought we may
have of the body or anything else. It is as a sensitive being, vulnerable to the world writ large,
that I can first come to encounter anything at all beyond myself, including the other who
approaches me as a body. In responding to the call of the other, I come to account for myself –
account for my bodily actions and freedom, and reckon my own place in the world relative to the
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other; this accounting is the formation of a further ethical, thematic self, in addition to the basic
embodied self – or what I call an embodied ego – already presupposed. For this reason, I use
Levinas to better understand the nature of self and self-disruption in psychopathology
phenomena, including depression, narcissism, and schizophrenia.
My reader must keep in mind a number of themes that, while not always explicit,
undergird this work. The first is the relationship between comprehension and understanding, on
the one hand, and incomprehension or “ununderstandability” on the other. Incomprehensibility
has long been considered a problem in psychopathology, since at least as early as Karl Jaspers,
but tracing back its roots to antiquity. In this dissertation, the project is not to deny
incomprehensibility nor to overcome it by some special method; rather, my claim is that
understanding always emerges out of prior incomprehension: first we communicate, then we
understand (the other, the world, ourselves). The question is of the relationship between
incomprehension and comprehension, thus the special interest taken in learning and sensemaking.
A second theme to keep in mind is the relationship between theory and practice in
psychology broadly conceived (including, e.g., psychiatry and psychopathology; at times I use
the word perhaps too broadly to also include cognitive science). I suspect that theory and practice
cannot be sharply distinguished, though of course that does not mean neither pole can be
emphasized for various purposes. Some psychiatrists, such as Giovanni Stanghellini (2019),
argue that psychological practice must be based on theory (though, this is fortunately not a
conclusion he seems to adhere to at all times). On the other hand, a Levinasian position that roots
itself in a face-to-face encounter with another person must emphasize the role that practice plays
in the very formulation – and accountability – of theory. Here, the most important thing to bear
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in mind is that my claims throughout ought to always have some import for at least one but,
often, both sides of this dichotomy.
A third is the question of naturalism. In this dissertation, I ultimately provide certain
naturalistic defenses and implications of Levinas’ thought. Yet, Levinas is often seen as resistant
to naturalization. Within psychopathology research today, the project of “naturalizing
phenomenology” looms large, and one should wonder, then, how Levinas fits into this project.
Though I do not treat the question explicitly in the body of this work, I can share some initial
thoughts on the matter. First, there are many ideas of what constitutes a “naturalistic”
philosophy. Quite broadly, I take naturalism to refer to an understanding of some phenomenon,
X, in terms of a system of concepts that ultimately refer to ‘natural’ phenomena as determined by
natural science. For instance, a naturalistic account of desire would ultimately found the reality
of that state on whatever things or forces our physicists (and perhaps chemists and psychologists)
claim exist. Second, bearing in mind this sense of naturalism, Levinas bears an interesting
relationship to the project of naturalism. As readers will see in Chapter 2 below, Levinas’ ideas
of embodiment, enjoyment, and even hedonism seem amenable to such a project. On the other
hand, Levinas explicitly maintains that one’s relationship to an other cannot be totalized under
any system of concepts, and thus it would follow that it cannot be totalized under a system of
natural concepts. In a perhaps deflationary reading, this is no more radical than maintaining that
ethics cannot be reduced to physics or moral psychology: it is just not a natural scientific
domain. On the other hand, it is because ethics demands justice that we are left to reckon with a
perhaps uncomfortable naturalism. Because we always relate not only to one other but to a
plurality of others, Levinas maintains that we must “compare incomparables” (Levinas, 1981, p.
158), that is, divide our attention and resources among plural others. Therefore, ethics demands
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exactly what it prohibits: the application of general concepts to the other. Insofar as “the Other’s
material needs are my spiritual needs” (Cohen, 1986, p. 24), I must apply material, i.e., natural,
concepts to understanding these needs and for executing a response. But this is an uncomfortable
naturalism since in doing justice to plurality through the application of general concepts I
unavoidably do violence to the non-totalizable Other.
Before moving to chapter outlines, I want to make a terminological specification already
suggested above. Herein, I distinguish between morality and ethics. Morality refers to values and
principles for orienting action according to those values. That is, morality deals with morals
construed as specific principles, lessons, or standards. To be moral refers to one’s adherence to
morals. Ethics deals with the source of meaning of values. Here, since Levinas is the major
figure, ethics refers to a responsible relationship with others, out of which we (ought) derive
morality. Enactivist ethics has hitherto, accordingly, been primarily an enactivist account of
morality: an account of the processes of production of specific values, principles, and norms.
This distinction is not meant in any disparaging way – morality is wed to ethics, and both are
utmost concerns; rather, the distinction is meant only for conceptual clarity.
In Chapter 1, I focus on the foundational text of phenomenological psychopathology,
General Psychopathology by Karl Jaspers, and the take-up of that project by transcendental
phenomenology, with an emphasis on Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and to a lesser extent Martin
Heidegger. I demonstrate that Jaspers’ concept of empathy more closely resembles that of
Husserl and Stein than it does that of his contemporary, Theodor Lipps, which has become
central to contemporary simulation-theory accounts of interpersonal understanding. Empathy, for
Jaspers, Husserl, and Stein, is the primary way that we understand others, and depends on
perceiving bodily movements that resemble my own, as well as familiarity with the kinds of

8

experience that, in my own case, accompany such movements. The movements of the other, just
as our own, take on significance as expression, i.e., psycho-physical unities of those movements
and associated mental acts. Where empathy fails, according to Jaspers, understanding becomes
impossible. In the case of certain pathology phenomena, such as thought insertion, this renders
the target phenomenon incomprehensible. In such cases, the only recourse is to a deficit method,
by which we understand only what the phenomenon is not. I critique the deficit method on
epistemological and ethical grounds, as well as the transcendental phenomenological
modification thereof. In the latter case, a special problem is introduced that continues to shape
the rest of the dissertation in the background: the discovery of essential structures of experience
that phenomenology claims to accomplish depends on certain interpersonal relations, and such
relations cannot be presupposed to hold in relevant psychopathology cases.
In Chapter 2, I explicate Levinas’ concept of expression. Rather than psycho-physical
unity, expression is primarily conceived by Levinas as communication: the other expresses
herself insofar as she communicates with me in such a way as to demand a response. In
demanding a response, the expression of the other is inherently disruptive of consciousness,
rather than being understood as an act constituted for consciousness. In order to explicate
expression, I begin with Levinas’ understanding of embodiment as vulnerable sensibility, which
becomes important for subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 5. The crucial point is that our
relation to the other, according to Levinas, is not a perceptual but an ethical one. It is this ethical
relation that contemporary phenomenological and enactivist approaches to intersubjectivity have
yet to seriously address (though there have been a number of accounts of what I call morality).
Formulating the interpersonal relationship in terms of ethics also allows us to approach the
incomprehensibility problem from a new direction: on this account, all understanding is founded
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on incomprehension; we first communicate, without presupposing any understanding
whatsoever, and it is only in responding to the call of the other that we come to understand.
Chapters 3 and 4 explore the ways that we arrive at understanding from incomprehension.
In Chapter 3, I begin by revisiting Jaspers’ incomprehensibility thesis and exploring its
implications for a Levinasian approach. Importantly, a number of thinkers maintain that such an
approach would be “without method,” “unsettled,” or would otherwise endorse some version of
the incomprehensibility thesis. This need not be the case. I go on to focus on the theory of
learning implicated by Levinas’ position, according to which learning begins with the other
directing our attention. This is complemented by the theory of natural pedagogy, which relies on
address as motivating general learning, as well as dynamical systems theory (which becomes
especially interesting in the domain of psychopathology). I then return to the incomprehensibility
thesis and explicate the forms of understanding available on a Levinasian approach, as well as
their implications for clinical and theoretical psychopathology, i.e.., that theory is founded on
and accountable to practice, that interpersonal understanding is particular and limited, that
incomprehensibility in the problematic sense results from unjustified generalization, and that
attentional modulation and affect can fruitfully guide research (à la “praecox feeling”).
In Chapter 4, I turn to consider interaction theory and participatory sense-making, two
accounts of intersubjectivity within enactivism that explore the idea of social cognition.
According to interaction theory, social understanding often just is social interaction, and
according to participatory sense-making, we make sense of the world – and ourselves and each
other – together. There are undoubtedly true insights here. I argue, however, that these accounts
overlook asymmetry, and in doing so are unable to adequately account for understanding
contrary to common sense and self-interest. This discussion leads into a consideration of
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enactivist ethics, represented here by the work of Francisco Varela, Giovanna Colombetti and
Steve Torrance. Levinas can help us to make adequate sense of ethical experience that enactivist
ethics has yet to account for. On the other hand, enactivist ethics and accounts of social cognition
can lend to Levinas a compelling story for transitioning from ethical asymmetry to doxic
symmetry, i.e., the social establishment of mutual sense. I thus see the Levinasian account as
complementary with enactivism, at least in this regard.
In Chapter 5, I consider the implications of Levinas’ conception of embodiment
(introduced in Chapter 2) for psychopathology. In recent years, many pathology phenomena
have been characterized in terms of self-disturbance, e.g., schizophrenia has been conceived of in
terms of a loss of one’s sense of agency or ownership, or an unstable first-personal perspective,
or a failure to differentiate oneself from others. I apply Levinas here to distinguish between an
embodied, sensitive ego and a social, responsive I, or personal self. This allows me to consider a
number of possibilities regarding self-disturbance, linking each to some form of pathology or
other, but concluding that responsibility for the needs and responsibility of others requires that
we rethink the scope of psychiatry beyond the limits of either the self or dyadic relationships. On
the way, I address two major concerns, which originate in my treatment of phenomenology in the
first chapter: (1) that a Levinasian position collapses into a different form of the deficit model
(represented here by the Seattle School of psychology), and (2) that the approach here commits
the same kind of problematic structuralism levelled at phenomenology.
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Chapter 1
Phenomenological Psychopathology:
Familiarity and Alterity in Jaspers, Husserl, and Contemporary Thought
Introduction
Phenomenological psychopathology is largely considered to have originated as a field
with the publication of Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, though today it is just as
influenced by classical phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. In this
chapter, I begin with Jaspers’ General Psychopathology, explicating the conception of empathy
at play in that work. This is the crucial concept because it is empathy that Jaspers identifies as
understanding “in the true psychological sense” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 304). An act of empathy, or
psychological understanding, requires two conditions: perception of bodily movement and
personal familiarity with the associated mental experience. I demonstrate that this conception of
empathy is congruent with Husserl’s own and not, as is sometimes presumed, with the concept as
formulated by the simulation theory of social cognition. Where empathy fails, Jaspers maintains
that our only recourse is to a deficit method, according to which we articulate only what some
(pathology) phenomenon is not. I argue against the deficit method on epistemological and ethical
grounds. Next, I show how transcendental phenomenology can move past a Jasperian, or “strict,”
deficit method, in virtue of positing universal structures of consciousness. This, however, is also
problematic: the applicability of such structures to a person other than oneself presupposes
certain things – broadly, resemblance of essential possibilities and inclusion in communal
practices – that simply cannot be presupposed (and are in fact often lacking or actually
undermined) in the relevant cases of pathology phenomena. In summary, psychopathology
thematizes divergences from ordinary consciousness in such a way as to undermine the
applicability of these methods.
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Jaspers’ General Psychopathology
In his foundational General Psychopathology, Karl Jaspers attempted not only to collect
and analyze some of the best work in the field at the time, but also to establish the fundamental
concepts of psychopathology and to systematize its methods. With this work, he is often credited
with founding the field. He conceives of ‘empathy’ as central to genuine psychological
understanding and, accordingly, to psychopathology. Empathy is a specific form of perception
that is both similar to but importantly distinct from ordinary forms of (object-) perception. The
details of this mode of perception are, however, underdetermined by the text. I here explicate
what can be determined from the text, then employ two other, more developed theories of
empathy – those of Theodor Lipps, on the one hand, and phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and
Edith Stein, on the other – that continue to be influential from Jaspers time to our own, in order
to disambiguate the concept and flesh out its remaining details
Empathy
Jaspers distinguishes between (i) subjective experience, (ii) objective performances, (iii)
somatic accompaniments and (iv) meaningful objective phenomena. Respectively, these refer to
(i) first-personal experience, to be described by phenomenology, (ii) psychic performances,
which are conceived roughly as mental or intentional acts,1 such as apperception or memory, (iii)
bodily events that are in themselves psychologically meaningless and merely accompany psychic
performances and (iv) expressive behavior, i.e., actions that may only be understood through
considering the agent’s creative productions and relation to a meaningful world. These

According to Husserl, Franz Brentano discovered the intentional structure of the “mental,” though he did not fully
realize the significance of this discovery nor develop a systematic method of intentional analysis. Jaspers, however, was
familiar with Husserl’s (early) work, and can be understood as more explicitly appreciating these points. Jaspers did not,
however, typically engage in the intentional method all the way down to explicitly uncovering the modes of the
appearance of the other for the observing subject, e.g., the psychologist. That is, he was interested primarily in the
constitution of noema – what characterizes the observed phenomena in question as object – and did not typically push the
question of noesis.
1
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phenomena are interrelated, and in order for understanding to be truly psychological (according
to Jaspers), it cannot satisfy itself with mere description of individual states or causal
explanations of mental and physical acts, but must grasp meaningful phenomena. The way in
which a psychologist can grasp meaningful phenomena requires an act of empathy: “There has to
be an act of empathy, of understanding” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 55).
Jaspers does not explicitly define empathy. However, there are some consistent uses and
determinations throughout the text. As one of the earliest mentions of empathy within the work,
he writes “where we understand how certain thoughts rise from moods, wishes, or fears, we are
understanding the connections in the true psychological sense, that is by empathy (we understand
the speaker)” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 304). Beginning here, we can elucidate at least three aspects of
empathy that remain consistent throughout the text. First, empathy is, for Jaspers, psychological
understanding, i.e., understanding “in the true psychological sense.”2 Empathy is consistently
taken to be identical to or necessary for psychological understanding throughout the text (as can
be seen, for example, at Jaspers, 1997, p. 311, quoted below). This idea of necessity is consistent
with a number of theories, prevalent at Jaspers’ time as well as (in modified forms) our own, that
designate the fundamental act by which persons come to understand one another in a broad sense
as “empathy” (such as those theories of Lipps and Husserls, considered below).
Second, empathy involves an understanding not of psychological states or processes, i.e.,
“thoughts,” considered in isolation, but rather in the context of other states, such as “moods,
wishes, or fears.” Jaspers is interested, in part, in establishing the fundamental concepts of
psychology and psychopathology, and this involves a determination of the being of the
phenomena in question. For Jaspers, this determination is thoroughly phenomenological, in the

He continues: “Empathic understanding […] always leads directly into the psychic connection itself” (Jaspers, 1997, p.
304).
2
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sense that it must accurately describe the phenomena as lived by the subjects that undergo them.
Drawing on Wilhelm Dilthey as well as Husserl, Jaspers takes the experiential life of a given
person to be interpretable only as a whole; an individual experience can be adequately
understood only in its interconnections with others. Thus, though a description of particular
kinds of “thoughts” is desired, such a description can only be adequate to the subject’s lived
experience if it factors in the context out of which those thoughts arise. The closely related third
point is that empathy grounds a form of understanding that is directed to understanding the
person, rather than some abstract psychological entity divorced not only from its psychological
context but also from the context of a specific, individual, actual human personality and life.
Reinforcing these points, and allowing us to determine the conditions that make empathy
possible, Jaspers writes: “we can have no psychological understanding without empathy into the
content (symbols, forms, images, ideas) and without seeing the expression and sharing the
experienced phenomena” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 311). Empathy thus delivers insight into specific
content, which Jaspers takes to include symbols, forms, images and ideas. As a grasp of a
psychological context, empathy necessarily involves a certain structural awareness of the
experiential life of the other, but this is inseparable from an understanding of the specific
contents that concretely realize that structure. In our empathetic relationship to an individual
person, we understand how, for example, a specific anger arises from a specific fear, how anger
arises from fear for that person, etc. (Jaspers, 1997, p. 303). These kinds of understanding form
the basis of psychological theory, which then strives to abstract from any individual and
understand relationships between psychological kinds in general. This inseparability between
mental form and content – that every psychological act has its content and vice versa, and that
adequate description must consider them both in relation to one another as well as to other acts
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and content – is a product of Jaspers’ take-up of the fundamental insights of Dilthey and
Husserl’s development thereof.
Furthermore, expression and the sharing of experienced phenomena (or simply,
experience-sharing) are conditions of empathy. According to Jaspers, “we never can perceive the
psychic experiences of others in any direct fashion, as with physical phenomena […] we can
only make some kind of representation of them” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 55).3 What is given directly in
experience of the other is never their mental life, but only their expressive behavior. Ideally,
expression is given “first-hand” in a personal conversation or perceptual observation of the
person in question, though written word is also a form of expression and thus can also ground
psychological understanding. Expression is not mere behavior, i.e., movement, however; the
perception of bodily movements considered in isolation would be insufficient for empathy, as
these movements could not of themselves reveal the psychic context that empathetic
understanding requires. Following Dilthey, Jaspers conceives of expression as a psychophysical
unity. Behavior is grasped directly by perception, while the psychical correlate thereof is
understood by a kind of reference to ourselves. He writes:
Psychology traditionally takes on the task of bringing into consciousness material of which
we are unaware. Evidence for such insight has always rested on the fact that, circumstances
being favourable, other people could notice the same things, provided they had undergone the
same experiences. (Jaspers, 1997, p. 306)

It might be objected here that empathy, as “representational,” is accordingly not a kind of perception. I believe that we
are better off interpreting it as perception, and the reasons why will become clear when we consider Husserl and Stein’s
account of perception. To briefly rebut the objection, it is sufficient to note that perception always involves something
not given but rather “represented.” There remains an important difference between empathy and other forms of
perception, however, in that the psychological aspects of the other person could never be given directly (“primordially,”
in Husserl’s terms), whereas the absent but represented sides of spatio-temporal objects, in principle at least, always
could.
3
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Having had similar experiences as the person to be understood, a fact presumably to be verified
through self-description and analogy to one’s own expressive behavior, allows one to
contextualize the behavior directly perceived and thereby indirectly understand the psychical
experience of which the behavior is an expression.4 The sharing of experience between the
person to be understood and the would-be empathizer is thus constitutive of the meaningfulness
of expression – it is that through which behavior can be psychologically understood – and thus
experience-sharing limits psychological understanding. “We do not understand a person merely
by isolating out a number of such contents, but the degree to which the psychologist is at home
with them will limit and condition his psychological understanding” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 308).
Since experience-sharing limits empathy, Jaspers also takes culture to be relevant to
psychological understanding (Jaspers, 1997, p. 307). Those familiar experiences with which one
is “at home” depend, to considerable degree, on one’s culture.
Some examples. First, consider a case in which someone’s loved one has passed away.
You see them talking, smiling, and joking around as usual – as if nothing were wrong. Had you
yourself never lost a loved one, or perhaps even had you never lost a loved one and also behaved
similarly then, you may not understand at all why this person seems so content, if not outright
happy. You might assume that they didn’t much care for the deceased, or perhaps are in
complete denial. Yet, had you undergone a similar experience, or had someone else explained it
to you, or perhaps if you simply know this person very well (e.g., you know their priorities, how
they’ve dealt with other hardships, their general outlook, etc.), you might realize that this
behavior is a strategy for putting their friends at ease and for trying to counteract their own grief.
Second, consider the context of an academic conference. Someone outside of academia is

4

Husserl elaborates the indication of this similarity or sharing, as well as the mode of its possible verification.
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unlikely to view a raised arm with a single finger extended as a ‘follow-up’ question or comment
in distinction from a raised hand which, in that context, signifies a new question or comment. In
general, outside of a context in which a particular movement is accepted as an ‘expression of …,’
that same movement can take on an utterly distinct meaning or, perhaps, even none at all. These
examples illustrate, I hope, that the theory of expression with which Jaspers is operating is a
broadly structuralist one, in the sense that the meaningfulness of the behavior in question
depends on that behavior’s relations to other behaviors and psychical states, both belonging to
the subject in question as well as those that the interpreter (e.g., the psychologist) has
experienced for themselves.
To recap: For Jaspers, psychological understanding is grounded on empathy, which in
turn depends on the perception of expressive behavior and the sharing of experience. Like
object-perception, it depends on certain qualities being given to sensation, i.e., the physical
aspect of the expression considered as bodily movements. Unlike object-perception, however,
aspects of what empathy discloses are in principle un-perceivable and must instead be
“represented.” That is, I can never see the psychological experience of the other person, though I
could in principle see, for example, the backside of the mug I am holding, if only I were to turn it
around. It is in this way that my experience of myself and my experience of others is
fundamentally distinct, despite only being able to make sense of the latter by reference to the
former.
Psychopathology
According to Jaspers, the benefit of psychological understanding for psychopathology is
to bring certain experiences to awareness, that is, to allow the psychopathologist to represent
relevant psychological phenomena through empathy. In many cases, he claims, we can
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understand psychopathology phenomena as increases or diminutions of non-pathological
phenomena (such as can be represented by empathy), or as otherwise normal experiences
brought about by abnormal causes (theorized by empirical psychology) [or motivational
relations.] In the former case, we can have a legitimate form of understanding since the
difference between the experience of the other and my own is only a matter of degree. In the
latter, we couple understanding with explanation: I can understand the kind of state that the other
is in, and I can understand the context out of which it emerges, but I must explain the connection
between these in terms of an aberrant causality; the phenomena could be described as a familiar
state arising from unfamiliar causes, or familiar causes resulting in a different state – though still
a familiar one – than what we would ordinarily predict.
In certain cases, however, understanding is not possible at all (though causal explanation
might still be applicable). For example, in the case of “made phenomena,” present for some
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, e.g., thought insertion and delusions of bodily control, the
relevant psychological phenomena are “beyond empathy” and are in principle ununderstandable.
He writes:
The most profound distinction in psychic life seems to be that between what is meaningful
and allows empathy and what in its particular way is ununderstandable, ‘mad’ in the literal
sense, schizophrenic psychic life. (Jaspers, 1997, p. 577)
In the latter case, “we find changes of the most general kind for which we have no empathy but
which in some way we try to make comprehensible from an external point of view” (Jaspers,
1920, p. 88; translation mine).
If empathy is the foundation of psychological understanding, then we can understand this
ununderstandability, or incomprehensibility, in terms of the failure of empathy. Recalling that
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empathy involves a grasp of the psychological context out of which the target phenomenon
arises, Christoph Hoerl (2013) argues that empathy is undermined in the case of “made
phenomena” because such phenomena do not follow an established psycho-generative structure:
they appear as if from nowhere (to borrow an expression from Martin and Pacherie’s “Out of
Nowhere” (2013)). Since this structure is part of the proper object of empathy (precisely:
grasping this structure is a part of grasping the target phenomenon, which is incomprehensible
considered in isolation), if it is not possible to grasp this structure, then the target phenomenon
likewise cannot be understood. It is unclear to me, however, whether it is truly the case that made
phenomena cannot be understood in terms of their generation and placement within a
psychological context. Indeed, many delusions and hallucinations build on the contents of
experience and develop over time, and there is substantial literature on the ways that
schizophrenic experience, for instance, emerges out of certain experiences, such as childhood
trauma, the loss of a loved one, severe depression or anxiety, substance abuse, difficultly
adjusting to a foreign culture, and so on, and the ways that the sense of some pathological state
develops from meaningful experiences of the subject generally. Rather than creation ex nihilo,
such phenomena only appear as if ex nihilo, in the sense that they often, at least initially, appear
without expectation and, according to popular approaches, with either an altered or absent sense
of ownership or agency. They can be understood in context, just perhaps not at first, or not in
terms of an experientially unified subject of experience. This latter feature has earned
schizophrenia its characterization as “dissociative.”
But there are other reasons why such phenomena may be, in principle, incomprehensible
on a Jasperian approach. Jaspers claims that there are “phenomenological elements” that are
inaccessible to the non-pathological subject, or even to anyone but the individual who undergoes
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such experiences. He goes as far as to claim, plausibly in certain respects, that schizophrenic
persons typically do not understand the specific character of one another’s experiences any better
than do non-pathological observers, though there can be a kind of co-development of
symptomology such that contents of experience adhere to a general structure; for example, he
discusses the case of a family who co-create a common narrative through which to interpret their
delusions, and he suggests even that one’s situation within narrative practice can even induce
certain forms of schizophrenia like symptoms (e.g., the parents in his example seem to suffer
from schizophrenia, and their narrative practices of sense-making, report, and explanation shape
the way that their children perceive the world, such that they would not receive a diagnosis of
schizophrenia on their own or even if simply removed from the narrative context, but
nevertheless experience a kind of pseudo-schizophrenia due to their environment). In such cases,
involving fundamentally inaccessible phenomenological elements of the other’s experience, we
can interpret incomprehensibility as the lack of the experience-sharing necessary for an act of
empathy; the observer simply does not know what the other is going through, since they have not
experienced the relevant kind of phenomena themselves.
Furthermore, empathy requires the perception of expressive behavior, and behavior
counts as expressive when it resembles my own behavior, that is, when it is behavior that I
understand as expressive of certain experiential facts. If the experiential fact is unfamiliar to me,
that is, if it is an inaccessible “phenomenological element,” then it is at least plausible that I may
fail to understand any behavior that expresses this unfamiliar state. Behavior that expresses
ununderstandable psychical phenomena will either be familiar or not; if the latter, it will be
ununderstandable, if the former it will be misleading.5

Some of Laing’s early work, especially The Divided Self (1965) makes the claim that schizophrenic persons, for example,
purposefully mislead; their behavior is a kind of “act” put on to cope with their fundamental “ontological insecurity.” I
5
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We can thus understand Jaspers’ incomprehensibility claim, i.e., the claim that some
psychical phenomena are inaccessible to empathy and thus cannot by psychologically
understood, in terms of an undermining of the proper object of empathy (specifically an
undermining of the psychological context that is a constitutional part of the phenomena to be
understood), or in terms of unfamiliar experience or expression. If one does not participate in the
forms of experience and bodily movement that pertain to the other, or if one at least has not
cultivated an understanding of these forms by experiencing certain descriptions that put one in
such a state as to be able to understand – perhaps an “as-if” state, so to speak – then
psychological understanding will not be possible.
Deficit Modeling
The only recourse to the failure of empathy in the face of radical incomprehensibility,
according to Jaspers, is to negatively circumscribe the target phenomena, understanding them
indirectly “by saying what they are not” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 577). Following Louis A. Sass (2014),
I call this approach “deficit modeling.” Deficit modeling represents the limits of psychological
understanding, and is, for a Jasperian approach, the psychologist’s only available method in the
face of difference, i.e., in the absence of the similarities that found psychological understanding.
It takes a number of forms in the literature: the target phenomenon may be described as
dissimilar from familiar phenomena in a specific way characterized by some kind of lack or
absence relative to ordinary experience, or as resulting from some deficient or malfunctioning
psychological process (e.g., the literature on “cognitive deficits” or “deficits in reason” as
making sense of pathology phenomena), or as reflecting present but “underdeveloped”
mechanisms, or simply as not some other familiar phenomenon. It is this latter that Jaspers seems

do not endorse this position, but there is a kernel of truth to it: we all “dress up” our actions, or “act” in the theatric
sense, from time to time and for various purposes, however innocent or otherwise they may be.
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to explicitly suggest, but he makes use of these other forms throughout his work, and many
contemporary phenomenological approaches to psychopathology do the same.
It must be noted that mechanistic approaches, at least for Jaspers, can offer a form of
explanation of the target phenomenon, but not understanding: they present the phenomenon in
terms of an external causality that, while underlying psychological phenomena as a necessary,
naturalistic referent, is in itself psychologically meaningless and inapplicable to understanding
the kinds of connections exemplified by psychological relations (this is one form of
circumscription from “an external point of view,” referenced above). At the level of
understanding, deficit models cannot offer a positive understanding of phenomena: they never
say what the phenomenon is or even what it is like (a typical goal for the phenomenologist), but
only what it is not.6
This absence of positivity is not only epistemologically limited (i.e., the deficit model
provides only a negative circumscription), but also risks internalizing deficits to the person in
question. It risks characterizing persons themselves as deficient. While not necessarily incorrect
in all cases, the Jasperian system cannot legitimate such a move across difference: the person
taken to be deficient in some psychologically meaningful way is still a form of understanding
and thus presupposes empathy; where empathy fails, such a characterization cannot be made.
Despite being illicit, this tactic is a common one. Ironically, the most obvious example deals with
deficits of empathy, and it is here that we can most clearly see the limitations and dangers of the
method.
Numerous scientific and philosophical theorists, including Jaspers (see, as a small
sample, Zahavi (2014), Fuchs and Koch (2014), Shah et. al. (2019)), attribute a failure of

This has implications for causal explanation. If we cannot determine the sense of the phenomenon, cannot say what it
is, this will impact our ability to discover “its” causes and effects.
6
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empathy to the subject of certain forms of psychopathological experience. For Jaspers, such a
deficit of empathy is the primary indication of the presence of pathology in general. Accordingly,
he applies such a deficit to a variety of pathological conditions. In certain cases, the deficits are
posited in terms of causal mechanism, and in others in terms of diminutions of familiar
phenomena. In both cases, however, there is still enough similarity between the psychologist and
their patient that some positive understanding can be grasped by empathy. This approach, when
the deficit is precisely of the subject’s capacity to empathize, indicates an asymmetry: the
psychologist can understand (empathize with) the person who cannot understand (empathize
with) the psychologist, and does so by attributing some deficiency to that person. A pure deficit
method – one according to which all we can do is negatively circumscribe the phenomena in
question – is typically reserved for certain experiences associated with schizophrenia, such as
“made phenomena.” In this case, nothing positive can be said of the other and even the
attribution of a deficient capacity for empathy must be interpreted not as psychological
understanding but as a kind of explanation.
In contemporary work, autistic and schizophrenic persons, for example, are often
described as lacking (or otherwise experiencing difficulty with) ordinary empathetic perception.
Such a description is a particular instantiation of the deficit approach in which the deficit in
question is precisely empathy, seen by Jaspers to undergird psychological understanding in
general, and this deficit is taken to belong to the subject in question. One consequence of this
view, from a Jasperian perspective, would be that schizophrenic or, for instance, autistic
individuals, would have a diminished aptitude for psychological understanding. There is some
tension here, since it would seem that such a person would – unlike the struggling psychologist –
be familiar with certain kinds of experience that would be necessary for empathy: would not the
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autistic person be in a better position, familiar as she may be with the relevant phenomena, to
empathize with and thus to understand autism than a non-pathological psychologist?7 In any
case, I am not sure there is support for such a claim, that autistic or schizophrenic persons are
less capable of psychological understanding, and if this is not the case then we must question
either Jaspers’ view of empathy as necessary for psychological understanding, or the attribution
of such a deficit to the other. I think there are independent reasons for rejecting both.
A number of explanations are available for the appearance of deficient empathy. Recall
that empathy, for Jaspers, is grounded on the perception of expressive behavior as well as a
sharing of relevant experience. There are at least two ways that we can express an unfounding of
empathy in cases of schizophrenia and autism. The first involves a kind of perceptual distortion.
Martin and Pacherie (2013), among others, articulate that a common schizophrenic difficulty in
object recognition can be understood in terms of shifting sensational boundaries, e.g., certain
features of the visual field are disunified, not smoothly integrated, and do not maintain stable,
coherent relations as to give rise to any definite object (at least not in the “normal” way).
Increasingly, autism is thought to involve an attentional component, such that some aspects of
the environment are attended to to a much lesser degree than is normal, such as facial features
and movements.8 Empathy relies on a certain perceptual territorialization, according to which the
expressive movements of the other are perceived as unified spatiotemporal, psycho-physical acts.
Yet, if either unification or attention are disrupted, they may not appear this way. A disruption to
the perception of expressive behavior would unfound the capacity for empathy, which

Jaspers’ treatment of the family that co-narrates a shared delusion may indicate that he does at least endorse the claim
that the pathological person is in no better position to understand the non-pathological, despite apparent familiarity.
7

See, for a sample of the autism eye-tracking literature, Dapretto et. al. (2006), Falck-Ytter et. al. (2013), Jones & Kin
(2013), Klin et. al. (2002), Riby & Hancock (2009), Sterling et. al. (2008), and Takarae et. al. (2004).
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presupposes such perception. Importantly, such an explanation does not posit a disruption of a
sense of self as central to deficient empathetic capabilities but does entail an altered perceptual
relationship with one’s environment.
In Jasperian fashion, we began with a kind of intuition that revealed a certain
incomprehensibility. The incomprehensibility is made sense of (negatively) by a deficit model,
that is, ‘the other is like me except without [empathy].’ An explanation is then given to make
sense of this deficit. But, the appearance of deficient empathy could be explained in entirely
different terms. I offer two relational approaches that attribute this appearance to certain relations
between individuals, rather than internalizing them to individuals.
Empathy is made possible by perception of expressive behavior and shared experience. If
two persons do not share both expressive practices and relevant experience, then they will be
unable to understand each other, at least relative to those expressions and experiences that they
do not share. In psychopathology cases in which we are inclined to posit some “inaccessible
phenomenological element,” then empathy is undermined not in an individual but between the
two. The psychologist does not empathize with their patient and vice versa. If empathy has to do
with matching – of both experience and expressive behavior – then it is reciprocal: if I can
empathize with you then, at least in principle, you could empathize with me. The psychologist,
as normal – that is, as ordinarily being able to empathize with most people within his culture, and
even with most patients insofar as their experiences diverge from his own only by degree or in
terms of abnormal causal relations – attributes this deficient empathy to the abnormal person, the
person whom he can only conceive, if he reads his Jaspers, by positing such a deficit. ‘The other
is like me, like the normal person, but without […],’ and this makes sense of the failure of
empathy that actually bottoms out in the relationship between these two, in their difference that
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cannot, for the Jasperian, be understood positively, by indexing it to the person thus negatively
circumscribed.9 This is not to say that the existence of difference is denied, but only that persons
cannot be understood by empathy across difference and, as I take to be equivalent, that the
difference itself cannot be understood on a Jasperian account as what it is but only as what it is
not. But the key point is that the difference in question is relational: it is not something that
inheres in one individual but is rather a discrepancy between the person to be understood and the
would-be understander. In the face of this discrepancy, to understand the other by deficit violates
the ununderstandability claim, and more importantly is unfounded: one only knows that oneself
and the other are dissimilar, and it is just as likely that the psychologist, and not the patient, is, in
some meaningful way, deficient. It is not clear, however, that all difference, whether it can be
conceived with any specificity, must be conceived as deficit.
Furthermore, the perception of expressive behavior does not only depend on one’s
individual capabilities but is inherently intersubjective and normative: without a shared context
to grant movements with significance, bodily motion is merely mechanical. That is, expressive
movements gain their significance precisely as expression, and thus as meaningful phenomena,
by their relation to a context in which those movements count as expressions. This presupposes
inclusion in or familiarity with shared practices. I remind the reader of the role of culture in
empathy, and of the examples of the death of a loved one and the conference question. Persons
with mental illness are typically excluded, at least within the American context, from various
practices and communities, and sometimes are placed within isolated communities in the form of
institutions such as the asylum, the ward, the psychiatric hospital. Outside of a shared context, it
is no wonder why they may seem unable to empathize, but the point must also be made of the
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This indexing might even be seen as the circumscription.
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psychologist. If the psychologist and patient do not share practices, which can be the result of
institutional forces as well as novel behaviors produced to navigate a world experienced
“abnormally,” then empathy fails, and each figure will be unable to empathize with the other:
what becomes motivation for a deficit model for the psychologist becomes the deficit for the
patient. Additionally, the enterprises of psychology and psychopathology generate theory-laden
significances all their own, familiarity with which cannot be reasonably expected of a nonspecialist, but which are taken with the psychologist to the clinical meeting. (Furthermore, as
suggested above, the attribution of deficient empathetic capabilities excludes one from the
community of psychologists: psychological understanding depends on it).
It may be true that certain forms of experience or life can genuinely involve an
appearance of deficient empathetic capabilities, but the deficiency cannot be understood in
individualistic terms; it is inherently relational, undergirded by experience sharing and inclusion
and exclusion in communal practices. To the extent that such a deficiency is taken to be
problematic (as the term “deficit” often suggests), intervention must accordingly take place at the
level of communities and social practices, and not (at least primarily or exclusively) at that of the
individual.
It is admitted by Jaspers that the deficit method does not produce understanding, but only
a negative circumscription, and that the method is only negative, i.e., it attempts to say what
some phenomenon is not, but never what it is, or is like. Psychopathologists do not often content
themselves with such an approach. According to Sass (2014, p. 126),
There are many psychiatrists whose adoption (often un-thinking) of a pure-deficit model and
neurobiological reductionism places them in a similar camp [to those who ‘place
schizophrenia beyond the pale of the comprehensible’]. But many subsequent
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psychopathologists who have thought about these issues (Henriksen in press; Sass 2003,
2004a) are disinclined to accept the radical nature of Jaspers’ distinction [between
understandable and ununderstandable], or his view about schizophrenia in particular.
Indeed, very few contemporary thinkers of cognitive science, psychiatry, psychology, etc.,
especially of philosophical bend, would satisfy themselves by thinking of their work as ‘mere,
psychologically meaningless explanation’ that never tells us what the phenomena in question are
but only what they are not. The unacceptability of a strictly negative epistemology is even more
intense for the phenomenological thinkers, who strive to produce a positive description of their
target phenomena; like Hume, phenomenologists broadly agree that if you cannot show me the
intuition that warrants a representation, then that representation is literally non-sense.
We can see this refusal to adhere to the negative, a refusal which concretely transgresses
the legitimate bounds of deficit modeling while nevertheless being founded in it, at play in much
contemporary work. For example, Matthew Ratcliffe, Thomas Fuchs, Joel Krueger, and JeanRemy Martin and Elizabeth Pacherie do not content themselves with purely negative
descriptions: they attempt to understand what some phenomenon is. The dominant method
begins by positing a deficit, then tracing it through a conceptual system to grasp the positive
difference such a deficit would make for the remainder of mental life. For example, Ratcliffe
(2013; 2015) argues that the lack of a sense of possibility and change in major depression results
in, or partly constitutes, a corporealization of the body. But Jaspers cannot ground this method:
where we understand in the true psychological sense, we understand by empathy; where we do
not understand by empathy, we can only negatively circumscribe, saying what something is not.
What, then, can ground the positive signification demanded by contemporary phenomenological
psychopathology? What is this conceptual system through which I can seemingly understand the
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other across difference? I take my hint to this question from the fact that contemporary
psychopathologists of various camps, but especially those operating within a phenomenological
approach, often take empathy as either the fundamental relation to the other or at least as
methodologically primary: we must interact with and observe the other, take their testimony
seriously, interpret their behavior, and attempt to understand the phenomenon, as what it is, in
terms of the familiar.
Transcendental Phenomenology
In contemporary philosophy of cognitive science and psychopathology, the term
“empathy” is conceived differently by at least two major approaches: simulation theory and
phenomenology. These conceptions of empathy are distinct and, ultimately, incompatible,
though they are sometimes conflated. Jaspers is taken to be a significant, even crucial figure by
both camps. I argue that Jaspers’ approach to empathy is best understood in its relation to the
work of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein on the topic. Though Jaspers is traditionally understood
as establishing “phenomenological” psychopathology, in the sense that it is concerned with the
lived experience of the subject to be understood, the ways in which his views relate to canonical
“Phenomenologists” is debated. Empathy is a crucial notion through which we can articulate one
such relationship but, more importantly, transcendental phenomenology – specifically considered
from the perspective of empathy and psychopathology, and in its claim to discover necessary
structures of experience – allows us to augment Jaspers’ proposed “deficit method” and better
understand and justify many contemporary strategies in the field.
However, before developing these connections between Jaspers and transcendental
phenomenology (viz. Husserl and Stein), I should first consider the alternative. I return to the
former task in the following section. Contemporary simulation theory approaches to
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psychopathology (see Gallese et. al., 1996; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Goldman, 1995; Gordon,
1995a-c & 1996; Heal, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1998, & 2005) make use of ‘empathy’ and
specifically relate the concept to Jaspers. Simulationist approaches trace their roots at least as far
back as a contemporary of Jaspers, Theodor Lipps (1851-1914), whose theory of empathy was
the prevailing one at the time that General Psychopathology was first published (1913). Indeed,
Edith Stein’s seminal Zum Problem der Einfühlung [On the Problem of Empathy] did not appear
until three years later, in 1916, and though Husserl references empathy in several senses and for
a variety of purposes throughout his work, his first fairly close account was not published until,
arguably, 1931, with the Méditations cartésiennes [Cartesian Meditations]. These considerations
make it plausible to assume that Jaspers’ notion is an heir to Lipps’, but this is a mistake.
Theodor Lipps, and Simulationism
Theodor Lipps conceived of empathy [Einfühlung :: feeling-into] as a kind of projection
of oneself onto (or into) the other. Lipps’ account is, like Jaspers’, rooted in expression.
According to Dan Zahavi, Lipps “emphasizes the role of expression and argues that gestures and
expressions manifest our emotional states, and that the relation between the expression and what
is expressed is special and unique, and quite different from, say, the way smoke represents fire”
(Zahavi, 2010, p. 288). Furthermore,
Lipps argues that when I see a foreign gesture of expression, I have a tendency to reproduce
it, and that this tendency also evokes the feeling normally associated with the expression. It is
this feeling which is then attributed to the other through projection. It is projected into or onto
the other’s perceived gesture, thereby allowing for a form of interpersonal understanding.
(Zahavi, 2010, p. 288; italics mine)
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In this regard, Lipps’ approach to empathy is continuous with contemporary simulationist theory
and, insofar as empathy essentially references expressive behavior as well as one’s own
experiential life, it might also seem closely aligned with Jaspers’ notion.
However, we can elucidate several discrepancies between the two formulations, as
presented here. First, Lipps’ conception of empathy specifically focuses on emotions and
emotional content; Jaspers’ is broader in this respect, extending to “thought,” “moods,” etc.
Second, Jaspers’ account of empathy involves a grasp of the psychological context out which the
phenomena to be understood emerges for the subject empathized with. For Lipps, however, I
“instinctively” (Zahavi, 2010, p. 288) reproduce the other’s bodily movement, this generates a
feeling in me, and I project my feeling onto the other. In this case, the other’s expression is
considered only as a bodily movement (an “objective performance,” perhaps) that has a causal
effect on me, and the only psychological framework involved in the process is my own. Not only
might my own psychological context differ from someone else’s, even granting that, at a given
time, I and the other experience the “same kind” of phenomena (that is, my anger and someone
else’s anger might differ radically in terms of psychological context while nevertheless both
counting as ‘anger’), I nevertheless needn’t grasp or otherwise understand even my own
psychological context: I simply live a psychological state or process, generated within a
framework that may remain obscure to me, and impose that individual state or process onto the
other. Lipps’ empathy is thus severed from the psychological context of the other in at least one
way relevant to Jaspers’ conception. Third, relatedly, the target of Lipps’ conception of empathy
is a particular emotional state of the other: what I understand is their current emotion. For
Jaspers, however, what we understand by empathy is the other person, considered as a whole.
Fourth, empathy on Lipps’ conception amounts to what might instead be called “sympathy”
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(same-feeling): I actually undergo the emotion that I project onto the other. There is thus a kind
of matching between the experience of the empathizer and the person empathized with. For
Jaspers, however, there is no such requirement: the empathizer need only have had, at some point
in time, a similar experience.10 It is certainly not the case, for Jaspers, that empathy is based on a
motor response that reproduces in me, at the very time of the act, the feeling that is to be
(subsequently) projected onto the other.11
Phenomenological Empathy: Husserl and Stein
Jaspers’ notion of empathy is importantly distinct from Lipps’ and, for many (typically,
all) of the same reasons, contemporary simulationist formulations. On the other hand, it is
closely related to Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein’s account, which agrees with Jaspers’ on
those points just presented. Historically speaking, this similarity can only be loosely attributed to
any direct influence that Husserl and Stein may have had on Jaspers.12 More plausibly, the
connection is owing to the fact that all three figures were influenced by the work of Wilhelm
Dilthey and Max Weber, the latter of which Husserl influenced in turn (Muse, 1981).13 In any

Despite the quote (Jaspers, 1997, p. 306) used to establish this point on page 4 above, it is sometimes unclear whether
one has to have actually undergone a similar experience themselves, or rather if they need only have been familiarized
with it in a looser sense. Jaspers asserts that the practicing psychologist must study literature and poetry, and that doing
so builds the kind of familiarity with experiences in a way useful for developing their craft. An analysis of the kind of
familiarity gained by such study would be necessary for further disambiguating the point, but such an analysis is not
forthcoming in Jaspers. I thus stand by the earlier quote and suppose, literally and naïvely, that one must have “had
undergone the same experiences” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 306).
10

In his “Phenomenological Approach to Psychopathology” (1968, originally 1912), Jaspers seemingly defined empathy
similarly to Lipps: “Subjective symptoms cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, but have to be grasped by
transferring oneself, so to say, into the other individual’s psyche; that is, by empathy.” Yet, I do not believe this
definition remains consistent even within this article, and it is no longer operative by the time on General Psychopathology,
only a year later. Indeed, prior to this definition, he counts Lipps as a phenomenological predecessor to Husserl, and so
it is arguable that at this time already Jaspers’ conception of empathy is somewhat confused between Lipps and Husserl,
though informed by both.
11

Jaspers does indeed cite Husserl as the source of his “phenomenological” method, but, again, neither Husserl nor
Stein had developed a nuanced theory of empathy at the time that General Psychopathology was published.
12

Indeed, Weber’s use of Verstehen to refer to a kind of interpretative or communal sense making, often called both
“understanding” as well as “empathy” can help explain the close connection between the two concepts in Jaspers.
13

33

case, the work of Husserl and Stein can be seen as a development of the concept of empathy that
is consistent with Jaspers and has implications for his view and method. Not only that, but many
approaches in contemporary psychopathology and philosophy of psychology and cognitive
science cite both Jaspers and Husserl (or some figure who, broadly, develops the latter’s
approach, e.g., Heidegger) as major influences.
The phenomenological notion of empathy is best worked out by Edith Stein and Edmund
Husserl.14 The former devotes the entirety of her Zum Problem der Einfühlung [On the Problem
of Empathy] to developing the concept in terms of perception, individuation, and expression. She
also provides a discussion of other senses of ‘empathy,’ including that of Theodor Lipps and
Max Scheler, both of whom Stein and Husserl alike are critical of. Husserl is largely in
agreement with Stein’s account of empathy, though they arguably (and depending on where you
look in Husserl) disagree at several points, including the various forms or “levels” of perceiving
foreign consciousness, what each level requires, and the proper objects of certain forms of
empathetic perception. For my purposes, the theory of empathy I will make use of is drawn
primarily from Stein’s On the Problem of Empathy and Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (as well
as selections from the 1923/24 lectures, published in the Husserl, 2019 (First Philosophy), which
preceded the Meditations in which they are included in a modified form). Husserl’s work in The
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology presents a somewhat different

Dan Zahavi carefully presents a number of phenomenological approaches to empathy, including Husserl and Stein’s,
in multiple places. For some examples, see his articles “Empathy, Embodiment, and Interpersonal Understanding: From
Lipps to Schutz” (2010) and “Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity” (2001), as well as
his book Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (2014). He correctly notes that there is no one approach
to empathy shared by the phenomenologists, though all accounts – he thinks – share certain features. For my purposes
here, Husserl and Stein develop the most relevant approach. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty displace the significance of
empathy, Levinas presents a critique of empathy that I think is underappreciated by Zahavi and the literature in general
(this comes into play in the following chapter), and Scheler, Sartre, and Schutz (others that Zahavi focuses on) will not
be discussed in any detail here. While Zahavi’s work represents, amongst other things, an invaluable resource for anyone
attempting to understand phenomenological notions of empathy, and while I am personally indebted to his work in this
way, I have some different interpretations than does Zahavi and, in any case, prefer to anchor the current discussion
directly in the texts and my own interpretation to the greatest extent possible.
14
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picture than these earlier works and becomes quite important in view Heidegger’s influence on
Husserl, and so I will explicate certain insights from The Crisis where appropriate. Since Stein
and Husserl are largely in agreement regarding empathy, at least until somewhere between the
Meditations and The Crisis, I will treat their accounts as unitary, except where noted.
Whereas Jaspers is primarily interested in grounding our psychological understanding of
others, the Phenomenologists prioritize intersubjectivity more broadly, asking how it is that we
can be and actually are related to others, and how we can understand (or fail to understand)
others at all. The answers to these questions have important implications for phenomenology in
general, particularly for Husserl. Attempting to reformulate the aims and methods of psychology
through Franz Brentano’s “discovery” of intentionality, Husserl maintains that “it would of
course be pointless to treat the positive science of intentional psychology and transcendental
phenomenology separately” (1931, p. 147).15 He notes that psychology and transcendental
phenomenology have the same content: the psychological ego and the transcendental ego are one
and the same. Thus, the insights provided by transcendental phenomenology should have direct
relevance to the significance and practice of psychology. Indeed, it is almost trivial to suppose
that an account of how we can understand others at all will be relevant to the question of a
specifically psychological understanding of others.
According to Stein, empathy “is a kind of act of perceiving sui generis,” “the experience
of foreign consciousness in general” (Stein, 1989, p. 11). By sui generis, Stein and Husserl mean
that such a perception is a form of intentionality irreducible to other acts, such as memory or
imagination. However, Stein and Husserl do appeal to the nature of memory and imagination to
elucidate the nature of empathy. In remembering joy, for instance, Stein writes:
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This claim and related also appear in Husserl’s Crisis (1970) and Encyclopedia Britannica article(s) Phenomenology (1997)
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the “I” as the subject of the act of remembering, in this act of representation, can look back at
the past joy. Then the past joy is the intentional object of the “I,” its subject being with and in
the “I” of the past. Thus the present “I” and the past “I” face each other as subject and object.
(Stein, 1989, p. 8)
Within the structure of the act of memory, there is a distinction between the “I” that remembers
and the “I” being remembered, but these are both experienced with a “consciousness of
sameness,” that is, as both being me. This is not true in the case of empathy: “The subject of the
empathized experience, however, is not the subject empathizing, but another” (Stein, 1989, p.
10). This distinction between self and other is constitutive of empathic intentionality: were the
“I” empathized-with experienced as a duplication of myself – as a modified but nonetheless same
‘me’ – then empathy would no longer be an experience of foreign consciousness; rather, it would
be a matter of projecting ourselves into the perceptually present body of the other and in such a
case we would never be able to experience anyone else irreducible to ourselves. (This forms a
foundational part of the phenomenological critique of Lipps).
At its most basic level, empathy is an experience of the other person as a subjective
perspective on the world – as a site of sensation and animation – similar to but distinct from me.
The empathetic act itself is achieved by associative and identifying syntheses, as well as what
Husserl calls “bodily coupling” and “transfer of sense.” We experience our own expressive
movements as psychophysical unities, such that bodily movement and mental life, in the form of
intentions, effort, moods, etc., are inseparably associated. That is, I am never originally given my
own body as a mere body, either in its movements or as an entity. My movements are not given
as mere mechanical motions but, instead, as actions; my body is no mere physical object like any
other but a necessary aspect of lived experience and a point of orientation for and reception of all

36

my sensible experience. When I swing my arm, the movements are inseparable from my
sensations, intentions, thoughts, concerns, what I know, what I want, etc. For example, I swing a
hammer because I want to build, or to destroy, because I know the hammer is the tool for the job,
because I can lift the hammer and see the nail, the wood, and doing so involves a sensation of my
body as moving, a feeling of the heft of the hammer, the contraction of muscle, etc. not as
objective phenomena observed like any other but rather as given to me directly. The swing
becomes constituted as a psychophysical phenomenon: it consists of visible movements but also
intentional states that, in my own case, I live through. When I witness the expressive behavior of
someone else – when I see them swing a hammer – I directly perceive only the physical aspects
of the act, the visible movements. However, this is an act like mine – a psychophysical act – and
their body, as performing such an act, is perceived as a body like mine. As like mine, our bodies
are “coupled” – they are distinct instances of the same kind, and as being of the same kind, there
occurs a “transfer of sense” at the level of perception, informing the what that is perceived: the
expressive behavior of the other, as expressive behavior (like mine), is perceived as a
psychophysical unity, though I can only perceive one aspect thereof. This already grounds the
sense of the other as a source of animation, i.e., of action rather than mere movement.16
What separates empathy from other forms of perception, and also from projection in
Lipps’ sense (which involves, first, a kind of sympathy), is that the mental correlates of the
expressive behavior of someone else can never be given to me in the same way as those of my

In Cartesian Meditations (1931, pp. 117-120), Husserl also argues for the constitution of the sense of the other as a locus
of sensation and animation in the following, somewhat convoluted, way: We know from our own experience that,
though I can conceive of my own action as if I occupied a different space than I currently do, I cannot actually occupy
two distinct spaces simultaneously. When I actually see the expressive movement of a body like mine somewhere other
than in the space that my body occupies, then it must be concluded that it is not my body but the body of an other. This
body is something seen, and specifically something seen that is like my own body in form and action, and so it is known
as my own body, but different – as an “alter ego” – as a locus of sensation and animation, like me, but distinct from me.
It is this perception that grounds the category of “man,” and indeed Husserl refers to the body of the other as the first
body, and the other as the first man.
16
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own; mine are presented to me as lived through, but those of the other are appresented as
belonging constitutively to their expressions. According to Husserl, the experience of the other in
empathy is “direct,” in that the other is given to me as actually present “in the flesh.” However,
empathy never gives the experiential life of the other primordially, in the sense of being given in
the same way as my own. As noted, this is not a failure of empathy: the non-primordiality of the
givenness of the other is what distinguishes them from me, and thus what makes empathy an
experience of the other and not just a projection of myself. It is an essential feature of empathy.
We can here note and resolve an apparent tension between Jaspers and the
phenomenologists. According to Jaspers, empathy is representational and indirect, whereas for
the phenomenologists it is direct but non-primordial.17 Despite their terminology, we can see that
“direct” and “representation” have different meanings for these thinkers: by representational,
Jaspers means not presented to me, whereas for Husserl the term means not given at all. Jaspers
would consider appresentation a form of representation, while Husserl would not. By “direct,”
Jaspers means that something is given to me immediately, whereas for Husserl “direct” means
given as here, “in the flesh.” Both agree that empathy is a mediate mode of awareness, but for
Husserl it is nevertheless direct. We can thus correspond Jaspers’ “direct” with Husserl’s
“primordial,” and Husserl’s appresentation is, in Jaspers’ terminology, a form of representation.
(Thus, the way that empathy is “direct” for Husserl, namely that empathy appresents the states of
the other, would qualify empathy as “representational” for Jaspers.) For both, our experience of
the other is distinct from our experience of ourselves: it is non-primordial, we do not experience
their psychological states as we do our own; it is mediate, it requires a relation between the

The act itself is primordial – I live through the act of empathy; it is the content, i.e., the experiential life of the other,
that is presented to me non-primordially.
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behavior of the other and our own psychological states bridged by perception and our own
expressive acts.
Furthermore, the non-primordiality of the content of empathy grounds our sense of the
world as the objective world. Were it not for empathy, we would be in the situation of what may
be called being-alone, solipsistic being specified only partly by the “reduction to the sphere of
ownness” articulated in Cartesian Meditations.18 Without an awareness of others, our experience
of the world is founded on what is given by sensation, and objects take the form of that which
exceeds any particular intentionality of my own. My mug, for instance, exceeds my viewing it
from this angle… or this one… or this one… With my experience of the other, however (i.e.,
empathy), the object becomes understood as exceeding all my actual or possible perspectives on
it. It is something available for some other ego, i.e., for a foreign consciousness irreducible to
me.
It is crucial that this “reduction” is an abstraction from lived experience; an all-toocommon mis-interpretation of the Cartesian Meditations takes Husserl to claim that we are at
first, or at least fundamentally, before becoming explicitly aware of particular concrete others, in
the situation of being-alone, and that the world must then somehow be constructed from
resources entirely my own. Instead, the world that we live in is already suffused by the other, by
objects and by practices that already presuppose intersubjectivity. The “reduction” is meant to
begin with this world and then, by “bracketing,” abstract to that which is only given to me
primordially, that is, originally in sensation, and to show that doing so would not negate the
possibility of the experience of the other ordinarily taken for granted. The goal is not show that

Being-alone can only ever be partly explicated because, in my understanding, the situation is itself incoherent. Even
within the sphere of ownness, according to Husserl, we experience others; we simply bracket (or “parenthesize”) the
constitutional effects of intentionalities directed at other egos for our most fundamental strata of experience – nature as
given by sensation – while we nevertheless must acknowledge such intentionalities as part of what is given to us.
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either the world or the other, nor even their appearances as constituted for me, are contained in or
constructed by myself, but rather to demonstrate that phenomenological self-reflection, and the
insights derived from this practice, are not committed to solipsism.19
To sum up the phenomenological notion of empathy here presented, and particularly in
relation to Jaspers: it is consciousness of the other, conceived of as a mediate form of perception,
based on the perception of expressive behavior, bodily coupling (i.e., perception as of a body like
mine, in its form and action), and a transfer of sense from the unified nexus of my psychophysical reality to the body of the other. That is, I see the movements of the other as one aspect
of a psycho-physical unity, just as are my own movements; I perceive their expressions as the
same type of thing as mine, i.e., expressions of a mental life, similar to but distinct from my own.
This all agrees with Jaspers’ notion, and so I now opt to use them interchangeably, except where
some difference becomes salient in which case it will be noted and considered.
Transcendental Structures and Positivity
My purpose has been to read Jaspers as broadly consistent with phenomenology as
developed by Husserl and Stein, specifically regarding the notion of empathy crucial to the
former’s proposed method of psychology and psychopathology. Where Jaspers and these
phenomenologists seemingly diverge is that the former is concerned with an empirical, scientific
method, while the phenomenologists first and foremost are concerned with transcendental
philosophy (Wiggins & Schwartz, 2013, p. 25).20 We saw above that a shortcoming of Jaspers’

Robert W. Jordan provides a nuanced discussion on this topic in his “On Not Living in the Primordial World,”
presented at a number of conferences and reserved for an anthology that was never released. In this work, he also
illustrates that the aforementioned interpretation is based on flaws in the work, but that “Husserl himself corrected the
worst of them in manuscripts written only five to six months after the book manuscript was given to French translators.
These were published in Husserliana XV (1973) some fourteen years ago.”
19

Remember, however, that Husserl takes psychology and phenomenology to be closely related, as sharing subject
matter, and so believes the insights of transcendental phenomenology will be able to be taken up by psychology. The
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approach is that, where empathy fails, we are limited to a purely negative understanding of the
phenomena that interest us.21 Transcendental Phenomenology, however, offers us a way to
augment an empathy based approach so as to provide deficit models with a positive significance
or meaning. This is due to Transcendental Phenomenology’s discovery of ‘necessary’ or
‘invariant structures of subjectivity.’
Transcendental Phenomenology claims to discover necessary structures of subjectivity.
For instance, all experience is structured by temporality, and empirical intuition is always given
in accordance with a horizon of possibilities. While these are both necessary structures of
subjectivity, they are not of the same level: the former founds the latter, as the open-ended future
undergirds possibility. These structures are necessary essentially. That is, they are conceived
through a kind of eidetic reduction and variation that aims to uncover eide, or essences, by
abstracting from individual concrete phenomena to a kind of ideal type. As an
oversimplification, the method involves an imaginative variation of features of some
phenomenon, in an attempt to understand what could be different (what could vary) while the
phenomenon nevertheless remains of the same type (for some given type of interest), and,
crucially, what could not vary without a fundamental change in kind. That is, the method
attempts to discover essential invariants. For example, were the notes of a melody to occur not in
succession but simultaneously, they would no longer count as a melody but instead as a chord. It
is essential to a melody, then, that notes follow one another over time rather than occurring all at
once. It is not essential, however, that the notes follow one another in a specific rhythm, or in a
certain order, or that the melody be produced on one instrument rather than another. These latter

two fields are not utterly distinct, however Husserl awards priority to the former whereas Jaspers focuses nearly, if not
entirely, on the latter.
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features are inessential to melody, whereas the former – that the notes unfold sequentially – is
essential. The method of eidetic reduction and variation allows Husserl to make the claim that
consciousness is essentially, i.e., necessarily or invariably temporal, structured by a horizon of
possibilities, and so on.
While Husserl does offer other derivations of these structures, the method of eidetic
reduction and (imaginative) variation offers us the clearest understanding of the sense in which
these structures are meant to be “necessary,” and, importantly for my purposes here, these
methods are frequently taken up in contemporary phenomenological psychopathology, especially
when it comes to apparent cases of radical difference. First, the sense in which these structures
are necessary is that they are necessary for the phenomenon in question to count as the type of
thing it is. For something to count as consciousness, for example, it must be temporally
structured. For something to count as empirical intuition, there must be a reference to a horizon
of possibilities. Husserl does allow, however, negative reference: a particular intuition may lack
a horizon of possibilities, but at that point it counts as a different or abnormal type of
phenomenon, something to be understood precisely by reference to this lack relative to normal
experience. There is thus reference here to not only a kind of essential, ideal type and identity,
but also to similarity in normative and non-normative senses: the reflecting phenomenologist
performs a reduction and variation on his own experiences (that is, she is self-reflecting),
discovers a universal type, and imports this to the sense of the phenomenon at a constitutional
level: the phenomenon is thus-and-so, universally, based on a specific form of self-reflection.
One’s own experience is thus taken as the norm against which to test variations. But, because of
the method, the findings are taken to exceed one’s own subjectivity: they identify a universal
type that any experience, no matter who’s, must conform to if it is to count as the same type of
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thing that I discover for myself. There is a related and (at least seemingly) richer sense in which
these structures are necessary. Husserl develops a system of strata which are ordered by
grounding relations (e.g., temporality grounds or structures possibility).22 Thus, the structures
become “transcendental” in a nearly Kantian sense: some are necessary conditions for others. So,
for instance, a horizon of possibilities is necessary for the consciousness that things might
change.
As referenced in the previous section, these structures become crucial for understanding
the other across difference in contemporary phenomenological psychopathology. Ratcliffe, for
example, claims that the experiential life of persons with major depressive disorder (“MDD”) is
not structured in the ordinary way by a horizon of possibilities. This form of consciousness is
thus essentially different, in this respect, from “normal” consciousness. However, he needn’t –
and does not – stick only to a deficit model, though it is where the account begins.
Transcendental Phenomenology grounds a method by which we can supply a positive
signification to this apparent lack. If the horizon of possibilities is absent (conspicuously so,
according to Ratcliffe), and if the horizon of possibilities is necessary for any sense that things
could change, then those experiences without a background of possibility will include a sense
that what is given (and perhaps experience itself) is unchanging, inevitable, perhaps even eternal.
He uses this kind of transcendental analysis to make sense of claims made by persons who suffer
MDD that nothing can change for them or, sometimes, that nothing can change at all, for anyone
(Ratcliffe, 2013 & 2015). Many thinkers in phenomenological psychopathology apply the
method in other cases as well. For instance, it is a popular position that schizophrenia involves a

We must not mistake Husserl’s understanding of “system” with a deductive, complete system. He attempts to uncover
various strata and relations (e.g., of founding) between then, but does not attempt to construct a final system once and
for all, nor to build a system on top of or in analogy to traditionally accepted logics.
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lack of ordinary temporality. If the absence or “disturbance” refers to the future, that is, if one is
not aware of the future in the ordinary ways, then this is often taken to undermine the “sense of
agency” that one ordinarily has over their actions, since an anticipation-fulfillment structure is
necessary for a sense of intentional action (Frith, 1992; Gallagher, 2005). If the disturbance
refers to the past, then it is thought to imply an interruption of an ordinary “sense of ownership,”
since ownership requires that an experience be situated amongst my others over time (Martin &
Pacherie, 2013; Metzinger, 2003; Zahavi, 2005). These states are then likened to the familiar by
a series of analogies and similarities. For instance, non-pathological, or psychologically
“normal” individuals undergo a number of experiences every day that lack the sense of agency
that usually accompanies intentional action. One common example is perception: within
perception, even if we agree with phenomenologists, pragmatists, and enactivists that it
essentially involves a form of action, we do not typically experience the objects perceived as if
they were created by us. The “made phenomena” that Jaspers references, and specifically what is
known as thought insertion, can then be understood in these terms: thought insertion is like
thought, in that its objects are intentions, willings, desires, fears, etc., but is like perception in
that these objects are taken as existing independently of me, as created not by me but in some
other way.23
Not all – perhaps not even most – phenomenological psychopathologists explicitly
leverage Husserl and Stein. Popular figures also include Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and
occasionally Scheler. These thinkers do not utilize empathy in the same way as do Husserl and
Stein, though they do often trace back their methods to Jaspers. Heideggerians tend to make use
of being-in-the-world and, rather than empathy, being-with. Merleau-Pontians utilize
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intercorporeity to further articulate bodily being in the world and our relation to others.24 In all
cases, however, there is a kind of community assumed between self and others, some
fundamental structures uncovered, and their interconnections and implications laid out.
The method is as follows. Begin with a set of transcendental structures of subjectivity, or
“existentialia,” or what have you. Then, encounter an other such that empathy – or being-with, or
intercorporeity – fails, that is, encounter an other such that, relative to some phenomena, the
ordinarily fundamental relation between persons does not afford any understanding. Next,
negatively circumscribe the phenomena in question by saying what they are not; negate, subtract,
remove (Jaspers’ method ends here). Finally, plug that negation into your system of
transcendental structures – essentially the structure of ideal subjectivity – and see what other
features of that structure would apparently be disrupted, or if any positivity (such as
corporealization) should be produced.
The Question of the Intersubjective Validity of Transcendental Phenomenology
Transcendental Phenomenology, especially in early Husserl, conceives of its method as a
kind of self-reflection. This aspect of phenomenology is reflected in the title of Husserl’s
Cartesian Mediations: he is interested, like Descartes, in discovering the foundations for
knowledge by a process a meditation. Throughout the first four books of Cartesian Mediations,
Husserl sticks to a method of self-reflection to the extent that, by the fifth book, he is concerned
that people will view phenomenology and its method as necessarily solipsistic, despite his
frequent reminders (typically footnoted) that the first four books make implicit use of
intersubjectivity and a theory of empathy, articulated in the fifth. Even before the Cartesian
Mediations, Husserl engages in this kind of apparently solipsistic method of self-reflection, and

24

I do not mean here to reduce being-with, intercorporeity, or empathy to one another.

45

the Meditations was not altogether successful in ultimately dismissing the charge. This is in part
due to misreadings of the work, but also because the fifth meditation is indeed problematic.25
The question is: If phenomenology proceeds from a method of self-reflection, abstraction
though it may be, with what validity can its findings be imported to others? Is it not merely selfreflection, the products of which remain with the self? I think not, in general, and the
overwhelming majority of phenomenologists (if not all) will agree with me. However, I here
attempt to demonstrate that psychopathology broadly, and specific forms thereof in particular,
challenge Husserl’s solution to the question. Furthermore, Heidegger offers a different solution
than does Husserl, and through Heidegger’s influence Husserl comes quite close to the answer
offered in the former’s Being and Time in his own The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology. In order to explicate these solutions – that of early Husserl
(through, at least, Cartesian Mediations), on the one hand, and that of Heidegger and Crisis
Husserl, on the other – requires an understanding of the ultimate basis of world-experience at
play in each. In the first case, this is sensation; in the second, it is practical engagement. I then
move to introduce a dilemma that challenges the intersubjective validity of transcendental
phenomenology specifically in cases of psychopathology that appear to involve radical
difference.
Sensation and Similarity
Husserl regards sensation as the ultimate basis of experience. In this sense, he strives to
be a good empiricist, following thinkers such as Hume, whose copy principle was noted above,
and Heraclitus, who “prizes” “the things of which there can be sight, hearing, and learning”
(Wheelwright 1959, p. 19). For Husserl, sensation is an abstractive moment of perception, and

I again recommend Robert W. Jordan’s article, “On Not Living in the Primordial World,” for resolving some of these
misconceptions and addressing the problematic nature of the fifth meditation itself.
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perception is temporal. Perception requires not only sensation (as a kind of substrate) but also
temporal synthesis of sensation, insofar as sensation only becomes meaningful against a temporal
horizon of both prior sensation and future possibilities. Thus perception ultimately refers to
sensation, while the very meaning of any given abstractive instant of sensation refers to the
retentional/protentional structure of consciousness that constitutes perception. Perception as a
meaningful act depends on a prior sensitivity, by which hyletic data are given to consciousness,
and temporal synthesis of this data.26 This hyletic data, or what is sensitively impressed, in time
passes into the past and becomes the foundation out of which meaning is constituted.
Correlatively, the possibilities that make up the horizon of possibilities are, at the most
fundamental level, possibilities of future sensation, i.e., that which may be given as hyletic data
to sensation (even if these data are already understood from a temporal perspective). Sensation
then is a fundamental form of experience insofar as it is what provides the basic content of
experience, and sensible data is also the basic content from which all other content is derived.
Crucially, for sensation to mean anything requires reference to a horizon of the past: the
meaning of an occurrent sensory impression requires that past sensation be appresented along
with the hyletic data presented at the present moment. The latter is presented as “now,” the
former as a past now, a now that has been modified into the form of “past,” and, similarly, a
horizon of the future (that is, what something is is in part a function of what something could be).
In any moment out of which the phenomenologist may begin his method and abstract from some
particular set of data, with its correspondent present, her sensation has already been incorporated
into a meaningful, temporal act that can in principle be grasped. That is, Husserl’s notion of

This givenness is sometimes called “primal impression,” but again this is an abstraction, and it must be remembered
that sensation is not separable from retention and protention, as the tripartite “protention-impression-retention”
structure might easily be misinterpreted to imply.
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sensation is not discontinuous with perception, contrary to the claim made by certain thinkers –
reductionists, some perception theorists and cognitive scientists among them – that sensation is a
kind of intrinsically meaningless building block which, when considered in combination with
other moments of sensation, add up to perception. Husserl follows Brentano here, in claiming
that intentional (or psychological) relations cannot be understood in terms of external causality, a
causality which simply combines various elements in order to understand the product as an
effect. Instead, sensation is unified over time, and this unification constitutes the meaning of
sensation at each moment; since sensation is an abstraction from perception, the meaning of
perception conditions our sensory experience, and insofar as sensory experience undergoes
temporal synthesis (and thus can be meaningfully thought at all), it is already incorporated into
the very constitution of perceptual acts. For Husserl, perception is not just a product of a number
of sensational states or contents standing in causal relations to one another.
Though sensation is a fundamental (though abstract) stratum of perceptual experience in
general (in an intransitive sense, but also in the transitive: experience… of the world,
experience… of ourselves), it does not directly underlie all forms of experience. Certainly,
mathematical entities, for instance, are not given to us by sensation (temporal synthesis does not
transform any sensory data into a perception of, e.g., the number 2 itself). And the foundation of
the perception of others (here, people or egos), as Husserl and Stein both make clear in their
account of empathy, is not exhausted by sense – the most interesting aspect of others for the
phenomenologist, i.e., their experiential being, is not given by sensation alone but by various
associative syntheses (including coupling and transfer of meaning). Yet all this, for (early)
Husserl, bottoms out in sensation. It is from sensation that we can abstract, according to specific
methods, mathematical concepts which we can only subsequently demonstrate. Once a proof is
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produced, however, it is also demonstrated that the mathematical concepts or entities can be
infinitely re-produced, that they do not essentially depend on the time of their original
production, and thus that they are eternal.27 We can be aware of the other on the basis of our
perception of their body, subtended by what is given of that body to sensation, in addition to our
own sensible experience, which reveals my own body as inseparable from a conscious life.
Though there are sophisticated forms of experience irreducible to sensation – Husserl does not
attempt to reduce experience to sensation – they are nevertheless founded on sensation and its
corresponding hyletic data. This seems to be part of what Husserl has in mind when he makes
claims such as
[…] every mode of consciousness involves its possibilities of an uncovering of what is
intended, its possibilities of becoming converted into either fulfilling or disillusioning
experiences of what is meant, and moreover, (as regards the genesis of the consciousness)
points back to such experiences of the same intended object or a similar one. (Husserl, 1931,
p. 106)
The way that Husserl hopes to avoid solipsism in his Cartesian Meditations depends on
his account of sensation. As mentioned previously, the first four books of the Meditations
presuppose his findings from the fifth, in which he attempts to address the charge of solipsism by
performing a “reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere of ownness” (Husserl, 1931,
p. 92). He writes:
As regards method, a prime requirement for proceeding correctly here is that first of all we
carry out, inside the universal transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoché with respect
to our theme. For the present we exclude from the thematic field everything now in question:

I am indifferent as to whether this is an accurate account of mathematics; it is Husserl’s, though intensely
oversimplified.
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we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or mediately to
other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and potential
intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar ownness. (Husserl, 1931,
p. 93)
What interests Husserl at this point is the way in which I myself could ever distinguish between
myself, what is peculiarly mine, and an other, that is, how I could distinguish between my Ego
and an other Ego.28 Within this reduction appears my own intentionality, Husserl believes,
directed towards the other. That is, the act of empathy is my own or, as Stein writes, with
empathy “we are dealing with an act which is primordial as present experience though nonprimordial in content” (Stein, 1989, p. 10). The primordiality of the act refers to the way in
which empathy presents its object, that is, the other, through sensation and mediating syntheses,
while the non-primordiality of the content refers to this very mediation, i.e., that the being of the
foreign Ego specifically as ego is not given as hyletic data to sensation (though its givenness is
founded on such data). In attempting to understand the way that one first constitutes, for oneself,
something other than oneself, Husserl, while maintaining that the experience of the other is direct
in the sense that “the other is himself there before us ‘in person,” clearly maintains that “properly
speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances
themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience
originally” (Husserl, 1931, p. 109). Instead, the other is given mediately, “making present to

In a footnote, Dorion Cairns (trans.) remarks that Husserl later appended the following comment: “inside the
universal transcendental sphere – “peculiar epoché”. But it is misleading when the text goes on to say: “in that we
exclude from the theoretical field everything now in question, in that we <disregard> all constitutional effects that relate
immediately or mediately to other subjectivity,” etc. The question after all concerns, not other men, but the manner in
which the ego (as the transcendental onlooker experiences him transcendentally) constitutes within himself the
distinction between Ego and Other Ego – a difference, however, that presents itself first of all in the phenomenon,
“world” : as the difference between my human ego (my Ego in the usual sense) and the other human ego (the other Ego
<likewise in the usual sense> ).” (Husserl, 1931, p. 93)
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consciousness a ‘there too’, which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an
‘itself-there’ […] we have here, accordingly, a kind of making ‘co-present’, a kind of
‘appresentation” (Husserl, 1931, p. 109).
Through empathy, the other is first constituted as a kind of “mirroring” of my ego, as a
“second” ego, which is “not simply there and strictly presented; rather he is constituted as “alter
ego” […] The “Other”, according to his constituted sense, points to me myself” (Husserl, 1931,
p. 94). We saw earlier that empathy is founded on the perception of expressive behavior and
certain associative syntheses, and here we see that it is constituted precisely as an alter ego, that
is, as something like me but not me. Husserl thinks that he can account for the constitution of this
form of alterity – a strange sort of analogue29 – by the reduction to the sphere of ownness, which
ultimately leaves sensation intact.
When we thus abstract, we retain coherent stratum of the phenomenon world, a stratum of the
phenomenon that is the correlate of continuously harmonious, continuing world-experience.
Despite our abstraction, we can go on continuously in our experiencing intuition, while
remaining exclusively in the aforesaid stratum. (Husserl, 1931, p. 96).
This “phenomenon,” or “primordial,” world is what Husserl calls the founding stratum, and is
prior to the world constituted as “objective.” For this, we must first have some experience of
others, such that the world can be given as in excess to my own intentionality, becoming
something shared.
Within the primordial world our own body is “uniquely singled out” precisely as an
animated body, to which “I ascribe fields of sensation.” I further know my body through
kinesthesias in the mode “I am doing,” that is, in accordance with an “I can” (in contrast with a

“the other is a “mirroring” of my own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and yet again
not an analogue in the usual sense.” (Husserl, 1931, p. 94)
29

51

Kantian “I think”). This founds the consciousness of my body as a psychophysical unity. He then
takes the term “Other,” referring to “alter” as his hint for discovering our intentionality of the
other: we experience the Other as like oneself, a psychophysical unity of sensation and
animation, but nevertheless distinct from oneself. What is presented of the other, within the
reduction to ownness, is their body. But this body is given as an animate organism. The only
other body given as such a thing, within the primordial world, is my own body. And so, the body
of the other “apprehended as an animate organism,” according to Husserl, “must have derived
this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism” (Husserl, 1931, p. 110). The
condition on which this can occur cannot be direct, as the sensation and animation of the other
(“I can”) cannot be given to me in the same way as my own. And so, crucially,
It is clear from the very beginning that only a similarity connecting, within my primordial
sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as the motivational basis for the
“analogizing” apprehension of that body as another animate organism (Husserl, 1931, p.
111).
Husserl notes, although it is sometimes overlooked, that this apprehension (which he calls an
“assimilative apperception”) is non-inferential, distancing his view from a popular theory of
empathy as analogical inference. Instead, the apperception “points back to a ‘primal instituting”
(Husserl, 1931, p. 111), of a kind that is familiar in everyday experience. This appresentation of
the other as an animated organism like me, i.e., the making co-present of subjective facts in the
perceptual presence of a body, is instituted by “pairing,” which is “a primal form of that passive
synthesis which we designate as “association”, in contrast to passive synthesis of
‘identification.” (Husserl, 1931, p. 112). Intentionally speaking, when two data are given
together as similar, then when one is presented the other is co-intended, that is, they are given as
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a “pair,” and there occurs an “overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other,” what
Husserl calls a “mutual transfer of sense.” What is given in sensation of the body of the other,
due to the data’s similarity to what is given in sensation of my own body, becomes perceived,
through mediating synthesis, as the same kind of thing as my own body.
For an ordinary example, if I see an unfinished table, what is given gains its meaning and
significance from other similar perceptions, that is, from other tables that I have experienced. In
my experience, it is unsafe to place a glass of water directly on the surface of an unfinished table.
I do not infer that this table, being like those, is also unsuitable for such a purpose. Rather, I
experience this table precisely as like those others; those others form a horizon against which this
table appears as the type of thing it is, and, being perceived as like those, it is also perceived as –
not reasoned to be – unsuitable for placing a glass of water directly upon. Likewise, when I
perceive the body of the other, it is perceived as similar to my own, and thus as the same kind of
thing. My body is known to me as a psychophysical unity, and it is against this awareness that
the meaning of the body of the other that I perceive becomes constituted: this is a body-likemine, i.e., a psychophysical unity. As readers may recall from the above section on empathy, it is
precisely the fact that the psychical aspects of the other can never be given primordially but only
appresented, whereas my own can be made present to me primordially, that truly constitutes the
other, given in this way through pairing and transfer of sense as an “alter ego,” as distinct from
myself.
In what does the relevant similarity consist, that motivates pairing and gets empathy off
the ground? It helps to understand the mode in which empathy, according to Husserl, can be
verified. Indeed, this is also an important development of the concept relative to Jaspers, who
operationalizes empathy without explicitly spelling out how we could ever evidence the claim
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that our empathetic findings are accurate, or true. In ordinary perception, verification comes in
the form of making-present. Yet, the subjective side of the other can never be made present in
this sense. According to Husserl, empathy has its own form of verification. I quote at length:
Every experience points to further experiences that would fulfil and verify the appresented
horizons, which include, in the form of non-intuitive anticipations, potentially verifiable
syntheses of harmonious further experience. Regarding experience of someone else, it is clear
that its fulfillingly verifying continuation can ensue only by means of new appresentations
that proceed in a synthetically harmonious fashion, and only by virtue of the manner in which
these appresentations owe their existence-value to their motivational connection with the
changing presentations proper, within my ownness, that continually appertain to them.
(Husserl, 1931, p. 114)
And,
The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate
organism solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious “behavior”. Such harmonious
behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must
present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change
in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism,
precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior. (Husserl, 1931, p. 114)
And finally,
Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, originally – is something I am; or
else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that
founded manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable experience – an experience
that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something
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indicated – is “other”. It is therefore conceivable only as an analogue of something included
in my peculiar ownness [italics mine]. Because of its sense-constitution, it occurs necessary as
an “intentional modification” of that Ego of mine which is the first to be Objectivated, or as
an intentional modification of my primordial “world”: the Other as phenomenologically a
“modification” of myself. (Husserl, 1931, p. 115)
The way that we verify our empathetic intentions is through the perception of harmonious
behavior, harmony being understood as bearing between a motivational context, on the one hand,
and the totality of one’s expressive behavior, on the other, such that one’s actions are
interpretable by relation to the motivational structure and to other action. Insofar as perceived
behavior is apparently either self-inconsistent or inconsistent with a given motivational structure,
then the behavior is seen as “pseudo” behavior; we suspect that what we perceive is not the
action of an other, that there is no other here “in person.” Chatbots, or artificial intelligences that
are designed to convincingly carry on a conversation with a human interlocutor, exemplify the
point nicely. Perhaps the currently most popular form of the Turing Test places a human being
into a discussion with either a chatbot or another human, and it is up to the first human to
determine whether their interlocutor is a chatbot or not. As anyone who has interacted with a
chatbot knows, they are often fairly convincing, up to a point. Then, inconsistencies begin to
appear. We wonder “why would someone say that,” or we notice that something said now is
difficult to make sense of given something said previously. When their behavior becomes
disharmonious – when we cannot understand the motivations behind their expressions, or cannot
make sense of the behavior as a consistent whole – then we cease to see the chatbot as possibly
human; we recognize that it is only a pseudo-consciousness, to adapt Husserl’s term.
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But the motivational structure that serves as a key referent to perceiving one’s behavior
empathetically and verifying those perceptions is never itself directly perceived: motivation is a
subject-concept that can, when it comes to the other, only be appresented. The final block quote
above is illuminating: the motivational structure of the other, indeed our perception of the other
in general, is conceivable only in relation to myself. I need not import my own motivations or
other subjective states directly to the other, as if mine and theirs were identical, but rather my
own structures and states can be modified, to account for the distinction between us. I modify my
own Ego, and, at bottom, my own primordial world, and it is insofar as the behavior of the other
can be consistently made sense of in relation to this modification of myself that empathetic
perception gains its verification. Similarity to myself, similarity to what is “peculiarly mine,”
born out as harmonious behavior, is the similarity that undergirds pairing. So, if I see someone
perform actions that I can understand in terms of myself and modifications thereof, then I can see
them as indicating someone, that is, as an ego like me but not me. On the other hand, if their
behavior is disharmonious, that is, internally inconsistent on the basis of modifications of my
own motivational structure, then I question whether they are indeed an other (they “become
experienced as a pseudo-organism”). If it could be demonstrated that there is some fundamental
similarity that pertains between us, some way to make some sense of the other in terms of
myself, then the other may be accepted as an other, but also as otherwise beyond understanding.
And so, as with Jaspers, we can see that empathy is founded on the perception of
expressive behavior and some relevant similarity – something experiential that is shared between
myself and the other – and that where empathy is undermined, including by the denial of one of
these conditions, there occurs a threat of incomprehensibility. Yet, it is precisely because of the
structural analysis of the Husserlian phenomenologist, and because of the importation of my own
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structures onto the other – so long as this allows me to make sense of their behavior – that
incomprehensibility no longer threatens a purely negative method, i.e., a pure deficit model.
Instead, the deficit posited can be interpreted within a framework of underlying similarities (e.g.,
we say the other is different in some way, but similar in other, perhaps more fundamental ways),
and in this way we can understand the deficit systemically. Though a deficit is attributed to the
other, or even perhaps just a difference between us,30 this deficit may have positive implications
for the remainder of the system, as when Ratcliffe, for example, takes the absence of the ordinary
horizon of possibilities for people who suffer MDD to both imply and explain the reported,
positive phenomenon of corporealization.
Practicality and Inclusion
As noted, many contemporary phenomenological psychopathologists prefer figures other
than those emphasized thus far. They will often cite Jaspers, and perhaps refer to Husserl, but
tend to explicitly anchor their work in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, or other recognized major
figures. Though such thinkers undoubtedly owe much to Husserl and Stein (though the latter has
been historically under-recognized), there are certain distinctions within their systems that make
a difference for my analysis. Furthermore, as already mentioned, Husserl’s The Crisis of
European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy complicates his earlier thought and presents
a position influenced by and similar to Heidegger’s. I here indicate and briefly comment on some
of these positions, focusing on the ways they differ from what has been presented here so far, so

Here, the Husserl/Stein account has an edge on the Jasperian. The difference between myself and the other is more
explicitly relational; rather than proposing to understand the other explicitly by attributing to them some deficit, the
former try to understand our relation to the other in terms of the possibility of comprehending them while accepting
that “the man himself” is something above any comprehension. However, radical differences – that is, differences that
are a matter of modifications that aren’t simply, in Jaspers terms, a matter of degree or causality – would seemingly have
to either be or appear as negation of the familiar.
30
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that moving forward I might better do justice to Husserl’s ever-shifting thought, and so that I can
address as wide an audience as this project permits.
Whereas Husserl takes the ultimate basis of experience to be sensation, Heidegger argues
that this basis is instead our practical engagement with the world: our primary relationship to the
world is through practical activity structured by Dasein’s being as care, and, accordingly, the
fundamental form of consciousness (understood intentionally, as consciousness-of) is our
circumspective awareness in and of the world. Even sensation, according to Heidegger, is
already organized by our practical concern and activity; meaning is not just a matter of
temporality and association but rather a matter of use and value. The first relation to the other is
not empathy according to Heidegger, as empathy already presupposes being-in-the-world as
structured by care; empathy is a form of perception, and all perception presupposes practical
engagement. Instead, our relation to the other is conceived of as Mitsein [being-with], which is
revealed as an essential feature of our existence, i.e., an “existentiale” of Dasein, through the fact
that we exist in a world always already structured by and implying the existence of others. The
tools we use, the projects we pursue, the values we accept, and even the perception of the world
abstracted from use and reformulated as the objective-scientific world, are already conditioned
by the other. We first, inauthentically, exist in the mode of Das Man [the they], meaning (in part)
that we first exist by taking up the world of others. Our values are the values handed to us by
others, our tools the ones they make, our concepts historically generated, our projects what
others expect of us… We are engaged in the world with others; others engage us in our practices.
The other is thus foundational for Dasein, though Dasein, according to Heidegger, can abstract
away from this foundation and instead exist “authentically,” accepting the ultimate responsibility
of its values and actions for itself: always conditioned by the other, Dasein reflects and decides,
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and realizes by its reflection that, within its conditioning, it was always Dasein that implicitly
endorsed (or rejected) what it was given.
For Heidegger, our understanding of being is structured by care, our care is structured by
the others with whom we are in community, and thus the community informs our understanding
of being, and care informs our understanding of others. The relevant similarity which undergirds
an understanding of the other is thus not that of harmonious behavior construed as making sense
of perceptual similarities between myself and the other as presented to me by sensation. Rather,
we first understand the other by sharing a common world, that is, a world already structured by
care, which we engage with the other, and in which our practices already presuppose community.
We understand the other by doing what they do, by sharing their values, by using their tools, by
participating in their (or, precisely, our) world.
According to the Cartesian Mediations, once we abstract to our sphere of ownness, we
discover a “primordial world,” a mere Nature, pre-objective and consisting of that which is given
by our senses. This world, through the syntheses that Husserl analyzes there (it is not practical
here for me to present these considerations), takes on the sense of a universal world, a Nature
that must be in principle accessible to all others, as a shared sensational world. For Heidegger,
however, even this world – any perception whatsoever – presupposes a certain practical
engagement, and practical engagement is already communal, structured as it is by the care and
concern of others, the they. Thus, for Heidegger, the fundamental appearance of the world is
shaped by our concern, which is conditioned by others; the world that appears is not necessarily
a universal one. Insofar as two individuals do not share worlds, then the question arises as to how
they can understand one another. Two modes suggest themselves: first, they can participate in
each other’s worlds, immersing oneself in the practices and concerns that organize the other’s
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world and very being; second, they can negate their own practices, in an authentic movement by
which they reflect on their being and accept or reject that which they have thus far only
implicitly, non-thematically, become.31
Contemporary Heideggerian approaches to psychopathology tend to focus on
existentialia, modifying them as the Husserlian modifies “transcendental structures of
subjectivity.” Typically, the method involves an explication of some ordinary world (a “normal”
or “home” world), a posited point of departure from that ordinary world – spelled out in terms of
alterations to the ordinary “care” structure, or the world, or altered “mood” (a common
translation for Heideggerian Befindlichkeit) – and theoretical correlates of that altered world. For
instance, Ratcliffe explores altered mood and the ways that it affects the at-home-ness within a
world for the subject of altered mood, or how it results in a changed orientation to the world such
that ordinarily accepted beliefs or processes are interrupted, or even become non-sensical.
In The Crisis, Husserl adopts a similar position, endorsing the life-world as the
foundation of intersubjective understanding.32 Husserl returns to the life-world from which his
Meditations had abstracted, and the similarity between my own subjectivity and behavior is
transformed from a perceptual-analogical model to a thoroughly normative one. This is first seen
in his genetic accounts of the objective-scientific and mathematical world-views. Through
certain practices, thoroughly historical and communal, we constitute new modes of givenness of
the world, coming to understand the world through specific methods and in specific ways. These

This latter may be preferable where participation is not possible or desirable. But it is also problematically negative, in
the same sense as is the epistemologically limited deficit method.
31

It should be noted that, even at the time of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl takes the life-world – the world of actual,
concrete, naïve experience – to be irreducible. His reductions are mere abstractions and, as Jordan tells us, we do not live
in the primordial world. Indeed, the “transcendental clue” from which he derives his thought on empathy and his answer
to the challenge of solipsism is our ordinary, everyday, life-world experience of other people. The fundamental datum
out of which his theory is developed, and in which his considerations must be anchored (that is, the relevant
phenomenon or “thing itself” to which Husserl promises to return) is thus a life-world phenomenon. This is his warrant.
32
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practices thus found such experience. When it comes to our understanding of others, Husserl
calls into question some of the findings of the Meditations. We understand the other by
participating with them in the co-constitution of the world. At its most basic level, the other is
perceived as making sense of a world, as do I, and as she whose collaboration is a necessary
condition of my experience of the world in its ordinary sense.
The Dilemma
Phenomenological insights are grounded on some form of intersubjectivity which
structures experience according to certain conditions. For Husserl, our ordinary experience of the
world is structured by the appearance of others, in the form of bodies “like mine”: the body of
the other appears as the same kind of thing as my own body, and through pairing and a transfer
of sense, the other is apperceived (or appresented) as a subject of experience like me. This is
necessary for the constitution of the world as objective, that is, for the constitution of the
ordinary, every-day world that we live in, which serves as a point of departure for all
phenomenological reflections, regardless of how solipsistic they might otherwise seem. Selfreflection presupposes empathetic relations to others. For Heidegger and Crisis Husserl, this
relation to the other and to a common world comes to the foreground. It is our inclusion in a
common world that grounds not only our own Being (as an understanding of being) and
phenomenological self-reflection, but the intersubjective validity of our claims: insofar as our
reflections are always situated within and structured by some world, it is that world that
conditions understanding. For Heidegger, a world is ultimately structured by care – by our own
but, primarily, by the care of others, the former being possible only within the latter – and first
appears through practical concern, i.e., circumspection. Those with radically different practices
than our own, with whom we do not share care or concern, actualize other worlds, and the
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possibility of an interworld understanding depends on the possibility of inclusion of ourselves in
the practices and care of the other, and vice versa.
Phenomenological claims are intersubjectively valid – they can be applied to others
beyond myself – insofar as I am conditioned by others, that is, insofar as some relation to the
other is constitutive of the phenomena upon which I reflect. The dilemma is as follows. If (1) our
relation to the other, and our fundamental awareness thereof, is based on sensation, as it is in
Husserl through the Meditations, then harmonious perception is foundational for an
understanding of the other, but (a) can be disrupted in certain circumstances and (b) what counts
as harmony is based on my own possibilities, which do not exhaust (or perhaps even touch) the
possibilities of the other. If, on the other hand, (2) our primary relation to the other is one of
practical co-engagement in a shared world, as it is for Heidegger and, in a modified form, Crisis
Husserl, then (a) radically different praxis implies ununderstandability (to echo Jaspers’ term),
and (b) in principle practice can interrupt understanding, conditioning incomprehensibility, i.e.,
ununderstanding.
What allows us to know the other, on Husserl’s account, is sensation and similarity –
perception and resemblance. When we perceive the other, through the perception of their bodily
expression, we perceive them as like me but not me: a body like mine, expression like mine,
subjectivity like me, but distinct. Our empathetic intentions are ultimately grounded on not just a
static perception, a similarity at a time, but on harmonious perception. The expressive behavior
of the other must cohere within itself – we must be able to make sense of the behavior as a whole
– and with an unseen motivational field ascertained by modifications of my own.33 If we assume

Of course, some one action may not cohere with others, but the final arbiter is motivation: if various motivations can
be made sense of together, as of the transitions between them, then the actions may seem quite incongruous amongst
themselves but nevertheless coherent in relation to the motivational field.
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that similarity holds, and that motivations are shared, then empathy may be a fine way of
understanding, even perceiving, the other. But in the case of disruption of harmonious behavior,
or the perception thereof, we begin to doubt our understanding of the other and, if the disruption
is radical enough, we doubt even that we are face to face with a real other, as opposed to a
“pseudo-organism.” In psychopathology, such disruptions are possible. Indeed, where we
understand the other as exhibiting “disorganized movement or behavior,”34 we have admitted to
a kind of ununderstandability, a disruption of the ground of understanding, and we have
understood the other in a strictly negative manner as disorganized, not organized. Furthermore,
when we understand the other as delusional, hallucinatory, or dissociative, we understand the
other as no longer a legitimate locus of sensation. Importantly, where we cannot find reason for
one’s actions or beliefs, that is, where we cannot discover a motivational context out of which to
make sense of the other, philosophers and scientists alike (e.g., cognitive scientists,
psychologists, psychiatrists) are quick to attribute irrationality: if I cannot find a reason, there
must be no reason. This is a justifiable move if the other must be understood in terms of
motivational elements personally familiar to me; what is foreign, in the sense that it cannot be
understood in terms of modifications of myself, will be unintelligible.
The question of the validity of empathy comes down to the ground for the assumption
that similarity holds and that motivation is shared. In the Meditations and related work, this
assumption is founded solely in perception: I see a movement like my own, and so I see it as
expressive and as corresponding to a familiar motivational field, even if modified. Later Husserl
and Heidegger can be seen as articulating this ground to be a kind of world, e.g., the shared lifeworld in Husserl. But the very constitution of such a world itself depends on a fundamental

This is one positive symptom of schizophrenia, for example, listed in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association,
2013).
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relation to the other. In the broadest sense of ‘world,’ we have Husserl’s “universal” life-world,
which is the familiar world in which we live. But this life-world is constituted as objective and
intersubjective precisely due to our empathetic relations with others; without such a relation, we
are left with a solipsistic world of personal perception; the world appears as inseparable from me,
as dependent while also transcendent.35 Through empathy, we come to understand others as like
but distinct from me, and only following this accomplishment does the world takes on the sense
of an intersubjectively shared world. Worldly validities – what can be directly evidenced in
experience – depend on the community of all possible subjects, to be confirmed by harmonious
perception. Yet, insofar as the grounds of empathy are undermined, the other is not even known
as other; a failure of empathy is exclusion from the community of co-constitutors of the world,
exclusion even from the class of ‘actual’ organisms (i.e., relegation to the “pseudo-”). Ordinarily,
such a failure is uncommon and easily corrected. In the context of psychopathology, however, it
can become endemic or even essential to certain diagnoses or symptomology. Disorganized or
disrupted movement, irrationality, hallucination, delusion, or radically abnormal experience
generally threaten the conditions of empathy and thus exclude the person to whom they are
attributed from the intersubjective community of valid world co-constitution.36 The attempt to
In the sense that Bob Jordan speaks of Husserl’s “immanent transcendencies”: the world is immanent insofar as it is
perceived by me and the body, given as actually present, and variable with my bodily movements, but transcendent
insofar as any intention from the solipsistic perspective intends more than what is actually given in the form of a horizon
of possibilities or potentialities, and, correspondingly, that “objects” perceived solipsistically have their own series of
potentialities.
35

In the 1923/24 lectures (Part 2, section 2, chapter 1, lecture 34), Husserl takes the possibility of insanity simply to be
the empirically real possibility of a disruption of universal harmony: “And surely the possibility is open that a human
being’s harmonious perceptual stream could be transformed into a senseless jumble, into a swarm of appearances. But
what does this mean other than that a human being, and ultimately every human being, could become insane?” (2019, p.
259). He goes on to argue that, in cases of insanity, “there could no longer be any talk of this world, of “existing things,”
of experienced or (in freely initiated acts of perception) experiencable things in general […], there also could no longer
be any talk of my lived-body, and none, therefore, of animals and of human beings – and so none of human beings
whose concordant unfolding experiences, experiences that constitute an actual world, I could invoke” (261, italics mine),
and “then “world” becomes a title for infinitely many phantasy-possibilities which are, taken together, empty” (261, italics
his). The world constituted for the insane person is not an actual world, it is disharmonious and senseless; it cannot be
understood by empathy if empathy necessarily references a coherent motivational framework. In The Origin of Geometry
36
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understand the other by modifications of certain elements of my own experience while importing
the remainder of my field is groundless in such cases, since the possibility of experiencing the
other as relevantly “like-me” has been undercut.
In the Heideggerian case the problem becomes more obvious: if someone does not
participate in the same practices as I do, if their actions are not organized by a familiar form of
care (essentially taking the place of Husserl’s “motivational framework,” but at what Heidegger
takes to be a lower level), then they will not be understandable to me. This could be remedied,
for Heidegger, by participating in the world of the other, but this is not always possible. In
psychopathology (though much of the following holds across cultural difference), we often
struggle to understand what some experience is actually like; much of our literature attempts, in a
variety of ways, simply to describe the phenomena in question. Analogy is often employed, as
may be predicted given the methodological and theoretical foundations explicated so far, but this
is often unsatisfactory. Importantly, the psychopathologist typically cannot simply undergo a
similar phenomenon as that which we hope to understand.
Furthermore, if our understanding of others is conditioned by practice, there is no reason
to suppose that certain practices could not undermine understanding. As I elaborate in the
conclusion that immediately follows, some such practices can be seen to occur within psychiatric
contexts.
Conclusion and Implications
Karl Jaspers, often credited with establishing the field of psychopathology, takes some
form of “empathy” to be crucial to its method. For Jaspers, as we also see in Husserl, empathy
depends on perception of expressive behavior and a form of personal familiarity with the

(1970, pp. 358-9), he echoes this sentiment at a different level, the level of language, where children and the
psychologically abnormal are excluded from normal communicative society.
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relevant phenomena. His theory of empathy, while somewhat difficult to pin down, is distinct
from the “projective” theory of Theodor Lipps prominent at the time and taken up by current-day
simulationism. When the conditions of empathy are undermined, according to Jaspers, our only
recourse to understanding the other is through a deficit method, by which we strive only to say
what some relevant phenomenon is not. This is inadequate for understanding what the experience
of the other actually is, or is like, and has consequences for even a causal investigation into it; we
have not determined the phenomenon to be explained. Accordingly, contemporary
psychopathologists – whether they explicitly move past Jaspers or not – do not typically content
themselves with deficit models. I have argued that transcendental phenomenology, particularly in
Husserlian and Heideggerian forms, allows for the negative signification of deficit models to
take on a positive significance: insofar as we presuppose a shared form of consciousness, that is,
we presuppose certain structures of consciousness or existentialia, we can then trace the
remainder of the system in light of a posited deficit, through imagination as well as
transcendental argument.
Husserlian Phenomenology, and phenomenological psychopathology in this positive,
structuralist sense, depends for its intersubjective validity on the discovery of “eide,” or
structural invariants of a given phenomenon. Eide are discovered through the method of eidetic
reduction, which leverages a free variation of possibilities: a factual phenomenon is taken as an
exemplar and initial evidence, and aspects of the phenomenon are imaginatively varied until the
phenomenon no longer counts as the same kind of thing.37 This process thus discloses what is

The method of eidetic reduction is detailed by Husserl and Heidegger in the Encyclopedia Britannica article
Phenomenology (1997). It involves four crucial features, but imaginative variation is the only one directly relevant to my
considerations here; I do not currently challenge, at least explicitly, and believe I can indeed accommodate all other
features (that is, they cause me no trouble).
37
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essential to the phenomenon – its form, so to say, or sense; it articulates its “internal horizon of
meaning.”
Conceivable possibilities (i.e., those that can be imagined in the variation) are constrained
by what can be given in original intuition, that is, by what can be given to oneself as self-evident
and present. Original intuition is thus dependent on one’s own experiences and capacities, and
also one’s community. One’s communal being is an accomplishment which depends on
understanding certain phenomena as indicating or partially constituting (depending on where in
Husserl’s work one looks) an Other ego like but distinct from me: an “alter ego.” One knows the
other through an act of empathy according to which expressive behavior is interpreted in relation
to my own movements and psychical experiences, but distinguished from my own possibilities
both in virtue of being given to me as simultaneous with my actual experience (which would be
an impossibility for one and the same subject, to experience this-here and that-there, both now)
yet as not original: the other is appresented, not presented. It is through this empathetic
accomplishment that community is established, as a community of subjects of which I am simply
one unique case. The encounter with the other, within the community, allows for me to conceive
of new possibilities as modifications of my own experience that would be impossible were I a
solipsistic subject, as well as by constituting new senses for already familiar experience, e.g., that
of the world as shared.
Confirmation of these possibilities depends on the harmonious perception of expressive
behavior of others, an understanding of which already depends on similarity to my own
experience; it must be articulable as a modification of my own experience, and in particular must
cohere with a motivational framework modified from my own. Confirmation, or fulfillment, of
our intentions directed towards foreign experience, whether theoretical, perceptual, or
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imaginative, depends on empathy as the act through which the other is given. If empathy is
undermined, however, then confirmation of such intentions would be impossible: empathy is the
perceptual act through which the other is appresented and is thus necessary for the harmonious
perception thereof. Empathy depends on the perception of expressive behavior, which consists of
a straightforward perception of bodily movement to which a sense of psychical activity is
transferred through its being paired with my own bodily movements and their inseparable
psychic correlates, and on a certain familiarity: without engaging in similar bodily practices, or
without having undergone similar psychic phenomena, the ‘perception’ of the other is reduced to
a kind of imagination or even projection. Without this familiarity, there is no tethering, so to
speak, of an understanding of the other to modifications of oneself. And, with empathy being
undermined, there falls the possibility of confirmation of related intentions.
If eide can only be discovered and confirmed by variations on one’s own possibilities,
and these variations and possibilities are constrained by one’s capacities and community, and
empathy can be undermined through radical differences in the practices or experiences of two
people, then eide can only factor in familiar possibilities and cannot be adequately applied to
unfamiliar subjectivity. The loophole is that eide hold for any conceivable phenomenon of such
and such a type, but conceivability is ultimately constrained by the limits of empathy, due to the
way that empathy conditions imagination (it constitutes new senses of phenomena and makes
conceivable modifications of myself only possible if there are (and I am aware of) other subjects
like but not identical to me). Any importation of transcendental structures – structural invariants
of consciousness, the eide of experience – to what cannot be understood by reference to
modifications of oneself is thus illicit. Precisely, it is illicit when empathy is undermined or
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otherwise not possible. What cannot be conceived of in terms of the familiar and its conceivable
modifications is thus, for the method, inconceivable.
Empathy is undermined in the psychiatric context, and in the broader case of
“abnormality” in general. If some phenomenon is abnormal, it is essentially not familiar: it is not
part of those ordinary practices and experiences that constitute a community, and therefore afford
conception and confirmation.
It could be objected that the fundamental similarity supposed to hold in the case of
empathy is that both persons are sources of animation and loci of sensation – we are both
organisms – and that this cannot be undermined. But this sense of the other as an organism, even
of myself as an organism, must first be constituted, and itself depends on a perceived similarity,
pairing, and the correspondent transfer of sense.38 In the first place, the perception of similarity is
fraught with difficulties. Our own movements are not given to us in the same way as are the
movements of others, not even considered as external objects in motion given to visual sensation.
From our own perspective, our body does not even look like the body of the other. Something
like a mirror would be necessary to see my movements as similar to the movements of the others,
but would not the identification of my own body in a mirror involve many of the same
difficulties?39 Furthermore, pairing between my body and the body of the other is not just
verified but instituted and sustained by harmonious perception: what separates the other’s
movements from mere motion is pairing with my own movements, which only holds as long as

Alfred Schutz (1970, pp. 62-4) raises a similar objection, calling into question the perceived similarity between my
body and the body of the other. While my point here is not entirely original, I do emphasize “outer perception” whereas
Schutz emphasizes “inner perception.” That is, he leverages a distinction between Leib and Koerpor, whereas I am
pointing specifically to the way that my own body as object is, without presupposing a relation to the other, not given as
similar to the body of the other.
38

This problem could potentially be resolved by evoking a notion of convergence of action, the object perceived, and
volition. That is, my reflection moves along with my volition, and with my own body both perceived (without the
mirror) and kinesthetically.
39
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the movements are coherently interpretable by reference to modifications of my own
motivational framework (perhaps, minimally, a motivational framework in general) and its
connections with those movements of mine meant to correspond to the other. What separates the
other as a locus of sensation from mere blind mechanism is, again, perceiving them in such a
way that I cannot make sense of their actions without an imposition of motivation, derived from
what is familiar. In any case, this can all be undermined in cases of “disorganized behavior,” and
also in light of recent rejections of “basic emotions,” “basic expression,” and any sort of
universal human practices.40 In such cases, the motions in question cannot be confirmed by
harmonious perception, and theoretical considerations usurp empathy, sacrificing their
phenomenological basis of verification.
Furthermore, even if movements are perceived as similar – which is already,
phenomenologically speaking, an accomplishment – they may not correspond at all to similar
psychical states. Many persons with abnormal psychical states, and many people in general given
their circumstances, adopt expressive movements that do not map their psychical states, for a
variety of reasons. We can also invoke a deeper Wittgensteinian point, recalling his example
(2009) of beetles in a box: we can see the box but we can’t look into it to check. The only
confirmation available is, to repeat, harmonious perception, but it seems that such a perception
underdetermines the psychical phenomena. Moving forward, I will suggest that the
“determining” factor is language, conceived of as discourse or conversation, and distinct from
any Wittgensteinian or Husserlian formulation thereof.

Disorganized behavior, as already cited, is a diagnostic symptom of the DSM-5; for a clear and convincing rejection of
so called “basic emotions,” see Giovanna Colombetti’s The Feeling Body (2013). Regarding basic expressions, the literature
broadly defines basic expressions as expressions of basic emotions, and so Colombetti’s criticism of the latter carries
over to the former.
40
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Another point to be considered is that the other, conceived of as a locus of animation and
sensation like but distinct from me, already supposes – somewhat covertly in Husserl’s
Meditations but explicitly in the Crisis – that the other and I already share a world, that we both
act in and make sense of a world conceived of as the most fundamental stratum of experience
and that the foundational datum for all of our considerations is that we do so together. However,
in diagnoses of hallucination, delusion, or irrationality, the validity with which the other coconstitutes our shared world is denied: they do not constitute validities for us, that is, what can be
given to original intuition, and cannot be understood through what Husserl calls world-validities.
Ultimately, it is through the world as something shared – as something itself intersubjectively
constituted – that we can first understand both ourselves and the other in the ways that we do.41
My last special concern here is that the psychiatric context itself can foster a kind of
invalidation. The power dynamic between therapist or psychiatrist and patient, or scientist and
subject, in which the former figure strives to listen to and responsibly observe the latter but
ultimately subjects the latter to diagnoses and models (not to imply that doing so is ill-intended,
or that it is not often, even usually, benevolent) is one in which the familiar has the final word
over the unfamiliar, and where confirmation of the former’s hypotheses can only proceed, and in
a sense exclusively, from what is already known: from the possibilities afforded to the former by

This leads Husserl to a paradox. In The Crisis (1970, p. 179), he puts the point as follows: “But precisely here lies the
difficulty. Universal intersubjectivity, into which all objectivity, everything that exists at all, is resolved, can obviously be
nothing other than mankind; and the latter is undeniably a component part of the world. How can a component part of
the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation, one
which has always already become what it is and continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of
intentionally accomplished subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects accomplishing in cooperation, are themselves only a
partial formation within the total accomplishment?” He attempts to resolve the difficulty through an account of
functioning subjectivity, and specifically, functioning or transcendental intersubjectivity, for whom the world is present
or co-present. I am indifferent as to whether he succeeds in avoiding a kind of circularity but note that in the
pathological cases here under consideration, co-presence is jeopardized.
41
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their own experiences, by the normal community, and by imaginative variations (constrained as
they are!) thereof.
The critique has a number of implications. First, empathy is a legitimate method insofar
as it applies to what can be made familiar. There are a number of methods for making the
unfamiliar familiar. Jaspers suggests that the psychiatrist studies poetry, history, and literature.
There are also technological methods of familiarizing oneself with otherwise foreign phenomena,
such as augmented reality devices meant to, for example, disrupt ordinary visual perception in a
way suspected to mimic autism (e.g., Qin et al., 2014; Mikropoulos et al., 2020), we can produce
a number of illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, that may be relevant for understanding
pathology phenomena. But in all such cases, how can we know that the method has gotten it
right? I suspect that, for the phenomenologist considered so far, the answer will be harmonious
perception – does the new experience allow us to make sense, motivationally, of what we can
observe – the expressive behavior – of the other? This runs into a number of difficulties already
discussed, and I again suggest, as I will attempt to show in the next chapter, that, for a true
“confirmation,” communication is the ultimate recourse.
The difficulties exposed in this chapter rest on a theory of intersubjectivity that is
grounded in a certain structuralist conception of expression: expressive behavior, and properly
speaking perceptually similar bodily movement, is the ground of the pairing between myself and
the other, and binds us together in a kind of quasi-identification (what Husserl says is an
analogue but not “in the usual sense”). So tethered, the other can only be understood in relation
to oneself; radical difference, i.e., differences that cannot be articulated in terms of my own
imagined possibilities (however imaginative they may be, and however common this kind of
difference may turn out to be), cannot be accommodated. A theory of expression that can
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accommodate difference is required for an adequate understanding of abnormality, even if,
according to such a theory, our understanding will always be – in some way – inadequate; what
we need is a theory that reconceives of our fundamental relationship to the other and in doing so
does justice to the phenomena and, more importantly, as I will proceed to demonstrate, does
justice to the other.
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Chapter 2
Expression: The Interruption of
Sensibility and Freedom by Demand
Introduction
Expression is a central concept for phenomenological and enactivist approaches to the
problem of intersubjectivity: it is taken as the foundation for empathy and various forms of direct
(social) perception, and performs crucial functions for embodied, intersubjective co-regulation as
specified by dynamical systems theory approaches. The sense of the term, ‘expression’, is not
univocal, but typically includes some claim about the relationship between mind and body (and,
specifically, bodily action), and is more and more considered in its socio-cultural dimensions and
conditioning.
In this chapter, I consider two concepts of expression: the first, that of Edmund Husserl,
and the second, that of his student Emmanuel Levinas. The Husserlian notion is an early and still
influential one within phenomenology and applications of phenomenology to fields such as
cognitive science and psychopathology. The Levinasian notion, on the other hand, has been
largely overlooked. I explicate both notions of expression, and demonstrate that the latter
provides unique insight into the nature of subjectivity and the interpersonal relationship.
Specifically, the Levinasian notion allows us to address many of the same problems as
Husserlian expression, but also allows us to recognize the distinctly – and thoroughly – ethical
character of intersubjectivity.1
For each concept of expression, I provide the conditions out of which expressive
phenomena arise, indicate some problems that the concept is meant to solve in each thinker’s

The term ‘intersubjectivity’ is not found in Levinas, though it is a term quite familiar to Husserlians. I adopt the term
since it is the one used by my target audience, who know Husserl better than Levinas, to describe a relationship between
one (e.g., myself) and the Other. I use the term in a broad sense as referring to any such relation, though I must
recognize that doing so is not unproblematic.
1
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system of thought, specify the concept, and indicate the solutions it affords. I then compare the
accounts and consider some implications, objections and limitations. My central claim is that
Levinas’ concept of expression affords us an articulation of the ethical dimension of
interpersonal experience that allows us to conceptualize the relationship between ethics and
objectivity and can more readily serve as a foundation for phenomenological ethics than its
Husserlian counterpart. This is fruitful not only for phenomenology but also its interdisciplinary
applications, such as phenomenological cognitive science and psychopathology.
Husserl
In his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl takes up the project of establishing a basis for the
sense of objectivity found in experience as well as a foundation for a corresponding objective
knowledge. The possibility of objective knowledge depends on overcoming ‘the objection that
phenomenology entails solipsism’ (Husserl 1960, p. 89). In other words, the objection claims
that the phenomenologist cannot countenance the existence and sense of other consciousness
and, since phenomenology demonstrates that what appears is in the first instance inseparable
from its appearance, it follows that whatever appears to consciousness is incapable of being
constituted as transcending the individual subject to which it appears.2 Husserl explicitly takes up
a ‘solipsistic reduction’ (Husserl 1960, p. 155), or a ‘reduction to the sphere of one’s ownness’
(Husserl 1960, p. 92), in order to disclose the resources available to the subject for constituting
for itself the sense and existence of others, and there and elsewhere he demonstrates the
foundational role that the consciousness of others plays for the constitution of objective nature.

Riceour and Schutz both emphasize the importance of the existence of others for Husserl’s project, and use this
interpretation to found their critiques thereof. Others, such as Carr (1973; 1974) and Costelloe (1998), argue that
Husserl’s problem in the Cartesian meditations is not a ‘straightforward’ ‘problem of solipsism,’ meaning that Husserl is
not concerned with establishing the existence of others but only with the constitution of the sense: ‘other.’ They thus offer
refutations of Riceour and Schutz that perhaps apply to my interpretation here. I consider this latter interpretation
below.
2
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Ultimately, the foundation of our consciousness of the other and, thus, the constitution of
objectivity, depends on what Husserl conceives of as expression.
Husserlian phenomenology can be characterized as an investigation into one’s own
experience in order to discover universal forms of any possible experience. In this way,
phenomenology is an egology: it explicates the structures and features of the subject of
experience. But it also strives to move beyond this individual subject in order to found a broader
knowledge of both subjectivity in general, whether my own or that of another, as well as that
which subjectivity constitutes for itself, e.g., things, the world, and objective nature. At this
stage, Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations earn their name: phenomenology’s foundation is the
cogito, but the goal is to discover within the cogito – by initiating a kind of investigation into the
nature of the cogito missed by Descartes – a foundation for all other knowledge (Husserl 1960,
pp. 155-7). Though Husserl admits that the reflecting philosopher is never really alone, the
reduction of all appearance to phenomena appearing in some intentional mode or other – the
bracketing of the actuality of that which appears in favor of an intentional analysis for which
constitution and correlation become the primary functions – requires philosophical reflection to
take a subject hypostasized by itself as its starting point. Husserl begins with the hypothesis of
solipsism to demonstrate the inadequacy of solipsism, not proceeding by a kind of proof by
contradiction but rather by demonstrating that solipsistic experience contains within itself that
which is necessary for its own transcendence.
At the heart of his response to the objection of solipsism is Husserl’s concept of
expression. In our own lives, our bodily and psychic states and actions are separable only in
abstraction: they are lived as unified, and only in reflection can we describe this unity as psychophysical. Specifically, our bodily movements express our subjectivity. Through a process called
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‘bodily coupling’ there occurs a ‘transfer of sense’ from experience of one’s own movements to
the perceived movements of the other. Initially, the bodily movements of another (at first a
spatio-temporal thing) are recognized as similar to my own. There thus occurs a synthetic
achievement by which my movements and the other’s are constituted as belonging to the same
type. Next, as my bodily movements belong to the type ‘expression,’ for which the essential
characteristic is psycho-physical unity, the bodily movements of the other become constituted as
one aspect (physical) of a psychophysical unity. Like my own movements, they take on the sense
of expressing subjectivity. However, since I live through my own psychic life in union with my
bodily actions but, on the other hand, only directly perceive the bodily action of the other and not
their subjectivity, the subjectivity of the other thus expressed belongs to a distinct subject: not to
the ego, but to an alter-ego (Husserl 1960, pp. 90, 94, 100). This intentional act, founded on
expression and, accordingly, on bodily coupling and transfer of sense, by which the other is
given as an alter-ego to the ego, based only on what appears immediately for the ego (structures
of its own subjectivity and spatio-temporal movement), Husserl calls “empathy.”
It is not that the movements of the other are given as formal, empty expressions of
subjectivity: the similarities that found empathy pertain to the specific content of subjective
experience. The movements of the other are made sense of in terms of one’s own, contentful
experience to the extent that similarity pertains between them. Perception of the other’s
movements thus takes on a more or less determinate character, as perception of <this> or <that>;
movement as <this>, movement as <that>. That is, not only can we perceive that the other
expresses subjectivity but also (according to Husserl as well as many contemporary
phenomenologists, especially in the context of philosophical cognitive science and
psychopathology) the particular states that the other undergoes. A smile, as resembling my own
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smile, and in familiar circumstances, has a specific, familiar meaning: I see the other as happy, or
insincere, mischievous, etc.3
Through empathy, the ego constitutes the other, as alter-ego, for itself. The things of the
world which had previously appeared to consciousness now take on the sense of being given not
only to one’s own possible intentional states, but also possibly to the other, or even to the other
and not me. That is, the constitution of the other founds a sense that the world is not exhausted
by me but, rather, is shared. The things of the world take on a new sense of independence,
becoming ‘objects,’ and the world gains its sense of objectivity.
Levinas
Levinas disagrees that the ego contains within itself the resources necessary for
overcoming solipsism, which he often calls “separation” or “atheism.” Yet, in Totality and
Infinity, he performs an abstraction analogous to Husserl’s solipsistic reduction: he considers the
human being in the position of solipsism, or ‘alone,’ and offers an account of the way in which
she can escape such a position. As he notes, “In the separated being,” which I have so far
referred to as solipsistic, “the door to the outside must be at the same time open and closed”
(Levinas, 1969, p. 148).4 Much of what proceeds from this abstraction can be understood as an
explication, first, of the closure of the separated being achieved by sensibility, and only then of
the openness revealed by the expression of the Other, which appears at the limit of the sensible.5
For more on this point, see Husserl 1960, p. 119, where Husserl affirms that ‘an appresentation of someone else
continually furnishes new appresentational contents – that is to say, brings the changing contents of the other to definite
notice’. Additionally, there is some debate in contemporary phenomenological and enactivist cognitive science as to
whether, in addition to seeing that the other is happy (for example), we also see the other’s happiness. Husserl appears to be
of two minds on this question. It is not, in this context, crucial that I take a stance on this, but – against recent take-up
of Levinas’ thought in these fields, such as by Overgaard (2003) – Levinas does not seem obviously in agreement with a
direct perception theory that maintains one can see the other’s mental states, at least not in any unmediated, sensory way.
3

Note how different an understanding of the separated being as having a door is from Husserl’s well-known formulation
of the subject as a monad that has “no doors” but rather “windows (which are acts of empathy)” (HUA XIV, 260). In
Husserl, monads can experience one another, but do not welcome. For Levinas, the reverse is true.
4
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In Otherwise than Being, this openness and closure are presented in a more holistic and dynamic
way, but the relationship between these texts is complicated.
Sensibility
Levinas maintains that “sensibility enacts the very separation of being – separated and
independent” (Levinas 1969, p. 138). Carrying out a kind of ‘solipsistic reduction’ that aims to
consider the ego precisely in its separation from Others means, then, that sensibility is our
starting point.6 Levinas does not tend to provide his readers with clear, stable, individual
definitions of that which he considers. Instead, he tends to define and redefine, to refer one
concept to another and then, later, to still others, introducing complications at each turn.
Sensibility is variously defined by Levinas, and always in reference to other central concepts. In
Totality and Infinity, the central concepts for understanding sensibility include enjoyment,
contentment, the body, life, egoism and hedonism. In section II, part B, subsection 4, titled
“Sensibility,” Levinas claims that sensibility is “the mode of enjoyment” (Levinas 1969, p. 135;
italics in original), later describing it as “the instance of enjoyment” (Levinas 1969, p. 136), and
even asserts, simply, that “Sensibility is enjoyment” (Levinas 1969, p. 136; italics mine). To
make sense of these characterizations, we must first say something of enjoyment.7

In English, “Autre” and “Autrui” are both translated as “other.” Autre refers to whatever is not the ego but refers back
to it, back to sensibility, hedonism, power, and a system constructed by the ego. Autrui refers to the human other. L’autre
is not typically seen as “other enough” by Levinas and does not correspond to transcendence. Autrui, however, is the
other that Levinas has in mind when he talks about the social or interpersonal relation. I here follow Lingis’s convention
(in Totality and Infinity) of translating “autre” as “other” with a lower-case “o,” and Autrui as “Other” with a capital “O.”
5

This is a crucial aspect of the entire strategy of Totality and Infinity. Levinas writes that “Revelation is discourse; in order
to welcome revelation a being apt for this role of interlocutor, a separated being, is required” (1969, p. 77). That is,
without a separated being, transcendence is not possible. Or, were the subject all-inclusive, there could be no radical
alterity. Or again, without finitude, there could be no idea of infinity, formulated as a thought that thinks more than
itself, and produced in the subject’s encounter with the Other. Since sensibility enacts separation, sensibility becomes the
first major consideration of the separated being.
6

Kas Saghafi has pointed out to me that “enjoyment” translates jouir, which, due to its sexual meaning, underscores and
emphasizes the relation to the body.
7
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According to Levinas, enjoyment – not intentionality (understood as consciousness-of,
and of which Levinas is, perhaps in part unfairly, dismissive) nor practical circumspection –
characterizes our fundamental relationship with the world. The sensitive being is the body
(Levinas 1969, p. 136), and the body is simultaneously a closure and openness to the world: the
body has needs, and, through sensibility, relates to the world that supports it, making possible the
satisfaction of those needs. Enjoyment, however, cannot be understood merely in terms of a
means-end practical relationship, where the things that we encounter in the world are given to us
first as tools defined by a practical finality, that is, merely as things with which to satisfy our
ends. Rather, Levinas claims, the sensitive being comes to take a stance towards this very
process of satisfaction, making the satisfaction of needs into its own end, rather than only a
means: we take pleasure in satisfying our needs, “we live from ‘good soup” (Levinas 1969, p.
110); “The need for food does not have existence as its goal, but food” (Levinas 1969, p. 134).
That is, we do not only eat to live, and to assert that the meaning of eating derives first from a
kind of means-end relation is to ignore the relationship the living, feeling body actually has to
food, and the significance of eating for the living body.8
The way that we relate to the world through enjoyment is characterized precisely by
sensibility. It is as a sensitive body that one both has needs and can relate itself to a world,
feeling the world and the very relationship between them. Levinas writes:
The sensibility we are describing starting with enjoyment of the element does not belong to
the order of thought but to that of sentiment, that is, the affectivity wherein the egoism of the I
pulsates. One does not know, one lives sensible qualities: the green of these leaves, the red of
this sunset. (Levinas 1969, p. 135)

8

Indeed, for Levinas, “Food can be interpreted as an implement only in a world of exploitation” (1969, p. 134).
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Sensibility is thus a matter of the affective body, both in its capacity to be affected by and to
affect worldly things. Rather than knowing an object, one lives sensible qualities, and it is the
latter, according to Levinas, that ultimately grounds the former. Adriaan Peperzak characterizes
Levinas’ sensibility accordingly, demonstrating its divergence from ‘traditional conceptions of
the senses’:
Sensibility is the name for that dimension of the human subject thanks to which it is able to
have this pleasurable commerce with the elements (108-14/134-40). Against the traditional
conception of the senses as the means through which we are able to know things, Levinas
shows that the basic sensibility, in which all other intentions and relations are rooted, is an
affective commerce with the elements, a naïve and spontaneous feeling at home in a world
that has not yet taken the form of an order of things, objects, instruments, and rational
relationships. (Peperzak 1993, p. 156)
The language of Otherwise than Being emphasizes sensibility as “vulnerability, exposure to
outrage, to wounding” (Levinas 1981, p. 15), which allows us to make sense of certain claims in
Totality and Infinity that seem to imply, despite Levinas’ occasional equation of enjoyment with
happiness, that sensibility does not refer solely to happiness but to an entire affectivity: not only
happiness but also despair and suffering, as “a failing of happiness” (Levinas 1969, p. 115). To
sense is to relate oneself to something that “delights or saddens [life]” (Levinas 1969, p. 112).
The body is that through which, in virtue of sensibility, the ego becomes constituted as a being
separated from but dwelling within a world which matters to it, in which it takes a stance towards
its own activity not only in terms of finality but in terms of happiness and suffering, joy and
sorrow, pleasure and pain. It is in these terms, on a Levinasian picture, that the ego is constituted
by sensibility, as it is in these terms that the embodied being relates to the world and to itself.
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Furthermore, the egoism of the separated being is a hedonism. The human being, as a
sensible creature, discovers the world through its enjoyment of the world, that is, its vulnerability
to a world that fills its life with happiness or misery. It is in these terms that the world becomes
meaningful, and so we can see that hedonism is both a moral and ontological term, describing a
certain motivational character of sensibility as well as characterizing the manner in which the
world is disclosed.9 Sensibility is in part a motivational basis that conditions the very being of
the ego. Peperzak, as one of few commentators who provides an in-depth consideration of this
hedonism, is again useful:
This self-identity of Me is more than a logical tautology; it is the concrete activity of selfidentification through which I establish myself as inhabitant and owner of my world. The
concrete way of my being what I am – in the supposition that we can make an abstraction
from all encounters with other people – is the egoism of my enjoying, ruling, and
transforming the world according with my needs.10 (Peperzak 1993, p. 136)
This hedonism is a first, inadequate morality at the heart of the ego’s very existence. Hedonism
is not inadequate for being in some way “bad” or owing to some badness, , since it is a condition
of the ego’s existence, as built into the very sensibility that constitutes the ego. Hedonism, when
considered from the perspective of separation, is not yet a transgression against any Other, “Not
against the Others,” “but entirely deaf to the Other” (Levinas 1969, p. 134).11 At this level of

Levinas often has Heideggerian philosophy in mind when he writes of ontology, though he seems to also lump Hegel
into this category, as well as many specific claims made by Husserl.
9

Peperzak also ties this hedonism to the central project of Totality and Infinity, specified in footnote 6 above: “The
enjoyment of a corporeal and terrestrial existence is constitutive for any ego: the I establishes itself as a self through the
absorption of elements, things, or events or by submitting them to the I’s domination and possession. Without this
appropriating and hedonic egocentrism, there would be no relationship to other persons because this relation
presupposes a basic level of individual independence, even if further analyses will show the relativity of this
independence” (1993, pp. 24-5).
10
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abstraction, hedonism is unavoidable. Peperzak writes that “In this still solitary dimension, the
law of life is: Enjoy life and enjoy the earth as much as possible” (Peperzak 1993, p. 36).
To say that hedonism is, in the ego’s separation, unavoidable, is to invoke what Levinas
refers to as sensibility’s contentment. Contentment does not here mean that all one’s bodily
needs are satisfied. Rather, in the context of this dissertation, we read contentment as a claim that
the sensible being (contra Husserl) does not contain in itself the resources necessary for
transcending solipsism: the sensible being does not – cannot – constitute the Other for itself. As
such, the world of sensibility is inherently a world of hedonism, disclosed in terms of enjoyment.
Levinas formulates “the permanent truth of hedonist moralities” precisely in terms of the
contentment of egoism:
…to not seek behind the satisfaction of need, an order relative to which alone satisfaction
would acquire a value; to take satisfaction, which is the very meaning of pleasure, as a term.
[…] need is naïve. In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the
Other, I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone. (Levinas 1969, p. 134)
Sensibility thus constitutes a separated and hedonistic being, i.e., the ego, whose very way of
being is structured by a content enjoyment, an enjoyment that does not search beneath itself, nor
that which it enjoys, for its very condition. As content, the ego knows no Other: all that it
encounters it encounters as for itself, to be appropriated as part of “the same”. At this stage, there
is a certain resemblance – though extremely limited – between the condition of the separated
being in Levinas and the solipsistic ego in Husserl: without the Other, the world as present to the
ego does not transcend the ego itself; all presence refers back to the ego. The major difference, of

Since Levinas takes expression to be speech, he also speaks of separation as involving ‘deafness.’ I am aware that this
term might be considered an ableist slur, especially here where ethics itself depends on ‘hearing’ the other. This term
does not here refer to literal deafness, of course, but I recognize that it remains problematic.
11
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course, is that for Husserl this is a matter of the world presenting itself to actual and possible
intentional acts: the world does not transcend the ego’s own intentionality. But for Levinas, the
world is first present in terms of enjoyment, which is not understood in terms of an intentionality
in which an act and an object become correlated, but rather in terms of the body as an exposure
to the world, and the very living through of the world by that body. Indeed, Levinas maintains
that intentionality, thought, cognition, representation, truth and even meaning rest on the prior
condition of sensibility as enjoyment.
Similarly, a problem of objectivity arises: if the world does not transcend the ego, then
experience of the world is a subjectivism. The problem is no longer merely epistemological,
however, but thoroughly ethical: at its rock-bottom foundation of sensibility, the ego already
adheres to a specific morality, i.e., hedonism. Anticipating a solution to the problem, the Other
not only founds objectivity in Levinas, but also reveals the necessary inadequacy of hedonist
morality. Indeed, the solution, too, partially resembles Husserl’s own, in which the constitution
of the Other reveals to me a perspective similar to but distinct from my own, to which the world
may also appear. Peperzak notes that “Objects are born when I place things in the perspective of
other persons…” (Peperzak 1993, p. 165). For Levinas, however, the ego cannot constitute the
Other for itself, and the Other is not constituted on the basis of a perceived similarity to myself,
or even at the level of perception at all. Rather, the approach of the Other is a matter of the
disruption of sensibility, of calling the ego into question. The previous quote continues…
“…Detached from their hedonistic and egocentric function, those things receive an
intersubjective meaning and existence” (Peperzak 1993, p. 165; italics mine). We must now ask,
as we did for Husserl, for the nature of our relationship to the Other such as to found objectivity.
But now, this question bears with it a distinctly ethical significance. As in Husserl, the answer to
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this question – what is our fundamental relation to the Other, on which objectivity and, for
Levinas, a refutation of egoistic morality, depend? – begins with expression.
Expression
Levinas offers a more radical notion of expression than does Husserl, for whom
expression refers to a kind of behavioristic sign: an intuitive datum interpreted in relation to
one’s own familiar horizons of experience, gaining its sense as signifying a subjectivity similar
to but distinct from my own through the achievement of synthetic acts in which meaning is
transferred from one(-self) to the other. The other, as revealed to empathy, on the Husserlian
picture, is constituted by the ego and for the ego as a modification of the ego, that is, as alter-ego,
“conceivable only as an analogue of something included in my peculiar ownness’ (Husserl 1960,
p. 115). The Levinasian concept does not follow this trajectory. While Levinas could also accept
Husserl’s claim that the Other is never given originally (Husserl 1960, pp. 114-5), he insists that
any conceptualization of the Other, insofar as all concepts – all thought – refer back to myself, is
inherently inadequate. While skeptical of any ‘appresentation’ of the Other in the Husserlian
sense, and maintaining that the Other is she who precisely does not appear in experience (even or
especially as an ‘alter-ego’ correlated with my own through a unity of our expressive acts in
understanding), Levinas speaks of a distinct kind of presence of the Other:
The presence of the Other, or expression, source of all signification, is not contemplated as an
intelligible essence, but is heard as language, and thereby is effectuated exteriorly.
Expression, or the face, overflows images, which are always immanent to my thought, as
though they came from me. (Levinas 1969, p. 297)
This presence (which is perhaps equivalent to what is called ‘the trace’ in Otherwise than Being
(Levinas 1981, p. 12, and throughout)) is not the presence of an intuition given to perception or a
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sign interpreted by an understanding always situated within its familiar horizons: the face, at
times identified with expression, is not the empirical face accessible to vision, and, as Levinas
states in his interviews with Phillippe Nemo,
The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one
observes the color of the eyes one is not in the social relationship with the Other. The relation
with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what
cannot be reduced to that. (Levinas 1985, p. 86)
Instead of perception and understanding, the relation to the Other is language or speech, which
proposes, and thus precedes, a (common) world to us. We do not first perceive or understand the
Other, but, rather, our first relation to the Other is discourse; it is on the basis of conversation
that I may subsequently come to understand her.12 Expression is a form of saying which is the
condition of anything at all being said.
The face is that through which the Other expresses herself, and as such I begin with the
face. First, we must clarify that the ‘face’, for Levinas, is not the empirical face, and does not
strictly correspond to it. Rather, “face” is Levinas’ term for the entire body, insofar as it is
expressive: the face is the expressive body. Peperzak writes that “The word ‘face’ can be
replaced by ‘expression’ or ‘word’ or ‘speech’ (la parole)” (Peperzak 1993, p. 142), and Barbara
Jane Davy points out that “Expression is not merely verbal for Levinas, because the significance
even of actual speech is not just words but meaning” (Davy 2007, p. 50). She goes on to cite a

Levinas sometimes speaks of the relationship to the other (even substitution; see Chapter 5 below) as “maternal,” or
describes the self in relation to the other as “the maternal psyche” or the psyche as “the maternal body”; embodiment in
contact with the other, vulnerable to the other and bearing an asymmetric responsibility, is maternity (Levinas, 1981, pp.
67, 71, 75-9; throughout). Interestingly, Diane Perpich (2008) provides a broadly developmental reading of the way that
the other (she emphasizes the father figure, rather than mother, but I believe the idea of maternity is here the
appropriate one) brings us into the world. Richard Cohen (in Gantt, 2002) argues that maternity is key to understanding
the psyche in its specifically psychological sense.
12
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useful passage in which Levinas explicitly states that “the whole body – a hand or a curve of the
shoulder – can express as the face” (Levinas 1969, p. 262).
In what way does the face “overwhelm images,” or escape domination by perception?
There is indeed an ambiguity at play. Otherwise than Being makes clear, and Totality and
Infinity raises the question of, the fact that it is within sensibility that we encounter the body and
expression of the Other. Yet, it is crucial for maintaining the alterity or exteriority of the Other,
i.e., for arguing that the Other is irreducible to the ego’s familiar domain, that she nevertheless
escape this sensible manifestation. In arguing that Levinas maintains a kind of direct perception
theory, according to which the Other is intuitively present to perception, Søren Overgaard cites
Levinas’ claim that “In expression the manifestation and the manifested coincide” (Overgaard,
2005, p. 268, citing Levinas 1969, p. 296), taking this as evidence that the Other is indeed, in a
certain qualified sense, “extremely” or “personally” present in their expression. The relevant
passage continues:
…the manifested attends its own manifestation and hence remains exterior to every image one
would retain of it, presents itself in the sense that we say of someone that he presents himself
by stating his name, which permits evoking him, even though he remains always the source of
his own presence. (Levinas 1969, p. 296)
The presence of the Other in their manifestation is not as something perceived or apperceived;
rather, it is as attendance to manifestation, source of presence, or “source of meaning” (Levinas
1969, p. 51; Overgaard, 2005, p. 269; Davy, 2007 makes a similar claim). The Other is not
something expressed alongside their manifestation, as something coinciding with it in perception
– they are not perceived together – but rather the Other is she who expresses herself. Attendance
is not something perceived, but the fact that the Other can defend, rearticulate, double-down-on
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or un-say her word, calling into question any interpretation of that word by the ego, “overflowing
[any] idea a thought would carry away from it” (Levinas 1969, p. 51). The Other escapes their
word, their manifestation, but coincides with it as she who speaks that very word. Reinforcing
this point on manifestation and the distinct form of presence achieved by expression, Levinas
writes that “expression does not manifest the presence of being by referring from the sign to the
signified; it presents the signifier. The signifier, he who gives the sign, is not signified” (Levinas
1969, p. 182).
Though expression is equated with speech, it is not simply one sign among others,
signifying the Other in the way apperception would present an alter-ego through the perception
of a familiar gesture. In Ethics and Infinity, Levinas states that “In discourse I have always
distinguished, in fact, between the saying and the said… the saying is the fact that before the
face I do not simply remain there contemplating it, I respond to it” (Levinas 1985, p. 88). This
distinction is a central theme in Otherwise than Being, and is perhaps the primary way that
Levinas there approaches the topic of expression. Though every saying refers also to something
said (and vice versa), it is saying, considered as irreducible to the said, that characterizes speech
as expression.
William Simmons clearly formulates this distinction so as to highlight the irreducibility
of the saying to the said, distinguishing Levinas’ approach from “traditional theories of
expression.” He writes that “In the traditional view, language originates with the speaker. The
speaker intends to speak, formulates thoughts into words, then expresses them. The ego is preeminent” (Simmons 1999, 88). Note that Husserl’s view of expression in the Logical
Investigations, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Ideas I, and Husserliana XI,
XIX, XXVI (references taken from Moran & Cohen, 2012, pp. 116-118) corresponds to this
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traditional view: there, before he becomes primarily concerned with our experience of other
people in the face of the objection by solipsism, expression refers to a sign that delivers a
meaning already present for (“internal to”) the ego. Simmons continues:
Levinas, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the addressee. The focus is thus shifted
from the ego to the Other. ‘The activity of speaking robs the subject of its central position; it
is the depositing of a subject without refuge. The speaking subject is no longer by and for
itself; it is for the other. (Simmons 1999, p. 88; citing Peperzak 1993, p. 221)
What is said refers to a sign produced alongside an act of expression, a something or
content picked out by language. As Simmons and Levinas both emphasize, it is the said that
carries the “as” structure characteristic of intentionality: it specifies ‘a this as that.’ Traditionally,
this issues from the subject considered as speaker, and is an exercise of his power. However, any
said presuppose saying, in which the Other approaches the ego, addressing them in expression.
Simmons writes that “Before any speech, before any intention to speak, there is ‘an exposure of
the ego to the other, the non-indifference to another’, which is not a simple ‘intention to address
a message” (Simmons 1999, p. 88; citing Levinas 1981, p. 48). It is in speech construed as
saying that the Other opens onto the ego, exposing herself to question and response and,
crucially, imposing herself on the ego by demanding response. It is risky to construe saying even
as an act (that, for instance, delivers a said), since this risks covering up its ethical significance –
that saying is a relation with an irreducible other, who affects me in my passivity by calling me
to responsibility – with categorical/ontological terms.
Expression is not just a communication of content, but communication as such, discourse:
addressing the ego as an interlocutor called to respond. It is this aspect of speech as saying
which, furthermore, indicates the way the Other always escapes, eludes, or overflows what is
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said, as well as perception; as saying, as approach, as expression and a call to response, the Other
stands behind their word and at its defense. The Other, revealed to the ego through expression, is
not captured by the ego in that expression, and is thus incessant. Expression, and the
corresponding inadequacy of any idea that attempts to capture it as signifying the Other in
something said, can be characterized by the incessancy with which saying always undergirds and
resists the said which presupposes it. The said carries with it a foundation for ontology, as
specifying a world in terms of signs, specifying ‘a this as that’, but the saying which addresses
the ego as an interlocutor, demanding from him a response, is – qua demand, approach,
imposition – already ethical. The Other approaches us through our sensibility, signifying the
world in sensible signs, but always standing behind those signs as someone exposed to the world;
language exposes us to the Other, exposes the exposure of the Other. Founding thought of the
world beyond our own naïve sensibility is one sense in which Levinas can think “Ethics as first
philosophy” (Levinas, 1989).
As in Husserl, one problem with conceiving the ego as a separated being is the problem
of objectivity: the world is inseparable from the ego to which it is given. A newly articulated
problem is that of hedonism: the way that the world is given to the separated being is through
enjoyment, and the ego is thus a kind of hedonist. Expression resolves these issues by calling the
naïvity of sensibility into question: the incessancy with which the Other can always challenge the
ego disrupts a sensibility which is content in itself – it demonstrates a failure of sensibility to
establish the existence it had taken for granted. Insofar as speech is demand and imposition, it
calls into question the ego’s freedom to pursue for itself whatever contributes to its happiness: no
longer are the only questions posed to the ego by itself those concerned with its own enjoyment,
e.g., how best to enjoy worldly things for itself, or when, i.e., hedonistic questions, but now also
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include whether the ego ought enjoy these things at all. The hungry Other who approaches the
ego and expresses herself calls into question the ego’s right to their food, thus instituting a kind
of rationality that Levinas takes to be foundational of all rationality. In his introduction to
Otherwise than Being, Alphonso Lingis leverages Levinas’ frequent formulation of being-foranother, which we might call ‘ethical subjectivity’ (or, perhaps more radical and simple, just
‘subjectivity’), writing that “To acknowledge the imperative force of another […] is, materially,
to give sustenance to another, ‘to give to the other [Autrui] the bread from one’s own mouth”
(Levinas, 1981, p. xxviii).
Peperzak writes that “Face, speech, and expression are the concrete manners by which
the irreducibility of the Other comes to the fore and surprises me, disrupts my world, accuses and
refuses my egoism” (Peperzak 1993, p. 142). As disrupting sensibility, simultaneously resisting
perception and making a demand on the ego – disrupting my world and accusing me –
expression founds objectivity over naïve sensibility and ethics over hedonist morality.
Juxtaposition
The major, fundamental differences between Husserl’s and Levinas’ concepts of
expression have to do with the ego’s power over – or one might say right to – the Other, and the
foundational role of similarity as opposed to difference. For Husserl, our relation to the other is
founded on a basic similarity pertaining between us, which allows the ego to conceive of or
otherwise direct itself towards the other, through intentional acts and synthetic achievements of
its own, to the other conceived of in the ego’s terms: the other is an alter-ego, distinct from but
similar to myself, and known by me on the basis of that similarity. There is established, through
empathy as a perception of expressive behavior, an increase in the ego’s power: it constitutes
both the other and the world for itself, through its own perception and experience. On the other
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hand, for Levinas, expression presupposes disruption and difference, rather than similarity – the
calling into question of the ego’s sensibility and their right to the world; our fundamental relation
to the Other is not a relation with an alter-ego, like myself, but rather with an interlocutor who
calls me into question.
The alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me,
for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply between us that community of genus
which already nullifies alterity… The relation between the Other and me, which draws forth
in his expression, issues neither in number nor in concept. The Other remains infinitely
transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals
to me breaks with the world that can be common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our
nature and developed by our existence. Speech proceeds from absolute difference. (Levinas
1969, p. 194)
The Husserlian conception of expression has been and will continue to be a useful one,
and it is in part its usefulness that has earned it a prominent place in phenomenological thought.
In phenomenology, it allows us to conceive of the other in familiar terms, founding
understanding on an easily recognizable basis. In phenomenological science more broadly, the
familiar structures of the ego founded by phenomenology – e.g., time-form, identifying
synthesis, and so on – provide a basis for investigating others and communities. For instance, in
cognitive science the intentional structures of the ego are assumed and extended to others in
order to articulate particular modes of thinking; similar holds true for phenomenological
approaches to affectivity. In psychopathology, it is typically these familiar structures of the ego,
supposed to apply in broad strokes to others, that allows for explanations by modification and
deficit: schizophrenia becomes ordinary experience minus some aspect of time-form, or
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depression becomes ordinary experience except with a modification of <familiar structure
determined by phenomenology as egology>…
One difficulty, however, is that similarity must be presupposed to get such an approach
off the ground. The relevant similarities pertain not only to the material body in its shape or
form, but also in expression, and thus are subject to culture, situation, and the languages that
serve us well enough in everyday life. For these reasons, Jaspers, for example, was skeptical of
the possibility of intercultural psychology, and thought some psychopathological experiences
were simply “un-understandable” (Jaspers, 1997). In cases where the foundational similarity for
Husserlian expression is undermined or otherwise cannot be presupposed, then, the method
amounts to a crude and inaccurate projection. This is especially troublesome in psychopathology,
where what is thematic is not similarity but difference, and where it seems that an application of
one’s own familiar structures to the other is especially suspect. Another, deeper concern is the
question of confirming presuppositions of similarity, even when they hold. We assume a
relationship, modeled on oneself, between movements and psychical states, but Husserlian
phenomenology itself accepts that the psychic states of the other can never be given originarily.
That is, our intentional acts directed to the other cannot be fulfilled in the ordinary way. Instead,
it is through ongoing experience of the other – harmonious perception – that we come to
confirm, though never conclusively, our understanding of the other.
All of this neglects another presupposition, however, which is precisely the
presupposition of an originary communication between self and Other, a form of expression by
which the Other expresses herself, regardless of my interpretation of that expression. It is on the
basis of the Other actually coming into contact with oneself, precisely as someone else
irreducible to me, that I can begin to make sense of the Other as someone like me. This is the
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bed-rock foundation of harmonious perception, and of any interpretation of the other whatsoever;
this is the basic fact on which intersubjectivity stands. To reiterate a point made earlier: First is
communication, regardless of what is communicated and its recognizability, and only on that
basis can there be understanding. Similarity is not a simple fact of which the individual is aware,
but rather this awareness must be produced by coming to terms with the Other, and this means
coming to terms with her on her terms, not my own.
This point is all the more important when we consider not only the foundational role
played by the Other for the constitution of the world as objective, but also for the constitution of
particular objectivities: it is, on both accounts, the Other who allows one to formulate specific
things as objective, providing a concrete perspective on what might otherwise appear only to
oneself. But here, similarity is only useful insofar as one is dealing with a real object, and of
course one cannot know if that is the case without at least some Others confirming our own
experience. It is through expressing herself that the other confirms or denies our experience, and
it is specifically expression as saying, rather than as something said (which I can already
recognize or appropriate as my own), that founds an understanding of what exists as an object
and what is perhaps only idiosyncratic. At the level of the said, or expression in Husserl’s sense,
there is already a kind of validity of my own experience of the world that Levinas calls into
question, by making the similarity that founds that very expression dependent on contact with an
Other whose expression is not reducible to the familiar.
A fruitful way of formulating the difference between these approaches is in terms of a
distinction between recollection and teaching. On the Husserlian approach, our awareness of the
other is a kind of recollection, or maieutics (Levinas, 1969, p. 51 and throughout). We retrieve
something from our own experience – a relationship between my own bodily movements and my
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own mental life – and then apply it to something in perception – the bodily movements of the
other. We understand the other in terms of ourselves, though of course in Husserl there remains
the possibility of modification, negation and recombination, and the necessary numerical
distinction between myself and the other: the alter-ego is similar to me but is not me, owing to
my inability to experience her psychic life originarily; they are another ego. Likewise, when the
other proposes something to us, we make sense of it by reference to what we have already
experienced; the meaning of phenomena is always situated within the context of what the ego
has already undergone. For Levinas, however, the Other disrupts my experience and calls it into
question: their first act is not necessarily the confirmation of what I already know, with the
addition of a sense of objectivity, but rather a demonstration of the inadequacy of the individual
perspective and a calling of attention to that which escapes it. In the case of concrete, worldly
things, the Other, through proposing the world in language, can teach us to attend to what we
may ourselves have missed, what we may ourselves have not already experienced. This is not a
project of making the implicit explicit but, rather, of learning, teaching. Whereas maieutics is “to
receive nothing of the Other but what is in me” (Levinas, 1969, p. 43), teaching “comes from the
exterior and brings me more than I contain” (Levinas, 1969, p. 51). In maieutics, expression is
already interpreted by a meaning – a transfer of sense – determined within the egos own
experience, and is then transformable as a modification of that egocentric meaning. For Levinas,
on the other hand, “Discourse [or expression] is not simply a modification of intuition, but an
original relation with exterior being… It is the production of meaning” (Levinas, 1969, p. 66;
brackets mine).
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant
he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive from the
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Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this
also means: to be taught” (Levinas, 1969, p. 51).
Building on this passage, Davy claims that “Conversation with the Other that is welcomed, as
when one is open to learning from the Other, is a teaching” (Davy, 2007, p. 57). The appropriate
response to the Other, not only in order to challenge hedonism but also for the establishment of
objectivity, is therefore not first understanding or perception, not first a recognition of similarity,
but, rather, to welcome the Other across difference.
An Objection
It might be argued that this reading of Husserl is simply misled. One way this can be
done is by arguing that Husserl, in his fifth Cartesian Meditation, is not concerned with the
existence of the other but, instead, the very sense: ‘other’. David Carr (1973; 1974) and Timothy
M. Costelloe (1998) take this position. They orient this discussion around Schutz’ criticism of
Husserl, in which he claims that rather than accounting for the existence of the other, he
illegitimately presupposes it. The thrust of Carr and Costelloe’s position is that Husserl begins
with the rich, everyday world in which we encounter others, and takes such an encounter – and
the very meaning of ‘other’ – as a datum to be explained within the phenomenological reduction,
pointing out that the “bracketing” characteristic of such a reduction is not skepticism or doubt
(akin to Descartes’) but, rather, only a putting existence aside in order to understand the
production of meaning, or sense, and the ego’s contribution to that production. Solipsism is a
problem from within the phenomenological reduction, but not from the world with which
phenomenology begins. What is in question for Husserl, according to Carr and Costelloe, is how
the ego can have a sense of the other, and what precisely this sense amounts to.
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I first point out a difference between Husserl and Levinas when it comes to existence, and
then turn to consider the sense of the other in Husserl.
Supposing for argument’s sake,that Husserl is indeed not interested in the existence of the
other, then this existence is left an enigma. It is often claimed that the traditional problem of
solipsism does not occur within phenomenology or, otherwise, that phenomenology resolves it.
Yet, if the traditional question concerns the existence of the other, and that very existence is
bracketed by Husserl, then phenomenology does not answer the question. Indeed, since the sense
of the other is something accomplished by the intentionality and synthetic achievements of the
ego (even if passive), it seems that the ego could constitute the other in the absence of any actual
other. We in fact do this all the time, seeing subjectivity in inanimate objects or even in the
anonymous machinations of the cosmos. An intuitive and perhaps familiar example is that of a
chatbot, which we may, for a time, think is a real interlocutor, but in fact is not. In such a case,
we may constitute the sense ‘other’ in the absence of any actually existing other. While Husserl’s
approach is explanatory in such cases, demonstrating the production of such a sense, it
nevertheless does not amount to a solution of the problem of solipsism, as the existence of the
other is not even necessary for such a production. I take the process of bracketing to not be
tantamount to blindly accepting everyday experience, and as such this existence of the other still
calls for some kind of explanation, if the non-existence of the other would compromise the very
achievement of objectivity meant to be carried out by the ego producing for itself a “sense” of
this potentially non-existent thing.
On the other hand, for Levinas, the ego cannot constitute the Other for itself, since the
Other is not an alter-ego nor reducible to anything familiar. He often formulates this position in
terms of Descartes’ idea of infinity, which the finite being cannot produce for itself and thus
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must receive from something exterior to itself; for Descartes’, this exteriority is God, and for
Levinas it is the Other. Levinas thus takes a metaphysical orientation to the Other, and imposes a
kind of transcendental requirement: proximity to or contact with an actually existing Other,
through expression across difference, is necessary for Levinas’ understanding of the sense
‘other’ (if we can be forgiven this language), in opposition to a concept of the other as alter-ego.
Contact with an actually existent other is necessary for calling the ego into question,
demonstrating its sensibility and the hedonism inseparable from it to both be inadequate. We can
see in Husserl that such a disruption does not occur, as the other takes on its sense from the ego
itself.
We might turn the above counterexamples against Levinas, showing that he too does not
solve the traditional problem of solipsism. In that regard, then, the theories would coincide. It is
important to note that Levinas does not formulate his project in terms of the problem of
solipsism, but his project does entail some response to the problem: as opposed to Husserl’s takeup of the problem, Levinas wants to affirm a kind of separation between self and other while
nevertheless overcoming this separation in ethical (rather than perceptual) terms. In any case,
when we compare Husserl and Levinas, the Other and her role in experience is of much more
central concern for Levinas; the major reason for this is that, for Levinas, an actually existing
other is necessary not only for establishing a sense of objectivity in experience, but also for
founding a genuine ethics (that is, the Other is necessary for knowing we are not “duped” by
ethics).
There is also a problem if we restrict ourselves only to a question of the sense of the
‘other,’ as Carr and Costelloe would urge interpreters of Husserl’s fifth meditation to do. Levinas
demonstrates an otherwise neglected dimension of the interpersonal relationship: the relation
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between oneself and the Other is inherently, fundamentally (if we agree with him), an ethical
one. The sense of the Other as an alter-ego is inadequate to this ethical dimension, in at least two
ways. First, the sense ‘other’, in Husserl, does not call into question the egocentric morality.
Indeed, for Husserl, ethics is often understood as a higher level concern to be addressed by
additional acts of the ego, or as either subordinated to epistemology or equiprimordial with it –
that is, epistemology itself being ‘ethical’, but in both cases immediately pertaining to the
relationships between the ego and itself, the ego and its knowledge and understanding, the ego
and its own exercise of freedom – freedom from bias on the part of the reflecting
phenomenologist (Donohoe, 2004; Siles i Borrás, 2010). Ethics in Husserl does not primarily
refer to the Other but is born of egology, referring to understanding, comprehension, and the
meaning of concepts discovered by the phenomenologist; the path to the other follows the
unchallenged egocentric trajectory of Husserlian expression and empathy outlined above. If what
is essential in ethics, in addition to a (secondary) relation to an other (who may or may not really
exist – it is, on Carr and Costelloe’s view, a bracketed and therefore open question) is a primary
reference back to the ego, then it is not clear how a non-egocentric ethics, hedonistic or
otherwise, could be founded.13 Even the great universalist principles of traditional ethics bottom
out in the ego’s own activity, as when Kant, for example, speaks of a rationality that gives the
moral law to itself.
Second, the sense of the ‘other’ as alter-ego is inadequate to the way in which the Other
overflows any idea we may have of her, subordinating the Other to a concept. In that sense, the
phenomenological project of determining the sense of the ‘other,’ whatever that sense turns out

Hedonism does not exhaust egocentric ethics. An ethics that refers back to the ego may be able to overcome
hedonism, but nevertheless does not found itself on a relationship with the Other and, as such, is not properly speaking
an “ethics”; the self is always privileged in some way, and altruism and sacrifice become impossible.
13
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to be, will be inadequate to the way in which the Other actually manifests herself to our
sensibility, i.e., as disrupting it, as non-containable by the ego. This disruption is the fundamental
ethical moment at which one comes into real contact with an Other, and any sense that covers up
this moment – even bracketing the existence of the Other – covers up the distinctively ethical
aspect of the experience (as-) of the Other. This noncontainability, this refusal of static sense and
the inadequacy of the conception of the Other as ‘alter-ego’, is the ‘trace’ left by the Other in the
ego – the “other in the same” or the “one-for-the-other” of Otherwise than Being – necessary for
the upheaval of egocentric morality.
To sum up my response to the objection that Husserl is not interested in the existence of
the other, but only its sense: it may be the case that neither Husserl nor Levinas solve the
problem of solipsism, but the transcendental move made by Levinas according to which the
existence of the Other is necessary for ethics would then justify the existence of the Other if we
indeed believe in the actuality of ethics. For Levinas, the possibility of altruism and even a small
deed performed despite-one-self is all the proof needed of the actuality of ethical relationships,
and thus too for the existence of the Other. Further explication on this point is outside the scope
of this chapter. Additionally, the very sense of the other in Husserlian phenomenology is an
inadequate one, as it does not account for the way that the Other overflows any idea we may
have of her, since this overflowing is not a matter of numerical distinction between us but instead
refers to the foundational ethical dimension of the interpersonal relationship. So restricting the
question of solipsism in Husserl to a question of the sense of the ‘other’ does not obviously
salvage his concept of expression, if the concept is meant to found an objectivity that must
already refer back to ethics.
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Conclusion
I have here explicated two concepts of expression. For Husserl, expression is founded on
a perceptual similarity between myself and the other, and a transfer of sense from my own
expressive behaviors, which always correspond to my subjectivity, and the expressive behaviors
of other bodies, which are then constituted appresentatively as corresponding to a subjectivity
like but distinct from my own. For Levinas, expression is speech, language, discourse, and the
other’s attendance to her own manifestation. Rather than similarity, difference is presupposed:
the Other does not first appear in perception as similar to me, but rather disrupts my sensibility
and calls hedonist morality into question.
Both concepts are meant to found the objectivity of the world as well as particular
objectivities in the world. I have argued that, regarding the former, Levinas indicates an ethical
dimension to objective-world-constitution, in virtue of the ethical nature of the interpersonal
relationship. I here note that the prospect of such an ethical dimension is receiving increased
attention in phenomenology and cognitive science. For instance, Colombetti (2009) attempts to
set out a beginning of enactivist ethics based on the supposition that our relations to others are
inherently ethical. Krueger (2019) develops a notion of the “between” taken from Watsuji’s
Rinrigaku, or “Ethics” (1996) in order to understand a kind of consciousness distinct from the
Husserlian phenomenology for the purpose of understanding certain cases of psychopathology.
Overgaard (2003) makes a serious attempt to reconcile Husserl with the ethical dimension
pointed out by Levinas. De Jaegher (2019) points out an overemphasis on rational thought and
knowledge and instead argues for the centrality of love and other ethical affectivity for a proper
understanding of intersubjectivity. Levinasian ethics, in particular, is being taken up more and
more in the areas of psychotherapy and clinical psychology, as a reprimand against a distanced
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objectivization of patients by psychological theory and understanding, the latter being widely
influenced by Jaspers’s broadly Husserlian theory of empathy (see, for example, Gantt, 2000;
Gantt & Williams, 2002; Nortvedt, 2008; Sass, 2019; Tsang, 2017). Interest in Levinas is now
increasing in other areas of phenomenological ethics, as well, such as animal and environmental
ethics (Atterton, 2011; Crowe, 2008; Davy, 2007). In all of these areas, difference becomes
problematized over similarity, and ethics privileged above – even as generative of – knowledge.
It should be no surprise, then, that Levinas is gaining traction in those areas where understanding
and knowledge must apparently be grounded in ethics across difference. Even the Husserlian
approach, I have suggested here, covertly assumes the kind of communication thematized by
Levinas, and so even adherents to a broadly Husserlian methodology stand to benefit from
Levinas’ formulation of expression.
Levinasian expression founds the possibility of truly expansive objective knowledge, as
the basis of our relationship with the Other is already one of teaching, that is, of an introduction
to the ego of that which it did not already contain, rather than the Husserlian model for which the
basis of understanding must always refer back to the ego itself. I would suggest that the way to
understand this kind of expansion mechanically – if one is so inclined to do so and recognizes
such an approach’s inherent risk of subordinating the other to concepts – is to explore the
intersubjective dynamics of attention regulation; for Levinas, the Other teaches attention.
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Chapter 3
Encounter:
How expression teaches attention for the world and other,
with implications for psychopathology
Introduction
Expression is at the heart of predominant approaches to intersubjectivity, including
within cognitive science, psychology, psychiatry and psychopathology. Prominent theoretical
conceptualizations of intersubjectivity and intersubjective sense-making especially germane to
these areas include Direct (Social) Perception Theory (DsPT), Interaction Theory (IT), and
Participatory Sense-Making. Each approach attempts to explicate the situation or context,
meaning, and what we might very broadly call the “mechanisms” of expression and how we
come to understand one another through expression. Yet, as a consequence of the argument from
Chapter 1, there are some expressions that are seemingly – on standard phenomenological
accounts, from Jaspers to Husserl, to Heidegger and contemporary thinkers – ununderstandable:
they do not adequately articulate the other or her mind, and leave it a mystery as to her
experience. This occurs, according to Jaspers and implicitly for Husserl, when there is too radical
a divergence from myself and my own phenomenological, psychological, or existential structures
and the real or apparent being of the other. Accordingly, it might be thought that the Levinasian
concept of expression, committed as it is to both separation and the absolute alterity of the other,
might be deeply committed to a form of ununderstandability; indeed it may be difficult to see the
Levinasian approach as lending anything new to intelligibility, and opponents and proponents of
Levinas alike often charge his position with a kind of mysticism, deeply committed to what
cannot be understood (Derrida, 1978; Janicaud, 1991). It has been argued – and to some small
extent addressed by Levinas – that a Levinasian ethics, with its concept of expression, would
result in a kind of relativism or (epistemological) nihilism: if expression signifies beyond any
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familiar horizon, it will be inherently ununderstandable. These assessments pick out something
right, but this is neither a complete picture nor a reference to anything mystic.
Recent enactivist approaches to intersubjectivity often endorse some version of direct
social perception theory, interaction theory, and/or participatory sense-making, each of which
offers some form of rejection to the ununderstandability thesis (UT). The basic strategy is to
reject any kind of radical inaccessibility of other minds. Direct social perception theory
maintains that expressions partly constitute the mental states with which they are associated, e.g.,
there is happiness in the smile, and since expressions are perceptible, so are the states they
express; there is accordingly no problem of radically inaccessible minds other than my own: far
from being inaccessible, other minds are available to perception. Interaction theory maintains
that intersubjective perception or, more broadly, understanding is established within and
dependent upon interaction between agents, operant prior even to the acquisition of concepts: the
view holds that perception of the other’s expression as meaningful is originally non-conceptual,
pre-linguistic, embodied, and conditioned by the situation of multiple agents interacting with one
another as they navigate a shared social and material world. Participatory sense-making
maintains that interpersonal interactions take on an autonomy of their own, such that meaning is
generated by the interaction itself and, more radically, that individuals are only constituted
through interaction in the first place; individuals and individual meaning are thus products of an
interaction that already incorporates a plurality of persons.
Given the fact that most theorists find the ununderstandability thesis to be either
untenable or, more often, simply unacceptable, it would be a blow to my approach were it
committed to UT, at least in any deeper way than are, as I contend, these other approaches.
Accordingly, I here elaborate my position so as to reject UT in a way distinct from those options
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just presented. Rather than denying any separation between individuals, my position presupposes
separation, and understands expression as a relation across that separation. I consider the theory
of natural pedagogy to show how learning can nevertheless occur across a kind of separation or
inaccessibility.
I begin by briefly revisiting the ununderstandability thesis’ motivations and raising the
concern that Levinas may be committed to some form thereof. I then turn to the relationship
between expression and attention, or teaching/learning, in order to articulate a form of
understanding even across the radical difference demanded by Levinas. This can be seen as an
extension of Levinas’ thought on learning and understanding (the key insights are contained
within Levinas, but only infrequently articulated in any detail). My goal is to express these
insights in a way that is both accessible and helpful to contemporary thinkers working on such
issues. I make use of the theory of natural pedagogy for this purpose, as this theory and Levinas’
thought, I hope to show, converge on certain relevant insights. I also suggest that dynamical
systems theory has something important to offer us, and conclusions can be drawn about the way
in which a certain form of attention should – and, when done well, does – guide psychiatric
practice. The first upshot of these analyses is the formulation of a unique objection to UT: the
Levinasian denies UT in a way that is distinct from (but not necessarily incompatible with; for
more on this relation, see Chapter 4 below) enactivist approaches to intersubjective
understanding. This difference allows me to draw some initial implications for psychopathology.
Ununderstandability
Jaspers claims that certain psychopathology symptoms are beyond empathy and are
therefore ununderstandable. “Made phenomena,” for example, are entirely inaccessible to those
who do not undergo them and cannot be psychologically understood positively, i.e., as what they
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are; they can only be negatively circumscribed from the outside (Jaspers, 1963, p. 580). This socalled “ununderstandability thesis,” or “UT,” is largely considered to be theoretically or
practically unsatisfactory. Many thinkers attempt to refute UT by arguing for a continuity or
structural relationship between pathological and non-pathological consciousness. This is of
course true in phenomenological psychopathology, when researchers offer structural
explanations of pathology experience and its relationship to “normal” consciousness (Fuchs,
2013; Gallagher, 2015; Ratcliffe, 2014): pathological experience is like non-pathological
experience, except […]. Another common strategy consists in appealing to some specific,
ordinary, everyday phenomenon and constructing an explanation of how a feature of that familiar
phenomenon enhances our understanding of some (aspect of) pathological phenomenon. Like the
previous, this strategy is meant to undermine the radical separation that UT seemingly depends
on and which, within the Jasperian mode of thought, perhaps inevitably prevents understanding.
For example, one might use the experience of being shoved to provide an analysis of the way in
which a sense of ownership (e.g., it is my body that is moving) can come apart from a sense of
agency (e.g., it was not me who is (causally) responsible for the movement), and then apply this
distinction to psychopathology phenomena, e.g., to explaining thought insertion (a “made
phenomenon”): thought insertion, on such an analysis, would be the dissolution of the sense of
ownership and/or agency with respect to one’s own thoughts, a dissolution we might ordinarily
be familiar with, at least in broad kind, from certain bodily experiences (these approaches vary:
Shaun Gallagher (2015), for instance, maintains that thought insertion involves a loss of the
sense of agency, while others, such as Bortolotti & Broome (2008) argue for a lack of the sense
of ownership as well as “authorship”). Other strategies, such as those proffered by direct
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perception and interaction theorists, likewise depend on rejecting a radical difference or
separation between familiar and alien states, or between oneself and others.
The Levinasian approach, however, is indeed committed to a certain form of radical
difference between self and other, a separation between them such that any concept, all of which
are founded in some way or other on familiarity, could only be inadequately applied to the other.
On traditional models, and certainly on the Jasperian picture, understanding is seemingly
inseparable from some reference to familiar horizons and known elements. There is thus a
resulting concern when we consider the Levinasian perspective through the lens of these
traditional conceptualizations of understanding: if the other is she who cannot be made to appear
within familiar horizons, she who is refractory to concepts (Levinas, 1969, p. 40) and she whom
the familiar can only present by dissimulation, then is not the Levinasian committed to UT?
The Other, for Levinas, is she who exceeds reference to the known, and, thus, would
exceed understanding (traditionally conceived). Yet, no small portion of Levinas’ task, not only
in those works that explicitly deal with understanding and intelligibility (e.g., “Transcendence
and Intelligibility” in Levinas, 1996), can be conceived of as articulating a different form of
understanding, one that can withstand the kind of distance introduced by him between self and
other. No doubt, this is not simply a change in mechanism yielding the same finished product as
the traditional notion. The task, rather, is to articulate some form of sense or meaning prior to the
appropriation of the other by the same, a form of understanding that is born of separation rather
than its negation, and which does not strive to totalize or systematize the other by reducing them
to knowledge and familiarity, that is reducing their very alterity. Despite the separation insisted
upon by Levinas, he is equally insistent that it is only in virtue of a form of contact with the other
– a contact all too often or perhaps altogether missed by traditional phenomenology and its
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contemporary inheritors in psychopathology – that our attention can be drawn to that which is
not already known, that which we do not already contain, that is, that we can genuinely attend to
the other. The Levinasian perspective, accordingly, strives to undermine UT without denying the
separation often (but incorrectly) taken as the guarantor of incomprehensibility, promising a kind
of “contact across distance” (Levinas, 1969, p. 172) as the ultimate foundation as well as first
instance of (i.e., primary) intersubjective understanding. The linguistic relation in a personal
encounter accomplishes contact across distance.
Levinas is often taken to imply, particularly within psychotherapy discourses, a kind of
“unsettled” therapy (Rossiter, 2011) “without foundations” (Loewenthal, 2011). Such
characterizations often instantiate only an incomplete understanding, offered by proponents and
opponents alike, who tend to variously attribute to Levinas a corresponding commitment to some
form of relativism (no general truths are possible, since truth is determined by each particular
other), or nihilism (there simply is no fact of the matter when it comes to the other). The various
contributors to Psychology for the Other (eds. Gantt & Williams, 2002) resist these latter
attributions, arguing throughout that, despite Levinas’ qualms with knowledge and method,
Levinasian psychotherapy is not thereby doomed to relativism, nihilism, or otherwise to
providing no methodological guidance whatsoever, and that resisting these purported
commitments is crucial for developing an effective and coherent Levinasian approach. It is my
position, largely in agreement with these insights of Psychology for the Other, that a Levinasian
psychotherapy and psychopathology alike, be it clinical or theoretical, need not be committed to
a complete lack of method, at least not if we understand ‘method’ in a broad sense. Nevertheless,
we must also attempt to capture the sense in which it is true that Levinas is, in specific ways,
opposed to foundations and knowing when it comes to the other. His philosophy is one that
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resists systematization, refusing to subordinate intersubjective or, perhaps more appropriately,
(inter-)personal relations to rules and principles. In the following section, I develop an
understanding of expression and attention that sets out a kind of “foundation” for psychotherapy
and -pathology, while nevertheless striving to respect the anarchic aspect of Levinas’ thought.
Encounter
Expression and Attention (Learning)
There are at least two major ways that Levinas speaks of attention in relation to
expression: the way that the other attends to her own manifestation, and the way that, in doing
so, she directs or teaches my attention The way that the other attends her own manifestation, that
is, expresses herself, was thematized in Chapter 2 above, so will not be belabored here.
However, one point that must be added is that the way the other attends to her own
manifestation, and even the mere fact that she does so, is an integral part of a Levinasian theory
of learning: without expression, in which the Other attends to her own manifestation, the world is
a kind of “anarchy,” without principle for distinguishing phenomena from mere apparition.
Apparition is Levinas’ term for an appearance without reference to that which appears, that is,
without reference from the phenomenon to an existent. An appearance is not yet a phenomenon,
but that which appears as merely subjective and without reference to any “thing” at all. A
phenomenon proper, on the other hand, is a complex kind of appearance referring from
consciousness to a thing-itself, implying a subject-object relation (whatever ontological status
might pertain to each term). The object of the phenomenon must appear as some kind of object;
this is not the case for appearance, in which what appears is merely lived through according to a
subjective and indeterminate sense, referring specifically to the individual bodily sensibility
through which it appears at all. What is needed to overcome the anarchic world is a principle for
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distinguishing phenomena from pure sensible appearances (and this is primarily a distinction of
sense construed in terms of the way in which the world appears). According to Levinas, “Speech
introduces a principle into this anarchy” (1969, p. 98). In speech, phenomena are placed into
propositions, according to which they gain signification, which is the form of meaning defined
by a relation of this to that, specifically the form of thinking “X as Y.” It is this “as” structure
that defines signification and picks out what appears as a specific ‘what’ that appears. On the one
side, signification issues from speech, and on the other side it introduces a principle – this ‘as’
structure – according to which phenomena can refer beyond myself and, instead, to other
phenomena, or to the Other who expresses them. It is insofar as the other attends to her own
manifestation that she embodies this very principle, or, rather, that she introduces – in the way
that we say of someone that she introduces herself – both herself and a principle into anarchy.
It is better to understand speech not only in terms of propositional language, but as
communication more generally. As seen in Chapter 2 above, expression refers to the entire body,
and so even non-linguistic bodily expression can serve to indicate the “what” behind a mere
appearance and can present the perspective of the other for whom it appears. Within
appearances, we do indeed perceive differences – our sensory field is not a uniform one but
rather one in which differences matter to us – and expression in general, not just propositional
expression, can serve to indicate differences to others. The idea of attentional direction and the
theory of natural pedagogy (explored below) can help us to better understand how bodily
expression can introduce significance into experience, that is, refer the things given to my
perception beyond their mere appearances for me.
Not only does the other attend to her own manifestation in expressing herself, but she
also directs, commands, or teaches my own attention. In expressing herself, the Other proposes a
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world, providing phenomena with significance. Providing phenomena with significance by
expressing them is also called thematization: what is spoken of becomes a theme for
consciousness. No longer are phenomena revealed only to a sensibility that, in an important
sense, lies beneath consciousness (understood as intentionality, as consciousness-of) for Levinas,
but rather phenomena can now be explicitly thought as well. In Husserlian terminology, we can
say that the Other places phenomena into a horizon of thought; in Heideggerian terms, the
relation to the Other who expresses herself is prior to and founds the moment of disclosure.
Indeed, much of Levinas’ critique of these two figures consists in showing that intentionality –
consciousness’ being always related to an object, and always within a horizon – and disclosure
do not constitute the foundational moments of consciousness but are themselves founded on a
relation to the other. (It is in this sense, if we keep in mind that “ethics” for Levinas refers to
such a relation to the other, that we can understand Levinas’ move to make ontology secondary
to ethics, i.e., ethics as first philosophy.) The other introduces a principle to anarchy by
expressing herself, which is simultaneously an act by which my attention is directed to a world
thus thematized. That the other expresses herself is what projects me toward a world at all, by
establishing a principle of phenomena, while the specific ways that her expressions command my
attention direct me toward specific features of that world.
The position here is that expression is teaching and as such also the foundation for
learning from the other, that is, attention: expression teaches by directing our attention to that
which we were not already aware, or simply, expression teaches attention. In the first place, to
the other who expresses herself (the saying) and, consequent to this, to that which is thematized
by that expression, given as significant (the said). The distinction between primary and
secondary intersubjectivity originating in Trevarthan (1979) and Trevarthan & Hubley (1978) is
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helpful here, though I will be reformulating the former. The first form of attention is attention to
the other who expresses herself, or primary intersubjectivity. The second form deals with
attending to that which is picked out by or attended to by the Other and, in doing so, better
understanding the other, i.e., secondary intersubjectivity.
Primary and secondary intersubjectivity, however, are predominantly understood as
referring to our understanding of or direction toward the other, that is, forms of intentionality.
Primary intersubjectivity, for instance, refers to the way the other comes to be constituted as
other for us. But for Levinas, constitution is not the primary issue. The relationship to the other is
one that cannot be understood primarily in terms of consciousness. That is, though the other is
constituted for us in a variety of ways, this all depends on the prior fact of communication – of
expression – from the other to me, a fact which cannot be reduced to its appearance to my
consciousness. The primary form of intersubjectivity on this Levinasian model is a form of
contact. Contact with an other who is not reducible to their appearance for me founds what is
typically known as “primary intersubjectivity,” or consciousness of the other as other, and makes
secondary intersubjectivity possible by accomplishing joint attention. It is by encountering the
other on their own terms, that is, encountering an other who expresses herself and draws my
attention, regardless of the specific content to which my attention is drawn, that this contact is
accomplished. This encounter is asymmetric, in that the other disrupts me and directs my
attention; it is the asymmetry between teacher and student who, nevertheless, can based on this
relation subsequently come to understand each other, that I first enter into a relationship with
both the other as such as well as an intersubjective, shared world.
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Natural Pedagogy
The position resembles, and can gain elucidation through, what is known as the “theory
of natural pedagogy,” developed by Gergely & Csibra (2009, 2013; Csibra & Gergely 2011).
According to the theory of natural pedagogy, human beings quickly and efficiently learn generic
information from one another through a certain form of communication. Gergely & Csibra argue
that human beings in general (though they emphasize infants) are receptive to indications that
they are being addressed by others in communication, and that being addressed by an other
makes a key difference for learning. They write that
The most unique proposal of the theory of natural pedagogy is the hypothesis that the
information extracted from the other’s ostensive-referential communication is encoded and
represented qualitatively differently from the interpretation of the same behavior when it is
observed being performed in a noncommunicative context. (Gergely & Csibra, 2013, p. 128)
Specifically, when one merely observes the other and their actions, they are directed toward the
‘here-and-now’: they see the performance as relating to current objects, events, or perhaps even
goals, specific to this unique situation, perhaps even idiosyncratic. To use their example of a man
opening an unfamiliar bottle through a series of specific movements: it is unclear which of these
are necessary for opening the bottle and which are merely superfluous behavior, and it is unclear
if this bottle itself uniquely requires such methods (Csibra & Gergely 2011, p. 1149).
If the other, in this case the man opening a bottle, first grabs one’s attention, however –
primarily by establishing eye contact and/or employing directed speech, both of which “make it
manifest that a [person] is being addressed” (Gergely & Csibra, 2009, p. 150) – there is a shift in
our understanding of the actions performed: we take the action to express, first, the other who
addresses us, that is, the action is no longer something I observe in a detached way but instead as
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a demonstration for me (Gergely & Csibra, 2009), and, second, the action no longer refers to or
imparts understanding of specific features of the here-and-now but rather generic and cultural
information. Teaching and learning refer to address. For instance, in the example of the man
opening a bottle, if he establishes eye-contact and addresses me by speech, there is a shift in my
attention such that I am now more likely – and, as is especially clear in the infant case, more
capable of – perceiving his expression as teaching me something general: this is how you open
this kind of bottle (and, Gergely and Csibra add, that this specific kind of bottle-opening practice
is cultural). In so far as learning and knowledge trade in generality or universality, and such an
address institutes the transition from particularity to generality, natural pedagogy describes the
way that the other, encountered in a certain way (that is, being addressed by the other), institutes
a kind of epistemic principle: being addressed by the other is foundational for knowledge
acquisition.
The theory of natural pedagogy (which has been shown experimentally), particularly
when coupled with a Levinasian perspective according to which the other who approaches us
addresses us prior to being constituted by me as other, is then useful for further specifying
primary and secondary intersubjectivity. There is a way of attending to another that is noncommunicative, non-personal, and this way corresponds to observing their actions as specific to
the here-and-now. General knowledge, at this stage, is impossible and, given its observational
mode and objectifying attitude, this mode seems hardly worth the name “intersubjectivity” at all.
There is then another form of interaction, which truly deserves the name “primary
intersubjectivity,” since it involves a communicative relationship to an Other as an Other, as one
who addresses me in communication (Levinas may call this “saying”), and this makes possible a
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secondary intersubjectivity in which we jointly attend to features of the world, making sense in
general terms (“the said”).
That the Other’s expression, as addressing me, teaches attention to worldly things
(objects, practices, cultural things) so as to teach something general about them beyond the hereand-now or, as we might say, beyond the mere sensibility that constitutes the very here-and-nowness of the here-and-now, is an overlap between my interpretation of Levinas and the theory of
natural pedagogy. (Another somewhat inexplicable place of overlap is that both views exclude
animals from the account, claiming that such a dynamic is at play only for human beings, with
Gergely & Csibra going as far as to argue that natural pedagogy is a unique human evolutionary
adaptation. I am here neutral on these further points.) What is crucial is that a certain, important
kind of knowledge – perhaps the form of knowledge, rather than mere acquaintance with a
plurality of contingent particulars – depends on a communicative relation in which the Other
directs my attention through a personal address.
Focusing on infants, Gergely & Csibra write that:
The evidence we reviewed here indicated that infants are also prepared to learn generic kindrelevant information directly and from a specific source that is not available to other species:
from benevolent communicators who manifest generic knowledge ‘for’ them that would be
difficult (if not impossible) to acquire without such support. (Gergely & Csibra, 2009)
That is, the other addresses me and draws my attention, thematizing that which they attend to for
me, allowing for general learning of that which I perhaps could not have learned without such an
address. Striking a similar chord, Levinas writes:
As an attendance of being at its own presence, speech is a teaching. Teaching does not simply
transmit an abstract and general content already common to me and the Other. […] Speech
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first founds community by giving, by presenting the phenomenon as given; and it gives by
thematizing. (Levinas, 1969, p. 98)
I see these two approaches as deeply compatible. The theory of natural pedagogy not only allows
us to make the Levinasian hypothesis more readily understandable and specific, but also provides
a naturalized account of how such a hypothesis could be realized in cognitive and evolutionary
terms. I do not maintain that such an account is necessary for the justification of a philosophical
position, but philosophical positions – especially ones that hope to intervene in empirical debates
– must be amenable to such forms of explanation, and I point readers to whom such an
explanation is important or helpful to the work of Gergely & Csibra.
One major difference to note between my reading of Levinas and Gergely & Csibra’s
theory of natural pedagogy has to do with the role of perception. On their view, there are certain
perceptual cues that signify that one is being addressed by an other, and as such it is at the level
of perception that one identifies a teacher and gains the capacity for learning. This construal of
the way that the other affects myself is consistent with an interactional or exchange view, in
which student is just as active as the teacher, though in a different way. On my view, however, it
is not perception but, rather, the interruption of perception that establishes address. That is, the
gaze or directed speech of the other does not grab my attention as a special kind of perceptual
object, but rather precisely insofar as it grabs my attention in a way that perceptual objects do
not: it points beyond what I perceive to someone else who directs my attention through my very
own perception. In this reading, encounter is distinct from interaction, in that the former is
asymmetric and has to do with the way the other commands my attention from outside of my
own powers. The encounter consists, initially, in being acted upon by the other, and only in
making sense of this act do I become active myself. The encounter refers to my own passivity in
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the face of the other, beyond even a capacity to receive the other. It is precisely as interruption of
perception that nevertheless leaves its trace in perception that the other addresses us and draws
our attention in a way distinct from perceptual objects: the latter appear to our sensibility and are
taken up by it in enjoyment, appropriated, and passivity becomes activity; the other interrupts the
contentment of enjoyment, redirecting my attention to what is beyond my own activity.
Dynamical Systems Theory
Recently, dynamical systems theory approaches to cognition, especially those within
“4E” (enactive, embodied, extended, embedded) traditions, have also emphasized the ways that
our relations to others condition or undergird our understanding of each other and the world.
Though such approaches are not univocal, they generally agree that our understanding of
ourselves, each other, and the world depends on the concrete relations we find ourselves in, and
the ways in which our own behavior and thought is modified by and likewise modifies the
behavior and thought of others. Some examples, offered by Joel Krueger (2014, 2010), include
musical improvisation and breastfeeding. In improvisation, each musician’s performance is
shaped by, and likewise shapes, the performances of the other musicians, as well as standing in a
dynamic relation to the ensemble’s overall performance. In breastfeeding, when infants pause,
this prompts mothers to “instinctively jiggle the infant, or exhibit similar tactile behavior, as a
prompt to resume feeding. And it seems to work […]” (Krueger, 2010, p. 10).
I here understand such dynamics primarily in terms of attention. The notes played or the
rhythm structuring the music, etc., draw the musician’s attention to the music and to their own
instrument and capabilities in ways that would not have occurred without this relation. The
infant, by pausing, draws the mother’s attention in such a way as to solicit a response that, in
turn, redirects the infant’s attention. In explicating the unique contributions of Watsuji to
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phenomenological and cognitive discourse, Krueger goes as far as to write that “basic attentional
processes by which individuals constitute intentional objects may be modulated by the
sociocultural contexts in which these processes arise” (Krueger, 2020, p. 765; italics mine).
Within discussions on secondary intersubjectivity that emphasize interactive or coordinative
dynamics, the emphasis is often on joint attention, which is sometimes described as necessary for
secondary intersubjectivity (e.g., Gallagher, 2012). A dynamical systems theory approach to
understanding the ways that we make sense of one another and of the world, then, is already
largely and perhaps fundamentally a study of attentional dynamics, whether it explicitly takes on
this moniker or not.
There has been, regrettably in my view, an overemphasis in the literature, however, on
similarity, mimicry, and reciprocity in the interpersonal relationship as studied by dynamical
systems theory. Simulation theory in particular bakes this bias into its conception of
interpersonal understanding: we understand the other by simulating them, that is, by some kind
of mimicry (whether explicitly conscious or pre-personal varies). The discovery of so-called
“mirror neurons” has intensified this idea, as simulation theorists typically understand mirror
neuron activity as simulation at the functional level, and/or the basis of mimicry in general.
Phenomenologists too, albeit in somewhat different ways, also rely on similarity, mimicry, and
reciprocity in their explanations of intersubjectivity: Husserl and the perception of similarities
between myself and the other; Heidegger’s account of Dasein caught up in a similarity with das
Man; Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on reciprocity in his concept of intercorporeity. This reliance
sometimes translates into overemphasis in contemporary phenomenological work, as well (for
instance, as I discuss in depth in the remaining chapters, see Froese & Krueger, 2021). These
approaches orient themselves around infants mimicking their caregivers (for example by
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replicating facial expressions and gestures), or participation and reciprocity (according to which
to understand social practices properly or to truly understand those who engage in them requires
us to participate in those practices, at least to some extent, and to construct the meaning of those
practices together, in a give and take relationship). This includes the participatory-sense making
literature (which takes its name from De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s 2007 article) and appeals to the
role of “common-sense” and the loss thereof in psychopathology, e.g., in de Haan & Fuchs
(2010) or Stanghellini (2000, 2001 & 2004). Yet, two points can be immediately made against
this emphasis.
First, it is not at all obvious what role mimicry must play in attentional dynamics and
learning. The dynamic relationship between an infant and their mother during breastfeeding
seems to imply there is indeed an asymmetry and divergence of action that pushes the interaction
forward. The infant does not do as the mother does, nor vice versa. Rather, they modulate one
another’s attention without mimicry, and the situation is shaped by a plurality of action types, not
simply a multiplication of same-kind tokens.1 To take the music example, the dynamic
relationship may be productive of synchrony (or, sometimes, certain forms of asynchrony), but
only very rarely mimicry: only on rare occasions, typically for emphasis, is it desirable for all
string instruments, for example, to play the same melody. This technique is indeed good for
emphasis precisely because it is not usually applied.
It may be the case that mimicry demonstrates some form of understanding of the other
especially germane to questions of theory of mind, simulation, and perhaps even empathy, but
mimicry does not characterize intersubjectivity as such, nor does it seem necessary even for
establishing shared understanding. Suppose, for example, that one witnesses a horrific racist act.

1

Similar points have been made by De Jaegher and Froese 2009, and Gallagher 2020.
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It does not seem that one must imitate features of that act, nor even truly understand the victim’s
experiential world, in order for it to be meaningful (and repugnant) in the first place.
Second, mimicry already presupposes attention: to mimic a face, one must already attend
to it. Infants selectively attend to human faces (Lewkowicz & Hansen-Tift, 2012; Tsang, Atagi &
Johnson, 2018). Here, we can apply the insights of the theory of natural pedagogy. It is as
addressed by an other that the infant (and the rest of us) learn from the other, and it is only as
addressed by the other that mimicry makes sense: we mimic the other, whereas we do not, at
least to the same extent and at the same developmental stages, tend to mimic inanimate objects
or even images or recordings of others (Shimada & Hiraki, 2006). Catching the infant’s gaze, or
the infant catching ours (we gaze back), addressing the infant in “baby-speak” (indicated as
significant cues by Gergely & Csibra), these are instances of the first grabbing-of-attention that
then makes mimicry an attractive possibility (and, sometimes, productive of further
understanding).
These points reject symmetry of the interpersonal relationship in the sense of simulation
or mimicry, and specify asymmetry in terms of attention: the infant attends to the other who
addresses them. Reciprocity, which characterizes intersubjectivity as a give-and-take relation in
which two or more parties all contribute, may well factor in to sense-making, in the traditional
senses of primary and secondary intersubjectivity, but they presuppose the asymmetry
accomplished by address and its direction of attention. We learn from the other as addressed by
the other, as one for whom the other communicates; there is at the heart of attentional dynamics
an asymmetric teacher/student relationship. Of course, the student might also come to teach the
teacher – both directions can be the case, even simultaneously. But the possibility of symmetry is
not what defines the intersubjective relation. Instead, address to one from the other, grabbing
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one’s attention in the right way, is really what is primary when it comes to intersubjectivity: this
asymmetric direction of attention is what first institutes a relation to the other as other, founding
understanding of the other and the world. Mimicry is neither fundamental nor strictly necessary
for the intersubjective relationship nor for understanding.
Ethics
Lastly, there is an ethical component to all of this (and indeed, teaching is “ethical”).
Consider care-giving. The caregiver responds to the infant even when they do not know what the
infant wants or needs. First there is an address, and then there is understanding. The infant draws
the caregiver’s attention in this way or that, and the caregiver responds accordingly, e.g., by
feeding the infant, changing their diaper, initiating play, and so on. This of course feeds back into
infant behavior – once the baby is burped, which is what they wanted all along, for example, the
crying ceases. It is indeed through the search for something that will relieve the infant’s cries that
the caregiver comes to understand what it is that the infant expresses. In this case, the infant is
the teacher, and the caregiver a student. This does not articulate a structure of a developmental
phase to be overcome, but rather characterizes any interaction with another: first, our attention is
directed to the other or to that which they attend, and it is based on this shift of attention
instituted in us by the other that we come to understand.
Use of the caregiver example does not load ethics where it does not belong. What I am
referring to is a general structure of interpersonal dynamics: we attend to the other, and then we
respond. This is the asymmetry, and this call for response is the demand (or perhaps necessity) of
ethics. Expression is tied to responsibility and, as such, is ethical on Levinas’ account. This is
due to expression’s simultaneous negative and positive moments. This was explored in Chapter
2 above but should be briefly restated here: In the negative, expression is an interruption of
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sensibility’s contentment. That is, it calls into question my naïve freedom and basic hedonistic
morality precisely by making me answerable to someone: an other presents herself to me, which
calls into question the subjectivism according to which the world is for-me. Again, this is a kind
of ethical version of the Husserlian epistemological task whereby the other demonstrates to me,
by being constituted as another perspective on the world, that the world is not exhausted by my
own intentionality. But, for Levinas, it is not a matter of constitution, but rather of interruption:
the other is not constituted by me in the encounter but is only dissimulated by the application of
familiar concepts to an other that has already made herself present. It is this making oneself
present – manifesting oneself – that interrupts my contentment. Expression disrupts the free-play
of constitution. The other side of the same coin, i.e., the positive moment, is that expression is
always a demand, command, invitation. That is, it presents the speaker and solicits response.
This solicitation is inseparable from a kind of responsibility: I am responsible to the other in the
sense that, having spoken to me, she has made herself present as she to be answered. My
freedom no longer has a right to proceed according to its own spontaneity, but rather is now
responsible for justifying itself. That is, if I am to act in any way at all, there is now an other
present to whom justification becomes possible, invited, demanded. Of course, a particular other
may not actually demand justification of us on each and every of our acts – such a state of affairs
might be maddening, though I believe Levinas would not shirk the idea that the demands of
ethics may be overwhelming and maddening – but the point remains that our freedom becomes
enmeshed with practices of justification, that is, justification becomes required or unnecessary,
as soon as an other to whom we would offer or deny such justification presents herself to me.2

Though ethical responsibility is overwhelming, on a Levinasian account, it is also the case that, for the sake of justice
(that is, extending our responsibility to all others, and not just one), we develop customs and practices to guide our
responses. Occupying a certain social role, for instance that of a teacher, comes with a certain set of expected and
prescribed responses: answer emails in a timely fashion; help students develop good study habits; foster a respectful
2
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The caregiver is just one example in which an other, here the infant, expresses herself and
makes a demand on my freedom, requiring a response and, specifically, requiring me to act
according to that expression or otherwise justify myself (indeed, it is easy to imagine a toddler,
being allowed to cry without assistance, asking why their parent is not helping them, and even in
the infant case others often get wrapped up into this questioning, asking the parent “why are you
just letting her cry like that?”). The structure remains intact in any number of examples: when
the bassist gets a guitar player’s attention with eye contact and an overt movement of the head,
he solicits a certain kind of response from the guitarist. When one knocks on your door, a
response is invited, solicited (we say: “no soliciters”), demanded. One asks a question which
calls for an answer, one says “no really, it’s okay” which calls for consideration or continuation,
and so on.
One can of course be inattentive or neglectful to the other who expresses herself as
command, but this is no objection to the position. First, attention must already have been
redirected by the expression of the other for one to be properly accused of ignoring the other.
Second, we already consider inattention to be an ethical failure. Not only is this confirmed by our
practices by which we accuse and charge people of neglect, but for Levinas it is more deeply
inexcusable to leave the other hungry, even if we are not aware of their hunger. To cite
inattentiveness is to “give reasons, when it is food the other requires” (Perpich, 2008, p. 89), that
is, to behave unethically. Third, in part because expression is defined by the way that it interrupts
our contentment and perception, Levinas would maintain that an absolute inattention –
encountering the other yet nevertheless remaining utterly unaffected by her – is an impossibility.

classroom environment, and so on. The demands made on a given person are infinite, but our commonly accepted
practices allow for a degree of consistency and practicality that, when responsive to the actual concrete demands made
by others, can help to foster justice for all.
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We may indeed not care at all about the plight of the other (which would be our ethical failing),
but Levinas maintains that “The being that expresses itself imposes itself, but does so precisely
by appealing to me with its destitution and its nudity – its hunger – without my being able to be
deaf to that appeal” (Levinas, 1969, p. 200). As Diane Perpich puts the point, “This moment,
where deafness eludes me, is the moment of responsibility. It binds expression to responsibility
in Levinas’ account and constitutes both as the essence of language (Levinas, 1969, p. 200)”
(Perpich, 2008, p. 96). It must be noted that, for Levinas, murder, too, is an impossibility. Of
course, he does not deny the banal fact of killing, but rather maintains that murder is an ethical
impossibility, which is of a different order than that of physically destroying someone’s body.
Likewise, it is an ethical impossibility to remain unaffected by the other who expresses herself: if
she indeed expresses herself, we are already responsible to that expression, whether she manages
to “get through” to us or not. What is primary is the expression, which enacts an affection, but
not that affection itself. The affection is only primary in the sense that it is the trace of the
expression, and as such is our first (though inadequate) own resource – produced by the other but
inside me – for turning toward and conceptualizing the other who expresses herself.
The point here is that learning is not an unethical engagement. It is founded on an
asymmetric relationship with an other who addresses us and, in doing so, solicits, demands, or
warrants some response. This becomes salient by the way that the other grabs our attention, and
in some cases attending to this shift in attention might be all that is demanded; in other cases, the
demand may be to formulate the world in specific ways for theoretical or practical purposes; it
may even be a purely material demand, a demand for food, shelter, clothing, with specific
formulation of the world being only instrumental (even if necessary) for this purpose. It is this
relationship with the other, accomplished by a personal encounter to which demand is
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ubiquitous, that founds understanding of the other and of the world. We can understand aspects
of the encounter through natural pedagogy theory, and we can model some general affects that
the other has on one’s attention through studying attentional dynamics – and in these ways we
can come to understand how understanding itself is produced – but these tools must recognize
the inherently ethical nature of their target phenomena.
Understanding
One of the most important consequences of a Levinasian approach to intersubjectivity,
with its emphasis on the face of the other as commanding or directing attention, is that it founds
understanding not on a perceived similarity between one and the other but, rather, on a
communication between one and the other, construed as an address – a proximity and contact –
that commands me prior to my understanding its content. As Levinas states in his interviews with
Richard Cohen, Ethics and Infinity, “The face is signification, and signification without context”
(Levinas, 1985, p. 86). This turns our ordinary conception of understanding, for which the
ultimate basis is the understandum’s being situated in a familiar horizon, upside down: the first
foundation, according to this theory, is the address to the one by the other, which signifies across
the difference between myself and what is beyond me – indeed because of this gap – and only
once introduced to consciousness (Levinas calls the experience of the face of the other
“experience par excellence,” as it “does not come from our a priori depths” (Levinas, 1969, p.
196)) does the communication begin to become understood in terms of familiarity and horizonal
structures. As is seen in the example of the crying infant, this coming to be understood in the
traditional sense, involving the situating of expression into familiar horizons, is not immediate,
and is oriented according to an ethical dimension. One implication is that the other’s expression
is more than (literally undergirds and is beyond) the way that we make sense of it; it is more than

125

it appears to be for me, since the other’s expression is not defined by the way that it appears to
and is categorized by me, but rather in terms of the fact that the other acts upon me disruptively.
(For Levinas, I am passive with regard to the encounter with the other, and even thought and
understanding are considered ways that I bring my own being to bear upon invocation by the
other as a form of activity. This passivity is the foundation of activity – it sets it up; receiving the
expression of the other makes possible thought and action.) Another implication is that we can
determine ahead of time neither what the other will demand of us nor our own response. Her
expression comes from outside myself and threatens to disrupt any or all of my own projects, and
to defy any principle (ethical or otherwise) I may have chosen for myself: I can be called to
recognize her, but can also be called to feed or cloth; I might respond like a utilitarian, but this
very relation might show the inadequacy of utilitarianism. In a sense, demand is a structural
feature of expression, but one that always bears some content without being bound to any content
in particular: it is a specific demand that conditions (and motivates) specific sets of response. The
Other is singular and expresses herself singularly.
On the account pursued here, understanding is founded on communication, which is in
the first place prior to understanding, as opposed to our understanding of the other being first
founded on ourselves (with some traditional accounts going as far as to maintain that the other is
constituted as an other insofar as they resemble me). Communication is initiated by the other
with oneself only coming in second to make limited sense of that communication, i.e.,
understanding. Understanding stands in a dependence relation to communication, which sets it
up and makes it possible. The establishing moment of communication is an asymmetric
encounter in which the other addresses me and commands my attention.

126

Accordingly, to return to the ununderstandability thesis (UT), we can see that not only is
a Levinasian approach not committed to UT, but it is actually resistant to it in a straightforward
way, rejecting its implicit assumption: difference from my own experience does not commit us to
ununderstandability, but rather is the foundation of all interpersonal understanding. Compare this
to traditional Husserlian/Jasperian view, on which a failure to empathize with the other, that is, to
approximate their own experience by what is already familiar to oneself, commits us to
unintelligibility, i.e., UT.3 On my view, we understand others across difference, not only despite
but because of difference, by being exposed to an expression that introduces something new to
consciousness, which is only subsequently approximated (or dissimulated) in terms of the
familiar.
A prior form of understanding – we can call it ethical understanding – is the basis of
understanding traditionally construed. Ethical understanding refers simultaneously to an
orientation, a starting point, and a never-finished process: it is turning toward the other, having
heard their cry, and realizing the demand to respond. What is understood, even if only implicitly,
is the other as making some claim on me, but this understanding is precisely not interpretable as
understanding an object. It is a personal understanding, what Levinas might call “revelation”, of
the other as other, which cannot be understood on the model of perception but only in terms of
an ethical relationship. It is a starting point for understanding in the traditional sense, as it is only
in responding to the other that thought becomes explicit, be it about the other, the self, worldly
things, or the world itself. It is never-finished, since it is discourse: the ethical relationship refers
to an accountability – a need to justify one’s actions, including one’s thoughts – to the other prior

For Jaspers, understanding does indeed begin with the limit that is ununderstandability, but it is only through empathy
– founded as it is on similarity rather than difference – that we come to understand. My proposal is different, since
understanding does not presuppose similarity; in responding to the other, even before we know what they mean, we
come to understand them. More on this in the next chapter.
3
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to a lonely need to justify oneself to oneself, attaining rational self-satisfaction, in an abstract
game of rationality detached from its interpersonal condition.
Implications
This has some implications for clinical and theoretical psychopathology. First, I disagree
with positions, such as that of Giovanni Stanghellini’s (2019), that take theoretical
psychopathology to be the foundation for clinical psychopathology (and in this, I agree with, for
example, those such as Edwin E. Gantt (2000, 2002) and Robert Kugelmann (2002)). Rather, it is
in the encounter with the other who expresses herself to me that I can first understand anything at
all about them, including the ways in which their experience differs from my own or from the
norm. Any theorizing – any understanding, from the abstract all the way down to the most
particular and concrete – is based on this encounter in which the other directs my attention (in
this example, directs me to what comes to be known as their “pathology”). Psychopathological
theory is grounded in encounters with the people theorized over, notably the clinical encounter.
Second, the understanding that comes out of such an encounter is particular and limited:
it pertains to the other as they express themselves, the expression itself, and my limited ability to
make sense of that expression based on familiarity. This limited sense means both that my
understanding of the other is always inadequate, and that it does not generalize to still other
others. In the face-to-face encounter with a singular other, my understanding is an ethical one
insofar as my interpretation is motivated by the very demands she makes on me, rather than
being motivated precisely by my familiarity with the familiar: my self-interest, my habits, norms,
my own structures of subjectivity or those thematized for me by still other others. Furthermore,
though I do bring the familiar to bear in making objective sense of the expression of the other –
that is, in understanding what is said, the world she thematizes, the worldly implications of her
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demand, and that which she tells me about herself – the sense thus produced does not
straightforwardly translate to an insight about anyone else, no matter how similar their
expressions might seem. Generalization might indeed be necessary for navigating a world
occupied by a plurality of others (for Levinas, since justice requires that we consider not one
other but all others, that is, that we “compare incomparables,” justice indeed requires
generalization (Levinas, 1981, p. 158)), but nevertheless must always be founded on and
responsive to particular encounters and their unpredictable idiosyncrasies. Our generalizations
must be responsive to each other whose expression is the basis of generalization and must be
justifiable to each other. Otherwise, they risk being not only utterly dumbfounded, resulting from
a limited perspective on phenomena not of our making for which one does not and cannot have
the resources to adequately determine for oneself, but also risk being ethically unjustifiable as an
appropriate response to the very author of that expression who speaks to us and in doing so
founds the entire enterprise of understanding as at bottom ethical. Indeed this is another meaning
of the famous “Ethics as first philosophy”, and is exactly the point that politics, law, policy, and
so on must always be held accountable to ethics as revealed in face-to-face encounters, or in
other words, to the singular others that we aim to understand. Further, it is for Levinas to the
very specific demands made by the other – as varied as all possible needs, desires, and whims, so
long as we remember that possibility is not exhausted by one’s own formulations – that our
thought and action must orient themselves (though we can do a better or worse job of
accomplishing this orientation ethically). In the context of psychopathology, this means that our
generalizations – our diagnostic categories, our recommended treatments, our entire psychiatric
style both in and out of the clinic – are always inadequations or dissimulations that can be
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ruptured by any patient at any time, and for which the ultimate standard must always be ethics.
Psychopathology must be held accountable to the patient.
Third, consequently, clinical practice, especially when it depends on such generalizations
as it, arguably to some degree, must, can do a bad job of listening to the other. Indeed, when the
practicing psychiatrist views the other first from the perspective of their own expertise and
knowledge, the moment at which the other expresses herself across difference is buried and their
expression becomes a series of too-few pieces to be fit into a jigsaw-like puzzle resembling I
cannot know what but must hazard a guess. Where do I place the pieces, among those already
familiar and positioned, to attain a diagnosis? It is exactly here that lies the threat of the
ununderstandability thesis: not separation or discontinuity or abnormality but, instead, overreliance on one’s own familiar horizons to the neglect of the other’s expression. Of course, this
may not be what all psychiatrists do, and probably not even what any psychiatrist does all of the
time, but nevertheless it is a special problem of foundational importance introduced here by
reconsidering the very grounds on which psychopathology is possible at all.
Fourth, we can conceive of attention (and attention to attention) as guiding
psychopathology practice and theory. My analysis agrees with Robert Kugelmann’s (2002),
when he writes, citing Devereux, that
The Other who faces me and calls me to task is, according to this analysis, an exteriority that I
cannot assimilate, an exteriority that I find affecting me within myself. The psychoanalytical
anthropologist, George Devereux, writing on counter-transference, claims that the
psychoanalyst “understands his patient psychoanalytically only insofar as he understands the
disturbances his patient sets up within him. He says: ‘And this I perceive’ only in respect to
those reverberations ‘at himself” (Devereux, 1967, p. 301). (Kugelmann, 2002, pp. 139-40)
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A concrete example of how this kind of affect recognition on the part of the psychiatrist is
already performed concerns “praecox feeling.” Praecox feeling, coined by Rümke (1958, 1990),
refers to a specific affective configuration of the psychiatrist when encountering a person
displaying schizophrenic symptomology, that is, expressing themselves in a way conceptualized
as schizophrenic. The psychiatrist attends to the patient affectively, that is, they’re affected by
the patient’s expression such as to pay attention to the way in which they are affected by that
expression. Furthermore, it is the way in which the psychiatrist is affected that draws their
attention to features of the encounter and aspects of the expression that they otherwise would not
have noticed. This modification of attention which reveals the way that one is affected in the
encounter does not totalize the other but rather indicates the difference between one and the other
in such a way as to introduce to the psychiatrist something they did not already and could not by
themselves contain: their affection by the other. In general, it is my position that the way in
which the psychiatrist is affected by the other guides their attention, though it is not always as
obvious as in the case of praecox feeling. Emphasizing the psychiatrist’s affective response to
the patient as its own text, and in a certain sense the only text available, institutes a distance
between the psychiatrist’s diagnoses (as interpretations) and the patient diagnosed, which I
speculate would decrease the risk of harmful objectifications and cut one of the many legs out
from under labeling stigma. To deny one’s own affective responses to the other is to deny the
trace of communication across the interpersonal distance that makes objectivity possible,
depriving the psychiatrist of one of their only forms of contact with the patient. This contact
denied, not realizing that affectivity reaches out toward the other before falling back on the self,
the psychiatrist overlaps completely with himself, becoming accountable only to familiar
horizons in which established theories and “objective” observations are recorded. Indeed, the real
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distance is the incommunicable distance between psychiatrist and patient, now incommunicable
only due to the denial of affectivity that records communication across interpersonal space.
Objectivity cannot be better insured by denying contact (at a distance) with she who is to be
understood.
Furthermore, if we understand dynamical systems theory approaches to intersubjectivity
as tracking the ways in which we affect one another, but incorporate the Levinasian insight that
one’s reaction to the other is always limited and never exhausts the expression that institutes that
reaction, then we can understand such approaches as a useful conceptual apparatus for
formalizing these changes and thus explicitly and systematically drawing our attention to general
patterns warranting that attention. That is, if we understand, in general (given all the caveats just
mentioned with regard to generalities), the ways in which psychiatrists are affected by patients,
we can produce a kind of affective-attentional schematic, emphasizing avenues of research that
might productively lend themselves to theoretical and practical applications, just as praecox
feeling is taken to be indicative of a certain theoretical and practical trajectory. Simply put:
praecox feeling draws our attention to certain aspects of the other as she expresses herself,
through the way that expression affects the psychiatrist, so as to guide research and practice;
dynamical systems theory, as tracking the ways in which the other affects the psychiatrist, can
generalize this structure without totalizing the other, that is, without needing to define the other
exhaustively in the role she plays in the interaffective system in question.
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Chapter 4
Ethics and Understanding:
From Ethical Asymmetry to Doxic Symmetry
with Levinas and Enactivism
Introduction
Levinas and enactivism have a good deal to offer one another. Enactivism began with an
understanding of the organism as an autopoietic system that makes sense of its environment
through its own activity oriented by a self-interest in survival or perpetuating (re-producing)
itself. One track of development for this tradition has been the exploration of human
intersubjectivity. It has been argued in empirical and conceptual terms that relations with other
human persons are an important part of our understanding of ourselves, others, and the
meaningful world. Two important and closely related approaches to social understanding in
enactivism are interaction theory and participatory sense-making. Some enactivists have moved
to exploring the specifically ethical dimension of human sociality. Two major attempts are
Ethical Know-How by Francisco Varela and “Emotion and Ethics: An Inter-(en)active
Approach” by Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance (the latter of these works explicitly
builds on participatory sense-making). Both attempt to move away from a self-centered and
rationalistic conception of ethics, according to which the self relies on reflective principles in
order to determine action, and to instead establish ethics on the foundation of affective
relationships with others. (Due to this emphasis on affectivity and relationality, there has been a
recent influx of quality work relating enactivism to care ethics, e.g., , Juan M Loaiza, 2019; Petr
Urban 2014 & 2015.)
Enactivist approaches to ethics ultimately bottom-out on autopoiesis (or, more broadly,
autonomy) and conceiving of subjectivity as being for-interaction, and accordingly fail to make
sense of ethical responsibility, ethical experience in general and the experience and possibility of
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altruism and self-sacrifice. By reconceiving primary intersubjectivity in terms of address – that
is, ethical expression that already implies responsibility – we can better understand the ethical
dimensions of interaction and participatory sense-making. This formulation requires us to
understand human intersubjectivity as involving ethical asymmetry, in a Levinasian sense.
Recognizing this asymmetry, enactivism can then provide a convincing story of how we move
from ethical asymmetry to a reciprocal give-and-take process of sense-making that finally results
in doxic symmetry, that is, in the establishment of mutual sense.
I argue that enactivism (and enactivist ethics in particular) cannot at present satisfactorily
make sense of ethical responsibility, ethical experience, and the experience and possibility of
altruism and self-sacrifice. I then offer a Levinasian corrective. Lastly, I demonstrate how
enactivism can help us to understand a transition that is recognized but underexplored by Levinas
which is crucial for understanding how we actually come to understand each other and act
ethically: a transition from ethical asymmetry through reciprocity to doxic symmetry. First, I
should say something about what I mean by responsibility, ethical experience, altruism and selfsacrifice.
Responsibility
My use of the term “ethical responsibility” is not a particularly special one: I mean what
we ordinarily consider to be responsibility, that is, a kind of accountability that directs our
actions according to should or ought and is bound up with practices of blame, praise, and
accountability in general. I do not mean causal responsibility, as these are clearly distinct: one
can be causally responsible for something but not ethically responsible and, perhaps more
controversially, one can be ethically responsible for what one is not causally responsible for. One
example of the latter would be future-directed responsibility, in which I can be held responsible
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for the future even if I am not responsible for the past. For example, I may be held responsible
for helping to fight our current climate crisis even if I really had nothing to do with bringing it
about. Levinas makes the distinction between ethical and causal responsibility even stronger,
insisting that in ethical responsibility we are responsible for what is not our own deed,
responsible even for the other’s responsibility (Levinas, 1985, p. 96). In terms that should be
familiar from previous chapters, the idea is that the other calls us to responsibility by their very
expressing themselves to us; expression is a demand for some response or other, and for what
Levinas calls the “justification of being”. The other who is hungry, for example, may call me to
feed him, and irrespective of whether I myself have brought about his hunger, I must now offer
some response to this demand (we may choose to ignore the other but there is no response – even
ignoring the call – that is somehow not a response at all; we may choose how to respond, but not
whether we respond). Against phenomenology as an exploration of the “I-can”, against
existentialism in which I am responsible because I am free, and against any ethics based on any
philosophy of freedom, Levinas states that “The freedom of another could never begin in my
freedom, […] The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, in my
decision” (Levinas, 1981, p. 10). (Indeed, a crucial point in the following is the inversion of an
existentialist formulation: we are free because we are responsible, according to Levinas, rather
than being responsible because we are free.)
One crucial aspect of responsibility for my purposes here is that responsibility must
involve a dimension of being responsible for the other, and even despite ourselves. It has long
been pointed out by ethicists that ethics is not necessarily easy, and that if what we should do
was simply a matter of doing what benefitted us or of always deriving some private benefit from
action, then ethics would collapse into a selfish egoism and relativism. Utilitarianism attempts to

135

counter this position by appealing to the greatest happiness for all, weighing the happiness of
others as much as my own; deontology maintains that personal gain does not decide ethics, but
instead appeals to a universal reason that takes consideration of the value of all rational beings. It
is thus a defining feature of ethical responsibility that we are responsible not only for and to
ourselves but also for and to others, even despite ourselves: an ethics that cannot make sense of
the denial of my own interests is no ethics at all, but rather a Darwinian moral psychology and
anthropological relativism that threatens a collapse of the ought into the brute existence of selfish
inclination.
Experience, Altruism, and Self-Sacrifice
The notion of responsibility as responsibility for others pivots into questions of ethical
experience and the possibility of altruism and self-sacrifice. Levinas is often taken as providing a
kind of phenomenology of ethical experience. It is my position that this is certainly part of what
he is doing, but only part; a discussion on this point is outside the scope of this work. But we do
not need Levinas to make some very basic points about ethical experience; everyday experience
is demonstrative. When we experience the other, we experience them as mattering independently
of ourselves. That is, we experience them as having interests irreducible to our own and,
sometimes, as (legitimately) calling our own self-interest into question. We are familiar with the
experience of being called to justify ourselves, as well as being called to respond to others, and
we are also familiar with the experience of our justifications and responses not being enough,
even if we do not understand how or why. We offer justifications of our own actions and are
surprised and even confused when these justifications are rejected; we may even respond to the
poor other truly as best as we can and yet understand that this is still not enough. Furthermore,
and returning to Levinas only for his presentation of an elementary fact of ethical experience, he
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sums up his entire work as the possibility of a primordial “after you, sir”, in which we put
ourselves literally aside to allow another to pass before us. This is a simple and familiar point
that demonstrates the possibility of altruism, that is, of acting in such a way as to put the interests
of the other ahead of our own. A cynic might say that it brings us pleasure to perform such acts,
but this is often foreign to our immediate experience of the situation and our own motivations,
requiring speculative psychology, e.g., that we are motivated solely or primarily by pleasure, to
justify itself; such acts are often not pleasurable and may even be irritating: we do not prefer to
wait, we do not prefer thankless jobs, and we may even complain that no one says thank you
anymore. Yet, even anticipating pain, we persist in acting despite ourselves in service of the
other simply because it is good. And were altruism revealed to be selfish, we would only have
thereby discovered a fact; the good is greater than being, Levinas maintains, because it is better
(e.g., Levinas, 1981, p. 19). That is, even if we are selfish, goodness calls us to be better. I take
self-sacrifice to be a kind of extreme altruism, action for-the-other-despite-oneself even unto
death or destruction. Self-sacrifice can be the literal sacrificing of one’s own life for the benefit
of the other but can also be – when we speak in interactional terms – the destruction of an
interaction or relationship when that destruction promotes the interest of the other precisely by
putting an end to one’s own interest. That is, though an interaction may benefit myself, selfsacrifice includes the possibility of terminating that interaction for the good of the other despite
myself.
Autopoiesis
Enactivism maintains that sense-making is a cognitive-affective activity undertaken by
embodied organisms embeded in their environment. In classical versions of enactivism, or
“autopoietic enactivism” (Métais & Villalobos, 2020), the organism is described as autopoietic.
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Importantly, there have been some recent attempts to “supplant” the concept of autopoiesis: on
the one hand, some rely instead on autonomy and adaptivity as more generally applicable for
defining organismic life (see Corris & Chemero, 2019), while other approaches, characterized as
‘sensorimotor enactivism’, propose a less central role for autopoiesis. The objections to be raised
in this section apply straightforwardly to the first alternative (replacing autopoiesis with
autonomy perhaps sharpens the point); the sensorimotor enactivist approach is an interesting
alternative, but one I cannot consider here.
Autopoiesis refers to the way in which the organism is self-re-producing or selfmaintaining. This concept is attributed to Maturana and Varela (1973) who specifically consider
cellular autopoiesis: cells maintain a permeable membrane that distinguishes inner from outer
and their inner states are adjusted responsively to the environment as well as to the overall state
of the cell itself (there is thus a dynamic or circular causality: the parts determine the whole and
the whole determines the parts). Evan Thompson (2007, p. 124) also notes that Maturana and
Varela further propose that “all living systems are autopoietic systems and that all autopoietic
systems are cognitive systems”. Thompson takes up this idea in the appropriately named Mind in
Life. In exposition, he writes:
According to Maturana and Varela (1980), the relation between autopoiesis and cognition has
two crucial features. First, the instantiation of the autopoietic organization in an actual,
concrete system entails a cognitive relation between that system and its environment. Second,
this cognitive relation reflects and is subordinated to the maintenance of autopoiesis.
(Thompson, 2007, p. 124)
These are indeed crucial features.
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First, cognition becomes a matter of embodied and embedded action – hence the name
‘enactive cognition.’ Enactivism maintains that in order to re-produce themselves, organisms
sensitively respond to features of their environment as well as their own states. Cognition thus
becomes understood precisely as this kind of sensitive activity, constituting an embodied
understanding of oneself and one’s environment, specifically an understanding that is valueladen. To use the most famous example, a bacterium swimming in a sugar gradiant swims
towards higher concentrations of sugar precisely because sugar has a value as food for the
organism (Colombetti, 2017). Of course this is not what we typically understand as cognition,
e.g., high-level thought processes or abstract reasoning (the question of transitioning to those
processes from the low-level ones proposed here generates what is known as the “scaling-up”
problem); instead, enactivists hold that cognition is, at its most basic, this kind of value-laden,
sensitive activity. Cognition is accordingly rebranded as “sense-making”, e.g., the bacterium
actively makes sense of sugar as food (note here that significance, as argued previously, has an
as structure, at least when described from the outside: for the bacterium that enjoys sugar, there
is likely nothing similar to the high-level, propositional understanding often associated with
human cognition; yet there is understanding in the form of the sensitive activity that makes sense
of the sugar in terms of its value as food: understanding as an active, cognitive-affective
relationship. Note the close association – perhaps even identity – between significance and
value). It is this value-laden aspect that Giovanna Colombetti refers to as “primordial
affectivity”: it is by affecting and being affected by an environment that matters to the organism
(specifically, to its self-re-production or survival) that the organism makes-sense of things. The
bacterium thus understands, cognizes, or makes-sense of the environment: it organizes its own
activity in response to an environment that matters to it (specifically, to its perpetuation). This is
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of course an extremely simple example, but nevertheless demonstrates that a world – the
environment as meaningful to the organism – is enacted by the organism’s own, value-laden
activity.1
Because sense-making is oriented by what matters to the organism, precisely in terms of
self-re-production, cognition is accordingly subordinated to the process of autopoiesis. Insofar as
affectivity is a primordial aspect of sense-making – and indeed, many enactivists hold that
cognition and affectivity can be separated only abstractly, if that – then affectivity, too, is
subordinated to autopoiesis. Autopoiesis as a fundamental drive or structure of sense-making
invites comparison between enactivism and Spinoza: we could say that the essence of the
organism (as is true, for Spinoza, of any finite mode) is its conatus, i.e., its striving to persist in
being.
Enactivism maintains that the organism is characterized by autopoiesis (or autonomy and
adaptability). The principle of autopoiesis maintains that cognition = sense-making = activity
oriented according to the organism’s capacity and drive to perpetuate its own existence.
Such an account subordinates sense-making to self-interest and, accordingly, cannot
make sense of ethical responsibility, ethical experience, or the experience and possibility of
altruism and self-sacrifice. Specifically, if sense-making is activity, and activity is oriented by
perpetuating one’s own existence, then there is a challenge for making sense independent of my
own self-interest. Fortunately, however, enactivism does not stop here, because the
individualistic account is clearly inadequate on enactivism’s own terms, i.e., it is an inadequate
account of sense-making: we do not understand the world only in terms of ourselves, or else we
would collapse into the kind of solipsism warded off by Husserl’s appeal to the constitution of a

This position is largely congruent with Jakob Johann von Uexküll’s formulation of the Umwelt. (In The Open: Man and
Animal (2003, p. 46), Giorgio Agamben paraphrases von Uexküll’s discussion of the Umwelt of a tick.)
1
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world precisely as that which is available to others (see Chapter 2). Enactivism recognizes the
phenomenological fact that we make sense of the world together. Accordingly, there is an
intersubjective turn in enactivism.
Intersubjectivity
At least for human beings, sense-making cannot be solely a matter of our own activity. It
has been shown, both empirically and conceptually, that other human beings play a crucial role
in our understanding of ourselves, others, and the world (in addition to the positions already
discussed, particularly in Chapters 1 and 2, see Piaget, 1995; Hegel, 1977, Carpendale & Lewis,
2004, and much of the work in the enactivist tradition). Shaun Gallagher, for example, builds on
Trevarthan and Hubley (1978) and Trevarthan's (1979) concepts of primary and secondary
intersubjectivity to explicate the ways that we come to understand one another and the world
(Gallagher, 2009). Primary intersubjectivity refers to our basic awareness of other people as such
and, according to Gallagher, this basic awareness necessarily involves interaction: it is by
interacting with others, rather than observing them with indifference, that we relate to them as
genuine others, and accordingly come to understand them as others.2 Secondary intersubjectivity,
on the other hand, describes the ways that we understand others through our shared relations with
the world. In secondary intersubjectivity, we begin to recognize features of the world along with
enhancing our understanding of others. Extending the argument of the previous chapter, we can
easily see how this is largely a matter of joint attention and joint action: we can understand the
other, in part, by directing ourselves towards what the other herself is directed towards. It is not

Gallagher (e.g., 2009) supports this point by considering studies on infant interaction but argues that primary
intersubjectivity is not simply an infantile, developmental stage to be overcome: rather, interaction remains the primary
way in which we understand others throughout our lives, and thus interaction characterizes primary intersubjectivity.
2
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simply a matter of perceiving the object that the other attends to, however, but also a matter of
joint action, as it is through action and interaction that we come to understand those objects.3
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007; also see De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher 2010) build
on this work, but also aim to go further by demonstrating precisely how interaction itself can
become primary: interaction theory, for them, is still self-centered insofar as it conceives of
interaction as that through which an individual comes to understand another individual, and
particularly in terms of agentive intentions (e.g., X intends (to do or accomplish) Y).4 They take
this further by emphasizing the way in which interactions often take on a life of their own,
gaining their own kind of autonomy – interaction-autonomy – that emerges from but is
irreducible to the autonomy of the interacting agents, and which acts as a condition on those
agents. We can already see here a parallel to the autopoietic structure in which the parts
determine the whole but, reciprocally, the whole also feeds back on the parts, constraining and
adjusting them top-down. In a dyadic relation, for example, the dynamics of the interactions
themselves take on the characteristics of an emerging autotpoietic system, and therefore takes on
an autonomy that transcends either individual participant. It is this surplus of autonomy beyond
the autonomy of the participants that is productive of new meaning; rather than meaning being
something that pre-exists an encounter, and simply recognized through interaction; it is instead
produced by that very interaction. Since interaction-autonomy is in excess of individual
autonomy, meaning and social understanding can be said to emerge from individual
understanding yet nevertheless be something beyond it. It is perhaps for this very reason – the

Eye-tracking research is helpful here, demonstrating how social understanding ordinarily involves following the other’s
gaze to objects in the environment. Furthermore, certain cases of pathological disruption to social understanding involve
disrupted gaze-following (for an overview, see Koster & Fang 2015; specific sources listed in Chapter 1 discussion of
empathy deficits in autism research).
3

4

I cannot here get into the question of whether De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s is a fair characterization of interaction theory.
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surplus of meaning and beyondness indexed to interaction itself – that Gallagher attributes a
certain transcendence to interaction itself (Gallagher, 2014).
We can conceive of the idea that interaction takes on a life of its own almost literally, that
is, by understanding interaction as constituting a higher-level autopoietic system. Importantly,
there is a source of value in interaction-autonomy (as we will soon explore), since certain things
matter for the continuation of interaction. Of course, interactions are in a sense more frivolous
than organisms: they tend to be more short-lived (relative to the relevant organismic timescale)
and only perpetuate themselves so far. In a certain sense, interaction-autonomy is still
answerable to individual-autonomy: if individual autonomy is undermined, De Jaegher and Di
Paolo (2007) tell us, the ‘interaction’ ceases to be a genuine, social interaction. On the other
hand, some interactions do perpetuate themselves (or, perhaps more precisely, condition their
interactors so as to perpetuate the interaction): we can think of highly stable and self-referential
deeply embedded social institutions such as the economy or legal system (see Gallagher &
Crisafi 2008), as well as smaller scale phenomena such as individual (e.g., romance, friendship,
business) relationships (and the norms surrounding them) which condition individuals towards
the maintenance of those relationships for better or, too often no matter how often, worse.
For the sake of clarity, and also because it will be of value later-on, I want to note two
oft-cited mechanisms by which participatory sense-making operates to produce social
understanding: imitation (or mimicry) and dynamic coupling. In imitation, we understand what
others do by ourselves doing what they do. There is a rich empirical literature on imitation and
understanding, particularly regarding neonate imitation, that is of growing interest in
philosophical cognitive science. Imitation could be seen as one form of dynamic coupling, but a
very specific one in which what I do agrees with or even simulates what is done by the other:
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they smile → I smile → I understand something about smiling. Imitation as an approach to social
understanding may inherit some of the problems of simulation theory, but we can set this issue
aside (see e.g., Gallagher 2020 for more on problems with ST). Beyond imitation, dynamic
coupling more generally requires a kind of attunement of action between one person and the
other (imitation being only one form of attunement) such that one’s actions are somehow
appropriate responses to the actions of the other. To borrow an example from Dan Zahavi, I
might understand my neighbor’s fury not by imitating it but by responding with fear (Zahavi
2010). In this sense, interaction can be characterized by reciprocity as a kind of give-and-take
relation. Through dynamic coupling, we come to understand the intentions and states of the other
because those intentions and states are inseparable from the activity with which we are coupled:
they are part of the other’s activity which is entangled with our own; insofar as we act in
response to the other and the other does the same, we arrive at insight into the total nexus of self,
other, and world.5
In turning towards intersubjectivity, enactivism promises a move away from the focus on
individual autopoiesis or autonomy, that is, from self-interest, to an approach that appreciates not
only the ways in which others affect us but also the ways in which our very relations to others
condition and constrain us both. Though interaction-autonomy depends on and is responsive to
individual autonomy (that is, when an interaction is guided by individual interests), it is not
exhausted by it; due to the partial independence of interaction-autonomy, we may end up with a
result that is broader than or even in partial conflict with our own interests: collaboration may
produce something greater than solitary labors, but may also involve compromise. This gets us
closer to understanding the possibility of acting against our own interests. However, it does not

5

This might be seen as a cognitive expression of the observer effect in physics.
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yet get us to understanding responsibility, altruism and self-sacrifice in the sense of acting
against our own interests for-the-other, but rather only for-the-interaction. Our only relation to
the other is here mediated by the interaction itself, and that interaction exceeds both myself and
the other. I therefore relate to the other by relating to a third term that does not adequately
represent the other’s interest. To put it another way, participatory sense-making overcomes the
subordination of sense-making to self-interest by subordinating self-interest to interactioninterest, which is always an inadequate composition of the other’s interest and also my own. To
act in the interest of the interaction is, even in compromise, to act at least in part for my own
interest; and to act against the interaction – to bring about its end – can only be made sense of by
reference to my own interest or the interest of the other as related to me in interaction.
Dierckxsen (2020) makes a compelling case that our responsibility to others extends beyond any
possible interaction or participation; indeed, we can hear the call of the other and respond to it
without ourselves ever being recognized by or conditioning the actions or experience of the
other, that is, without dynamic coupling. This ethical dimension of sociality is overlooked by
interaction and participation and exceeds it.6
More precisely, what is missed is the fundamental asymmetry of my relationship to an
other. The difficulty with enactivist sense-making, and specifically with participatory sensemaking, is that on these views values and norms arise out of interaction, where interaction is
construed as a coordination of my action and the action of the other. The problem is that, in
conceiving of value as a product of interaction, we fail to recognize the independent value of the
other, absolutely distinct from myself and from any relationship (including interaction) that may

Dierckxen (2020, p. 111) writes: “ethical relations transcend natural relation in the sense that responsibility for others
requires more than natural participation. It requires a sensibility for otherness which cannot simply be understood in
terms of natural participation or failed natural participation, because it goes beyond that which any kind of participation
could possibly achieve.”
6
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hold between us. The expression of the other reveals to me the other as independently valuable,
independent even of that very revelation. In terms of responsibility, I am responsible for the
other whether I recognize it or not, and prior to any activity or autonomy on my part. It is for this
reason that Diane Perpich, for example, can talk about ethics in terms of “normativity without
norms” (2008, p. 124) (though in this context, I would say prior to norms): it is the independent
value of the other that motivates interaction and constitutes at least part of the binding force of
the norms thus produced. Responsibility for the other is not a product of my own action, even in
coordination with others, but rather characterizes the basic relation prior to and even despite my
own action and interest. As such, enactivist sense-making misconstrues responsibility, as well as
the possibilities of altruism and self-sacrifice, since these are all made to depend on coordinated
activity at least partly invested by my own interest.
An important objection can be made that only through interacting with others, we come
to recognize their interest, and thus can act on that interest specifically; such an objection might
leverage primary intersubjectivity construed as a direct relation to an other. But if understanding
is one with activity, and my activity is always my own – no matter how conditioned it may be by
the other and our interaction – and if the interest of the other is also conditioned by our
interaction, then my understanding of the other is always suffused by self-understanding and
self-interest. This is not at all a description of facts, but rather of the resources available to an
autopoietic understanding of interaction that relates parts precisely through mediation by the
whole. Another way to make the point is in terms of asymmetry, which is rejected by Gallagher
(we return to this point later): according to Gallagher, ethical meaning depends on mutual
recognition, i.e., recognizing the other precisely as recognizing me. Yet, it is not at all obvious
that ethical responsibility requires that the other recognize me nor, further, that I recognize that I
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am recognized by the other. All it seems to require, from the perspective of Levinas [?], is that
the other express herself as an other, and perhaps that I hear that expression. As soon as
interaction is conceived of as symmetric (and not just reciprocal; again, more on this later),
recognition of the other is already bound up with self-recognition and therefore with self-interest.
As we will see, this situation is a real and common one, but it crucially neglects the fact of
experience, that we can recognize the interests of the other before interaction, and that we can act
on those interests without incorporating our own.
Another difficulty can be drawn from Levinas’ concerns with Buber’s I-Thou
relationship. He charges the I-Thou relationship with formalism and claims that the relation “can
unite man to things as much as man to man.”
The I-Thou formalism does not determine any concrete structure. The I-Thou is an event
(Geschehen), a shock, a comprehension, but does not enable us to account for (except as an
aberration, a fall, or a sickness) a life other than friendship: economy, the search for
happiness, the representational relation with things. (Levinas, 1969, p. 68)
In one sense, participatory sense-making is indeed a formalism: it posits a formal structure that
characterizes interpersonal relationships in general. But supported by phenomenological and
empirical concerns, enactivism explores concrete, contentful relational dynamics on the basis of
these insights. As such, the formalism charge doesn’t quite stick.
However, the charge that the relationship can characterize man’s relation to things just as
much as to one another is appropriate. Using the notion of economy, we can understand
enactivist interaction as transaction: a reciprocal exchange resulting in an independent third term,
the interaction, an economy, in virtue of which the individual contributions gain their
significance. The representational relation here is not representation in the sense in which the

147

term occurs in most current debates but instead refers to the fact that the relationship to the other
is both mediate (mediated by the interaction/interaction-autonomy/coordination of activity) and
inadequate. The search for happiness indicates that our own interest is wrapped up in the
economy that determines the meaning of self and other: the interaction may exceed my interest
but is nevertheless invested by it.
Objects stand in dynamic relations to us as well. Indeed, a standard articulation of the
extended mind hypothesis maintains that objects can count as proper parts of cognitive systems
precisely because they are dynamically coupled to states we ordinarily consider cognitive, that is,
mental states traditionally conceived, i.e., memory, judgement, intentions, and so on (e.g.,
Chemero, 2009; Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Piredda, 2017; for the famous objection
that dynamic coupling is distinct from constitution, Adams & Aizawa 2010).7 There is also a
growing literature on how affective states are extended qua coupling between objects and
affective states traditionally conceived, e.g., between a musician and their instrument
(Colombetti & Roberts, 2014), or a theater play and its viewer (Slaby, 2014). In short, we
dynamically couple with objects: we act upon them, they resist through their own active
productivity or power, this changes how we respond in turn, so on and so forth until the system
formed between us is irreducible to either of its parts. We witness this in art, science, literature –
any human endeavor. The very notion of phenomenological intentionality – inherited at least as
inspiration by enactivism – is itself a notion of a dynamic, mutually conditioning and
constraining relationship between subject and object.

Clark (2008) states that coupling is not sufficient for extension, and that what is further required is a “self-stimulating
loop.” Specifically, the system must, through the coupling of its parts, self-stimulate or augment itself. That is, there
must be effects within the system irreducible to any of its parts. This is only a sidenote for us because he and others go
on to argue that relations between persons and objects can satisfy this condition.
7
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What distinguishes the other from objects, in experience? Husserl distinguished the other
as another ego like myself, but distinct from myself, and this distinctness largely amounted to the
non-presentability of the other, although, how this principle of non-presentability, i.e., the
principle that the other is never given originarily, emerges in experience, and in such a way as to
distinguish between absent other-presentations and absent object-presentations – since, after all,
objects are also never given “from all sides” (Husserl 1999, p. 27) – is unclear; it is plausible that
there need be some positive aspect to this lack that motivates the principle, some positive aspect
to the experience of the other that distinguishes such an experience from object-experience. Or
else the distinction depends more crucially on similarity – the other, unlike the object, is like me,
and also non-presentable (like the object) – but similarity has already been called into question.
Contemporary phenomenologists and enactivists have pushed back against – or at least deflated
– this non-presentability, without moving beyond its focus on the negative (the non-) to its
positive significance (e.g., Smith, 2010 maintains that others are given non-originarily in the
same way as are occluded sides of a given perceptual object; Krueger, 2018 maintains that
certain aspects of the other’s experience are not given to us originarily, but that others, namely
the bodily aspects of emotional states, are given to us in the same mode as are objects, i.e.,
perception). Levinas articulates the positive significance (or presence) of this non-presentability
that distinguishes the other from objects in experience (and not just in terms of what does not
appear in experience) as ethical responsibility, which is present as an asymmetry. It is as
responsible to and for others that they, others, are positively distinguished from objects in the
first place.8 The other presents to us an ethical resistance, not only disrupting one’s action as an

Of course, we can note that people sometimes personify objects, even to the point of feeling responsible to these
objects. My goal is not to argue that such an error is impossible, but rather to point out that it is precisely responsibility
revealed by expression that constitutes otherness phenomenally: it is only in taking the object as making demands on us
that the object is personified. We can adapt Husserl’s notion of harmonious perception (or continued confirmation) in
8
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opposing force but, rather, as a demand for the justification of one’s action; the other demands an
ethical response, rather than a modification of my appropriative acts so as to overcome objective
resistance.9
The claim that autopoietic enactivism subordinates self-interest to interaction-interest
may seem abstract, but we can now pivot to enactivist approaches to ethics and see how, for
these approaches, responsibility is formulated as responsibility-to-and-for-interaction, rather than
to-and-for-the-other, and thus misses or misunderstands fundamental ethical explananda. There
is nevertheless something right in these approaches and, later on, I will show that everything we
have explored up to now is not irrelevant but rather can be productively modified to help us
better understand ethics. Specifically, once we recognize the asymmetry of social interaction, we
can not only make sense of responsibility, altruism, and self-sacrifice, but we can also see –
through enactivist eyes – how the reciprocity of interaction establishes mutual sense and norms.
Ethical Know-How and Affectivity
The embodied, embedded, enactive conception of sense-making, with its move away
from reflective rationality and towards embodied action, naturally leads to a prioritization of
know-how (as opposed to know-that). A number of thinkers have taken up know-how as a central
notion for understanding how we should live and what exactly we are doing when we live well
(see, for example, DeSouza (2013), and, for a criticism, Dierckxsens (2020)). The relationship
between know-how and ethics is the major theme of the appropriately titled Ethical Know-How

helping us to distinguish actual others from mere objects; the point is simply that responsibility is the difference that
makes the difference.
Diane Perpich (2008) provides a discussion of this topic. Though objects resist us, we still recapture them according to
an idea. The mind reasserts its spontaneity over the object by constituting it for itself. The other, however, disrupts my
spontaneity in a way that is not recuperated. She appeals to Levinas’ consideration of the idea of infinity in Descartes. I
can be the cause of my representations of finite modes, but not my idea of infinity; the idea of infinity is instead
produced in contact with the other, exceeding every idea: “infinity does not enter into the idea of infinity” (p. 58).
9
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(1992) by Francisco Varela. Varela associates know-what with knowledge and rationality, and
know-how with wisdom and spontaneous, skillful action. He embraces a kind of virtue ethics,
based on Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, that focuses on developing certain abilities (he
calls these, following Mencius, extension, attention, and intelligent awareness) to act wisely
when it comes to conducting oneself practically in the world and to serving others through one’s
actions. In short, what we extend is our own understanding of a given situation; what we attend
to is the situation itself and what it demands of us; what we are intelligently aware of are salient
features of our own embodied and embedded activity.
Varela recognizes the importance of responding to the needs of others for ethics; an
ethics built on one’s own well-being and self-service is no real ethics at all. He goes as far as to
claim – in a way that should half remind us of Levinas – that
What we call “I” can be analyzed as arising out of our recursive linguistic abilities and their
unique capacity for self-description and narration. […] If this narrative “I” is necessarily
constituted through language, then it follows that this personal self is linked to life because
language cannot but operate as a social phenomenon. In fact, one could go one step further:
the selfless “I” is a bridge between the corporeal body which is common to all beings with
nervous systems and the social dynamics in which humans live. My “I” is neither private nor
public alone, but partakes of both. And so do the kind of narratives that go with it, such as
values, habits, and preferences. In purely functionalist logic, “I” can be said to be for the
interactions with others, for creating social life. (Varela, 1999, pp. 61-2)10

There is apparently an affinity between this account and that of discursive psychology, specifically as presented by
Gillet and Harré (2013), according to which “I” exist as a kind of intermediary between two worlds, one of traditional
causal ontology and the other of human social life.
10
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I say half because the I is, on this picture, neither for itself nor for the others, but instead for
interactions with others. Here we see a kind of responsibility, a being-for, directed towards the
interaction itself. We can see the entire argument concerning autopoiesis and motivation above
spelled out here in explicit connection to ethics: a move from individual autopoiesis and selfservice to a relational account that privileges the life of the interaction itself – a relation
considered not simply as the way that two beings relate, but as itself a kind of third being which
exceeds us both. The focus on self-concern is brought out by the fact that the “I” on this account
is really an intermediary between the organism’s low-level parts – neuro-biological facts
concerning brain or hormonal states and patterns, for instance – and high-level “constraints
imposed by global coherence on local interactions” (Varela, 1999, p. 61). The virtual self acts as
an interface (Varela, 1999, p. 61) between the organism’s parts and overall structure; it refers to
the double or circular causality from low to high and high to low that characterizes the organism
as a dynamic system.
Two questions. First, does the self get out of itself on this account? That is, if the self is
for interaction, and interaction is the introduction of higher-level social behavior that must then
be squared with lower-level organismic facts, can this help us to understand responsibility to and
for others? Or, rather, does it only allow us to understand the “I” as self-serving, in this case
serving to make coherent the relationship between my own higher and lower level processes,
including those processes of mine constrained by social interaction? For Varela, the “I” is a
social product in the sense that our self-organization is in part an “ongoing interpretative
narrative” between lower and higher levels. As such, it is language dependent and so depends on
relations to others. But on this account, the object(s) of the narrative are precisely my processes,
or me, and there arises a question of whether the other becomes a mere causal input to a self-
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serving being, a constraint on my self-organization. If the “I” refers to an organismic process by
which I come to coincide with myself – by which I regulate myself – then is it possible to make
sense of action against self-interest, against my own freedom, against egoism?
The second question, raised by Varela himself, is whether his account of the virtual self
can resolve conflicts between scientific explanation and experience. On his view, science seems
to (but perhaps does not really) show that consciousness can exist without the self, yet in
experience we seem to have a persistent sense of self as a “top-down, centered, globally
directing” (citing Dennett) “centralized center or agent” (Varela, 1999, p. 60). His view is an
attempt to follow a middle path between these extremes, maintaining that there is no substantive,
persistent entity, “the self,” but nevertheless our own self-organization results in an interactional
process that explains experience of the self: it is the “two-way movement between levels” that
explains our experience of the self, in terms of describing, narrating, and accounting for this very
movement. But I want to extend this question: does the virtual self account for our experience
not only of ourselves but of others? Does navigation between my own lower and higher-level
processes make room for the other as anything but a constraint imposed on self-organization?
Varela’s answer to the first question appeals to a pragmatic approach grounded in Eastern
meditation traditions and, specifically, to the association between emptiness and compassion:
again in a double (or circular) causality, it is by cultivating compassion that we come to
experience the self as “empty” (non-substantive, non-persistent, non-central) and it is in
overcoming oneself that we cultivate compassion. Emptiness then is not a concept of nothingness
or absence but rather refers to a “full” emptiness, a non-substantial yet affective orientation
towards others. This “full emptiness” is seen in his definition of the virtual self as
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a coherent global pattern that emerges from the activity of simple local components, which
seems to be centrally located, but is nowhere to be found, and yet is essential as a level of
interaction for the behavior of the whole. (Varela, 1999, p. 53)
It is the self as virtual that is meant to resolve the tension between science and experience, as per
the second question: the self is not to be found anywhere but instead is an interactional level
between those states or processes described by traditional science.
Ultimately, Varela’s goal in this work is to understand how we can foster spontaneous
ethical action. To do this, he must overcome powers of the self that bind it to reflective principles
– reason, knowledge – and call the self into question. He does so by recommending a pragmatic
approach: meditative practice that discovers the emptiness of self and cultivates compassion.
Having displaced the self, he goes on to explain our sense of self in terms of a virtual self, that is,
a global pattern that emerges from simple local neuro-behavioral states. Subjectivity, thus
emptied of substantiality and persistence and instead emerging within and adjusting itself to
arising situations, becomes conceived of as for-interaction.
But if it is the self that calls the self into question, then have its powers been overcome?
Is it not the self-same entity that simultaneously demands and provides its own justification?
Does not the appeal to serving others refer back to the appeal of self-service, of the cultivation of
virtue, to the improvement of oneself? And is compassion at all a sufficient motivation for wise,
spontaneous, ethical action that opposes itself to rationality and knowledge, that is, to prefabricated principles, or is compassion not just a new, affective principle, but a principle all the
same? Does it not, just as much as reason, depend on something pre-existing the specific
encounters with the others who calls us to service, that is, depend on something already existing
in me, whether that be a rational or affective capacity and disposition? Do the other, the social

154

interaction, the interaction between levels, and compassion always agree in their demands? If
they do not, then who does ethics prioritize? Who should we prioritize? Virtue ethics clearly
maintains a preference for the self – here, for the self’s own interactional dynamics and affective
cultivation – even if that self is virtual, this is still a self-orientation – but I maintain that ethics
must uphold the priority of the other, or else it collapses into self-interest, perhaps a productive,
pro-social self-interest, but action guided by one’s own interests nonetheless. That is, without
prioritizing the other over interaction, we fall into cynicism of altruism and self-sacrifice as we
fall back onto principles prior to encounter.
Does the virtual self, a kind of narrative unity of change over time, account for (or,
nonequivalently, contain) all there is to say of ethical experience or, by extension, the totality of
our experience of the self? Is not part of the sense of the self, particularly if we are interested in
ethics, a matter of our responsibility and accountability over time? We are responsible for far
more than what we ourselves call into question, far more than we ourselves see a need to justify
or account for. We tell stories about ourselves but others tell these stories too, and it is not
obvious that our own have priority or privilege. The question of the individuation of the self is
answered by Varela through a story of changing organizational dynamics carried out at a level
connecting neuro-behavioral states and narrative. But our narratives are not only or primarily for
ourselves; they are always offered to another with whom we speak: we offer them to the other.
Varela recognizes this and calls the ‘I’ linguistic and social. But any good narrative must relate
to its audience. When we tell stories of ourselves that interest only ourselves, concern only
ourselves, satisfy only ourselves, we are rightly rebuffed or ignored. The individuation of the I as
a narrative unity and as a creature held responsible over time for those actions corresponding to
disparate neuro-behavioral states to which I now only bear, as my very existence itself, a
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developmental relation of adjustment (see, for an example, predictive processing accounts),
comes from the other who demands an act of justification: we are held accountable for
organizing and presenting ourselves, not only by a self-interest that could only make sense of the
good as the good-for-me (even if in the form of the good-for-an-interaction-that-includes-me),
but by the interests of others who question and invest my interests.
More simply, there is a fact of experience that Varela’s account of the virtual self as a
form of self-overcoming does not acknowledge or explain. The other is revealed to the self
through compassion – a form of orientation towards the other – but compassion is a cultivation
of self and part and parcel with calling oneself into question. Varela states that the beginning of
mindfulness/awareness practice meant to cultivate compassion is a certain freeing of oneself,
resulting in the development of an interest in others: a warmth, or compassion, as an otherdirected interest (Varela, 1999, pp. 66-7). Compassion thus becomes a central part of the
pragmatics of ethical expertise, that is, the cultivation of one’s own ethical dispositions. Yet,
compassion is developed by the self and, even if directed to others, is still the self’s interest in
others, an interest produced by overcoming one’s own other interests. There is a datum in
experience that Levinas indicates by expression and responsibility, the experience of being called
into question not by oneself but by the other. It is not our self-overcoming, then, that explains our
experience of self (at least not in its entirety), nor is self or other disclosed in an interaction in
which I bring my own developed powers – my cultivated expertise, or virtue, as capacities to
extend, attend, and become intelligently aware – to bear. Rather, the self precisely as ethical is
experienced as that which is called into question by the other. It is in the face of this demand for
justification that we construct and offer ethical justifications (that is, that we regulate our holistic
social behavior with individualistic neuro-behavioral states). Compassion and the emptiness of
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self, then, should not be considered merely a development of my own cognition and cultivation
of and by myself but rather refer to an other who calls me to compassion, who calls me to empty
myself.
Varela’s account recognizes the importance of overcoming the self in the pursuit of
ethics, that this overcoming must be an overcoming of principles that determine the situation in
advance, and he recognizes in affectivity a potential site of resistance to self and principle. But
this account raises a number of questions that must be answered if it is to achieve its goals. As
presented, I believe that it fails: the attempt to overcome the self still relies on the self, that is, the
self is called into question by itself, jeopardizing the selflessness and overcoming of principle
that ethics is supposed to imply. As such, it is still a form of egoism and still does not make sense
of either ethical experience or self-experience, which must account for the ways in which we put
ourselves aside in service of the other (that is, it must make sense of altruism and self-sacrifice),
and of how we experience ourselves as responsible over time. But the question of compassion as
an affective direction to the other starts on the right foot.
Emotion and Ethics
Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance (2009) draw a close connection between ethics
and affectivity, specifically emotions. They use this approach to show a kind of responsibility
that exceeds personal responsibility and in doing so they implicitly demonstrate a kind of
motivation that does not refer primarily to one’s own persistence. According to Colombetti and
Torrance, emotions are inherently ethical insofar as emotions – and affectivity in general – are
value-laden: for the enactivist, affectivity is a primordial mode of sense-making in which the
organism makes sense of the environment (enacting a meaningful world) in terms of what
matters to it. They transition quickly from this claim that emotions matter to a claim that
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emotions are, therefore, ethical in character, the idea seeming to be that what one should do, as
well as what one is responsible for, depends on what matters.
Before continuing, I want to tie this claim into the discussion of solipsistic hedonism
from Chapter 2. For Levinas, the organism indeed makes sense of the world in terms of what
matters to the organism. This fact defines the first morality (which I distinguish from ethics: the
former deals with morals, i.e., rules, principles, agendas; the latter deals with responsibility for
others), which is hedonism. The organism is to enjoy the world as much as it can. This sort of
mattering can be achieved by the organism alone, even by the sole bacterium swimming in a
sugar gradiant. On the other hand, it is only the introduction of the other that shows hedonist
morality to be insufficient by introducing a responsibility that exceeds one’s self-interest (i.e., by
disrupting self-interest). That is to say, though affectivity deals with what matters to the
organism that does not mean that affectivity is therefore ethical in the sense of one’s
responsibility to others. Rather, affectivity (or in Levinas, sensibility) can emerge from solipsism
and engender hedonism, which is a valuing yet unethical perspective on the world.
The next claim made by Colombetti and Torrance, supposing emotions are ethical since
they are value-laden, is that the emotional character of an interaction is in part determined by the
interaction itself in a way that is irreducible to the actions or intentions of any particular agent;
they embrace De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s claim that interaction takes on a life of its own. They
then go on to claim that responsibility should not be exclusively conceived of in individual terms
but, rather, that interaction itself can bear ethical responsibility, since it produces its own
emotional character or tone. But this seems to conflate ethical (or even moral) responsibility with
causal responsibility.
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Consider the following two situations presented by Colombetti and Torrance (2009): one
interaction, between an elderly woman and her caregiver, utterly devoid of affection, genuine
engagement, and, for lack of a better term, care; and another interaction in which the caregiver
initiates and maintains eye-contact (the elderly woman reciprocates), speaks softly, connects
with the elderly woman, and the overall interaction involves a sense of tenderness. First, I want
to note that while we might prefer the warmer emotional tone of the latter interaction over the
former, we nevertheless cannot reduce ethics to such a preference; sometimes ethics might
require coldness. (The preference here is normative and hypothetical, presupposing what we
already think such an interaction should look like, but then it is unclear how we can conceive of
ethics in opposition to dominant norms, or how to think these norms come about.) While care
ethics, for example, teaches that emotions are ethically relevant, it does not erase traditional
theories of ethics according to which other things matter. Colombetti and Torrance, it should be
noted, are not attempting to reduce ethics to emotions, but I raise these points simply to illustrate
that an emotional account of ethics is incomplete (I do not believe they would object to this). We
will see, in part II below, that the Levinasian position complicates enactivist ethics by conceiving
of affectivity as more radically passive than enactivism has thus far, but passive in a way that
structures interaction itself.
What they do insist on, however, is how the emotional character of and responsibility for
interaction depends not only on the participants but also on the unfolding interaction itself. They
suggest that their approach requires two shifts, the first of which is
…to see the ethical content or valuation of a given situation as emerging as much from
the interaction of the participants as from the autonomous decision making or original
authorship of the participants themselves. This shift implies a very different way in which
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ethical appraisal is to be applied in such situations from the way appraisal is conventionally
applied. It constrains us to defocus (to a greater or lesser extent) from questions of individual
responsibility, exculpation, blame and praise, and encourages us to focus on the ethical
qualities of the interaction itself. (Colombetti & Torrance, 2009, p. 523)
Colombetti and Torrance leverage interaction-autonomy (and the close association between
autonomy and responsibility) to argue that the coldness of the first interaction is not solely the
caregiver’s responsibility. The coldness of the interaction is a relational fact, and the interaction
itself is partly ethically responsible. Put another way, responsibility is somewhere between the
caregiver and elderly woman. Indeed, to praise the second caregiver and blame the first
represents a “superficial ethical analysis” (522) whereas a sophisticated analysis focuses instead
on interaction.
The shift to interaction-autonomy conceived of as the autonomy of agents in an
interaction seems feasible, but the additional step to redistributing responsibility away from those
agents to the interaction itself is ethically untenable. This seems to be a backwards-facing, guilt
formulation of responsibility, implying a quick transition from causing or bringing about
emotions – that is, being causally responsible for (or even constitutive of) emotions – to ethical
responsibility. This may be too quick a transition from causal to ethical responsibility. Crucially,
we do not need Levinas to tell us that ethics is concerned, at least predominantly, with humans
and human responsibility. We may extend responsibility to or for animals, or the environment,
for example, but it seems strange to hold an interaction between individuals to be ethically
responsible over and above its participants; how would we hold an interaction accountable,
blame or praise the interaction itself, or demand that an interaction cultivate its own virtues;
would not these responsibilities and moral ascriptions distribute to the participants? (Why would
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blaming the first caregiver, for example, only be possible on a superficial approach?) Even if we
could properly hold an interaction accountable, to do so would amount to making an excuse, e.g.,
for a caregiver who should have acted better and whom we actually hold responsible for acting
better, and also amounts to putting some of the responsibility on the neglected woman herself
since the interaction is in part dependent on (though irreducible to) her own action. The ethical
consequences of displacing responsibility by appealing to higher-level interaction-autonomy are
problematic at best and incoherent at worst.
I would like to add that their second major insight – that social interaction and sensemaking are inherently ethical – is also plausible. However, their reason for this is that these are
inherently affective, or more specifically value-laden. This helps us to understand that social
interaction and sense-making are invested by values, but values are not necessarily ethical in the
sense that values can be individualistic. The Levinasian perspective can help us to understand
why and how social interaction is inherently ethical, by pointing to the way in which the very
encounter with an other calls our own freedom – including our own values – into question. That
is, social interaction is inherently ethical because others call us to responsibility.
De Jaegher and Di Paolo do have resources for dealing with the objection that shunting
responsibility away from individuals and onto the interaction is ethically incoherent, and
considering their possible response can bring us to an up-shot of a Levinasian position. For De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, although an interaction has a life of its own, i.e., its own autonomy, it
nevertheless also constitutionally depends on the autonomy of the individual participants. They
write:
… the autonomy of the individuals as interactors must also not be broken (even though the
interaction may enhance or diminish the scope of individual autonomy). If this were not so, if
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the autonomy of one of the interactors were destroyed, the process would reduce to the
cognitive engagement of the remaining agent with his non-social world. (Di Jaegher & Di
Paolo, 2007, p. 492)
We could say, then, that in the case of the cold care-giver, since the elderly woman is particularly
vulnerable (she is institutionalized and depends on care) her autonomy has been undermined.
According to De Jaegher and Di Paolo, maintaining that individual autonomy is an essential
condition of social interaction, the cold interaction ceases to be a genuine social interaction at all.
This seems correct, as the caregiver does not even look at or speak with (or even to) the elderly
woman, but instead lazily serves her food while gazing out a window, occupied in her world.
This interaction, since it is not a genuinely social interaction, then, cannot appeal to a higherlevel social structure in order to displace responsibility: the caregiver is squarely responsible for
how she treats the elderly woman. In the tender interaction, however, we can understand the
caregiver as genuinely engaging the elderly woman, respecting and inviting her agency, and
accordingly initiating a social interaction that becomes greater than the sum of its parts. In this
case, both parties are responsible since both are genuinely autonomous. It should be noted,
though, that this solution somewhat deflates Colombetti and Torrance’s conclusion about
interaction-responsibility, since it is plausible that it is the former kind of “interaction” (which is
not genuine interaction), and not the latter that will be most important when thinking about ethics
and, of course, in the former we’ve now done away with interaction-responsibility.
Yet, it is incorrect to generalize the point and assert that a relation is not a genuinely
social interaction simply because one of the relata’s autonomy has been destroyed. Many of the
great unjust, violent social institutions have done precisely this. On the one hand, we would not
say that for this very fact they are not social: a social relation is one in which two or more
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persons relate directly to one another. It is also not for this fact simply not an interaction (unless
of course we only understand interaction as a kind of symmetric transaction, which I have
suggested above is precisely the wrong move): this view overlooks the way in which one
person’s passivity itself can affect the interactional dynamics of a social relationship. That is,
even if one’s autonomy has been destroyed, this does not therefore make their presence,
precisely as non-autonomous, non-active, that is, passive, irrelevant to the encounter.11 To
interpret the Hegelian master/slave dialectic loosely, though the master might dominate the slave
this does not mean that the slave does not structure the relationship; it is by the slave’s very
passivity – by giving in to the master’s will rather than his own – that the relation takes shape.12
The point is that it is not only in acting that one interacts, but also in calling action into question;
the more impotent the call to responsibility, that is, the less effective one is in actually holding
another accountable, the more desperately forceful that call becomes. The very demand made by
the presence of an other, even and perhaps especially a slave, the greater the effect on the overall
ethical character of the interaction, regardless of any actual response to that call. Reconsidering
the cold caregiver, can we really claim that ignoring a vulnerable someone’s presence is in no
way a form of social interaction? By her very presence, the elderly woman makes a claim on the
caregiver, and this affects the overall character of the interaction whether or not the caregiver
responds morally. Accordingly, two-way action is not strictly necessary for defining the social
relation or even interaction (in the sense of affecting and being effected by another), as the other

There may be some interesting connections between this claim and what George Kunz (1998) calls the “paradox of
power and weakness,” more specifically the paradox of weakness.
11

One could also, rightly, say that the master is truly the passive member here, with the slave being active. But this
doesn’t change the point: one person’s passivity still structures the overall interaction, and even if someone is dominated
completely it cannot change the fact that their very presence as an other calls the activity of their interlocutor into
question. This is one reason why so much ideology is necessary when attempting to justify oppressive dynamics.
12
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affects us in our own passivity even if we try to reduce them to an object. The very vulnerability
of the other thus reduced opens a dimension of sociality precisely as responsibility for her.
The difficulty with the position is that it privileges individual autonomy over the social
relation. Though De Jaegher and Di Paolo want to move beyond methodological individualism,
they nevertheless take as their starting point human agents as defined by autopoiesis (they
endorse the idea, defended by Jonas, that “metabolism creates a perspective of value on the
world” (2007, p. 488) (remember: this value might be hedonistic-solipsistic, i.e., not ethical) and
extend the terminology of autopoiesis to describe genuinely social interactions as operationally
closed and oriented towards sustaining themselves.
Primary Intersubjectivity as Address (Corrective)
Levinasian insights can help approaches that hope to move beyond individualism.
Though Levinas affirms the individual at the level of sensibility (he does not deny the existence
of something like an embodied self), he nevertheless makes even autonomy subservient to ethics.
He could challenge the idea of autopoiesis thusly: we are not creatures that strive only to sustain
ourselves by whatever means the environment affords, but instead we enjoy the world and
enjoyment cannot be understood as a means-end relationship, not even of survival; ethics
disrupts our enjoyment and in doing so invests our freedom. That is, our individual autonomy is
the autonomy of a sensible being that enjoys the world, but as soon as a social relationship
appears, autonomy is invested by the relationship to the other: relational-autonomy (the
autonomy of the relationship itself) appears as a being called out of individual-autonomy,
specifically as the questioning of one’s naïve freedom to enjoy the world according to selfinterest. The elderly woman, by her mere presence, autonomy aside, calls us to ethical
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responsibility, and it is this call – below and beyond any normative context – that motivates our
holding the care-giver accountable, motivates even outrage against norms themselves.
Crucially, from this perspective, individual-autonomy is a kind of myth. Without being
called out of oneself, one’s actions are determined by self-interest. Being called out of oneself in
responsibility to others makes one’s actions an open question – to enjoy or not; how and why;
what to do? One can choose how one responds, and even ignoring someone is a response, but
one cannot choose whether to respond at all. The neglectful caregiver responds poorly. Put
another way, sociality constitutes us as individuals, in the sense that sociality calls us to account
for ourselves, that is, to offer ourselves to the other. Relational-autonomy is not simply grafted
onto individual autonomy but is, rather, a being-called-out of naïve individual autonomy that
more closely resembles enjoyment-seeking automaticity than genuine freedom. The ethical
relation is a primary relationship with another person beyond myself. My genuine freedom
depends on being called into question by the other, as a way out of deterministic self-interest.
This works itself out in the first instant of contact with an other, prior to any activity on my own
part but instead simply in the presence of an other who expresses herself. The important point
that has been missed is the asymmetric direction of this ethical dimension: the other calls me out
of myself, whether I make any claims on the other or not, and before I respond in any way.
Specifically, the other calls me to responsibility for the other, and whether the other is likewise
called to responsibility by me, as Levinas says in his interviews with Philippe Nemo, “is his
affair” (i.e., not my business, not my concern) (Levinas, 1985, p. 98). He elaborates: “the
intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. In this sense, I am responsible for the
Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair” (Levinas,
1985, p. 98). Interaction in the sense of reciprocal action is not necessary for a concept of
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relational autonomy, as my autonomy is already invested by the other (1) in passive terms, i.e., in
being affected by the other independent of any act I go on to perform and (2) without waiting for
any response on the part of the other. It is in an encounter with the other that my individual
autonomy gets set-up, but an encounter that may not yet be interaction in the reciprocal sense.
Two important points. We should not start with autopoiesis and individual-autonomy and
then try to sort out sociality and ethics at a higher level, but rather should begin with an ethical
relationship and understand autonomy on the basis of sociality (in particular, in terms of
disruption, investment, and responsibility), and we also must recognize that at times ethics might
require that autonomy – even relational-autonomy – be compromised. Indeed, Levinas’ ethics is
one that makes possible self-sacrifice unto death, which is untenable from the perspective of
autopoiesis or even an interaction that privileges my autonomy. Autopoiesis is a self-oriented (in
the sense of referring to my own, organismic processes and interactions with the world) and
exploitative (ethics as value, value as value-for-me) characterization of human experience.
Calling autonomy into question is not the end of genuine social interaction but, instead, its
beginning.
My proposal, which should already be anticipated, is this: construe primary
intersubjectivity, our primary relationship with another person, as involving an asymmetric
component of address. Building on the previous chapter as well as the concerns raised above by
way of Levinas’ criticism of Buber, we can better understand our experience of another person as
distinct from our experience of objects, and can simultaneously better make sense of the
positivity of both, if we understand the other as calling oneself out of oneself. In other words, our
primary relationship to the other as an other is not simply a relationship to something similar to
ourselves that enhances our own powers by referring them to a new kind of object or by teaching
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us about ourselves. Instead, primary intersubjectivity involves the way in which the other
disrupts my powers, introducing a foreign element into consciousness (what Levinas calls
subjectivity as “the-other-in-me” or “inspiration”) and thereby investing my freedom. The result
is a social relationship to an other not merely as an analogue to myself but rather as an
interlocutor to whom my actions – whatever they may be – constitute a response. As invested by
the other, which we can understand in terms of the way that a disruption of myself is
simultaneously a re-direction of attention and, thereby, of motivation, we can also understand the
social encounter as an overcoming of individual autonomy; it does not destroy my autonomy, but
calls me to accountability for it.
Importantly, the kind of asymmetry I am proposing here is an ethical asymmetry,
according to which by the very fact of expressing herself to me, I am responsible to and for the
other – my self-interest is disrupted and response is unavoidable. In his 2014 article, “In your
face: transcendence in embodied interaction,” Gallagher is right in arguing that transcendence is
not in the other; rather, it is a relation to the other. But he too hastily dismisses asymmetry in
favor of reciprocal recognition: that the other and I meet each other’s gaze (Gallagher, 2014;
2020, p. 206). On Gallagher’s view, asymmetry is introduced to the intersubjective relationship
externally, by institutional arrangements for example. But on my own position, asymmetry is a
basic characterization of intersubjectivity as such: the relation to another subject just is a relation
to she who interrupts my content sensibility. He is perfectly correct that reciprocity plays an
important role in the establishment of mutual sense and, therefore, ethical norms, but I am
suggesting that we understand asymmetry not only as disrupting reciprocity as a higher-level,
institutional modification, but as motivating that very reciprocity from the ground up: the other
calls me away from myself toward the other, and in every moment of interaction, even when
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reciprocal, we are oriented to an other who is reducible neither to myself nor that interaction.
Crucially, it is the first moment of encounter with another – prior to any response on my own
part – that we are already called to responsibility, regardless of reciprocity.
By understanding the asymmetry of primary intersubjectivity, by which I simply mean
that the way that the other demands a response from me is the very basis of our relationship, we
can better understand responsibility, ethical experience, altruism and self-sacrifice. In the social
relationship, I am already directed to and by the other, and as such am already for the other; my
responsibility to the other is not reducible to my own interests (called into question by the other)
or to the interaction (i.e., transaction) itself constituted by this responsibility. There is a positive
presence of the other, though it is not an ontological-perceptual presence (nor the in-principle
impossibility thereof, which would be only a negative phenomenology), which is precisely the
disruption-redirection-responsibility complex instituted in me by the other. Even an infant, who
perhaps knows nothing of responsibility, is disrupted and redirected by the other, and as such
responds. We can understand altruism and self-sacrifice, since my own freedom is already
invested by the other from the start, and in any case its exercise is called into question and in
need of justification: this account allows for the charge that the use of my freedom is unjustified,
and the standard of justification lies not in my own self-organization but in the demands made on
me by the other.
My proposal, then, allows for the enactivist to begin with autopoiesis for understanding
an isolated organism, but provides the means by which self-interest can be overcome by the very
start of sociality. The point remains that primary intersubjectivity is not a developmental stage to
be overcome, and this implies that our higher-level systems through which we make-sense
together always involve an asymmetric relationship where one is held accountable to the other as
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the very ground on which such an interaction can be social in the first place. We can say that the
interaction itself shapes the character of the social encounter, but we also can coherently hold
individual participants responsible for that character even though it exceeds them; indeed,
individual responsibility is the very motivation for understanding the ethical character of the
interaction in the first place.
Enactivism, for its part, still plays a valuable role in understanding how we transition
from ethics to understanding.
From Ethical Asymmetry to Doxic Symmetry
Totality and Infinity is shaped by a certain insecurity: Levinas wants to describe an
alternative to ontology, yet is seemingly forced to do so in ontological terms. In Otherwise than
Being, however, this is no longer seen as a bug but a feature; the anxiety of falling back into
ontological terms is instead embraced as a kind of necessity. Though the other disrupts
consciousness and thus challenges our familiar categories by affirming the priority of ethics,
consciousness nevertheless consists in bringing-home even this disruption, casting it in terms of
being, i.e., ontology. Though ethics is primary for Levinas, and is the very foundation of the
social as such, it is nevertheless the case that we do (and must) make-sense of the other’s
expression in ontological terms. What I propose now is that, bearing in mind the new
interpretation of primary intersubjectivity as involving a challenge to consciousness – a
disruption of thought and perception – enactivism nevertheless shows how a transition is affected
from ethical asymmetry (that the other calls me to responsibility prior to my response) to doxic
symmetry (mutuality of sense, meaning, belief, etc., i.e., meaningful agreement), precisely
through reciprocity.
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Another way to pose the issue is in terms of particularism. Levinas appeals to the face to
face encounter as a source of ethical significance, and the appropriateness of any response seems
to be dependent on the particular demands being made in a given encounter. Yet, there is also in
Levinas’ work a concern for justice as universally applying to all. How could such a justice be
based on a particularism that rejects universalizing principles? More broadly, it is sometimes
argued (e.g., by Critchley & Bernasconi, 2002) that Levinas is not doing normative philosophy at
all and has nothing to tell us about what we should actually do. Diane Perpich (2008) defends
Levinas as articulating a “normativity without norms,” yet we still need ask: whence norms, and
more specifically, whence ethical norms that respect the face-to-face encounter? The claim here,
then, is that ethical asymmetry explains an initial motivation for ethical sense-making, and that
enactivism can then explain – through reciprocity – how norms are established in (and feed back
on) interaction.13
Interaction theory and participatory sense-making prioritize reciprocity: making-sense is
a give and take activity. And this is fair enough. Levinas, however, can help us to appreciate an
underlying ethical asymmetry always operating beneath reciprocity. Interaction takes place in the
face of an other who makes a demand on me in virtue of the very fact of interaction. That is, the
other who expresses herself demands that I make-sense while simultaneously making sensemaking possible, opening herself to sense-making as reciprocal. It is out of responsibility to an
other with whom we make contact through vulnerability to expression that we take up projects of
object-constitution in the first place. This underlying ethical asymmetry is broadly compatible

The position developed here is similar to that developed by Dierckxsens, but with a few differences: (1) I make no
claim about multiple senses of justice; (2) I emphasize the establishment of mutual sense and norms; (3) we express
asymmetry differently, and I leave open whether our expressions are compatible; (4) I do not endorse “pre-ethical social
interactions,” which Dierckxsens claims enactivism reveals, as coherent; instead, I insist that enactivism must recognize
the ethical dimension of social interaction generally. For all that, I highly regard Dierckxsens work on this topic.
13
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with interaction theory and illustrates how an ethical dimension conditions further
cognitive/affective dimensions and analyses. If primary intersubjectivity is interpreted as
involving asymmetric address, then we can see multiple ways that common belief (and
knowledge) depend on this prior ethical understanding. In the last chapter, we explored how it is
precisely the ethical significance of interaction that directs our attention and underlies the
learning of general categories. But we can also see how reciprocal sense-making, a give-and-take
of propositions, things said, and expressions conceived as propositions or acts, rest on a
responsibility one has to respond to the other. Or, on one’s ability to respond, which already
implies an asymmetric relation.
Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello (2008, 2009) and Schmidt & Rakoczy (2017) explore
the ways that certain give-and-take interactions between children and adults, which can be seen
as a development of natural pedagogy, result in the recognition of norms and normativity in
terms of what one should do. The 2008 article shows that children can apply simple rules across
contexts and will respond normatively to violations of those rules (they protest, critique, or
teach). In 2009, the authors go on to show that when learning various acts and rules, young
children engage in selective normative learning, that is, they prefer reliable teachers not only as
providing better information but also normatively appropriate information; they will adhere to
norms learned from a reliable agent and extend those norms to new contexts. In 2017, Schmidt
and Rakoczy provided evidence that “very young children engage in rational and selective thirdparty norm enforcement, which suggests they understand some important features of
normativity”. This shows that “human social cognition is not only concerned with the prediction
and explanation of others’ behavior, but also with the prescription and evaluation of others’
actions.” This just demonstrates that normativity is bound up with cognition from a very young
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age. But the relationships we are interested in here are those between normativity and ethics, and
between teacher and student (in this case, children) such that children learn these norms in the
first place.
In 2009, Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello raise the question: “When, under what
circumstances and how do young children engage in selective normative learning? Which cues,
for example, do they make use of (such as verbal, ostensive, or other potentially pedagogical
ones)?” (2009, p. 68). In the previous chapter, a connection was drawn between natural
pedagogy and expression construed as asymmetric address. Since normative learning is a kind of
learning, we can suggest here that the same conclusions apply: it is by being called to respond by
the other that our attention is guided in such a way as to pick out general features of the situation
beyond particular here-and-now qualities and thus institute normative learning. It is also
intriguing that each of these studies employed a human teacher of norms, on the one hand, and
either a puppet teacher or puppet transgressor, on the other. The findings seem to ignore the
differences this might make. Overall, children preferred norms taught by human others, were
able to apply those norms across different contexts more readily than with those norms learned
by puppets, and children prescribed behavior to (as well as criticized and reprimanded) puppets
much more so than humans. There is something in the response to a human that is relevant for
the questions raised just above: it is in response to a human interlocutor that children learn these
norms, preferring human-taught norms and discounting puppet ones. A consideration beyond our
scope here is the question of power and authority, as it was shown that children would not
typically reprimand adults in these studies, and would also trust adults as reliable sources of
information over other children, choosing to enforce adult-learned norms over childrenlearned/co-constructed ones.
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Our answer, then, to the kind of cues that actually motivate norm learning refers in large
part to asymmetry: it is human expression that calls the child into question and directs their
attention to the kinds of generalities necessary for entering into reciprocal interactions with other
children, puppets, adults, and so on, out of which normative awareness – or better yet, normative
activity – arises.
Enactivist accounts of participatory sense-making and interaction provide insights on the
transition from a reciprocal interaction to doxic symmetry, i.e., to agreement of sense: through
interaction, we come to understand each other, or come to understand the world in largely the
same way. This is a kind of transaction in which we trade, adopt, modify, and challenge senses
and understandings until they resemble one another closely enough to get on with business. The
entire business of mind-reading and even direct perception is a part of this economy, whereby we
understand the other by bringing something of our own to the table, and insofar as this process is
externalized, that is, expressed, the other comes to better understand us as well. But the other is
never completely known to us: they are always-more-than any category that we bring to them
(Kunz 1998, p. 36) and this accounts for ‘infinition’ in Levinas, i.e., the production of the idea of
infinity through contact with the other.
It is this excess, the escaping by the other from any conception such that a demand is
always made by expression, that is at the heart of ethical responsibility (responsibility for
someone other than myself), ethical experience (of others as irreducible to oneself and making
necessary response, even if inadequate), and altruism and self-sacrifice (as action despite
myself). This excess requires that our reciprocal interactions be sensitive to ethical asymmetry.
That is, the other is a source of signification and can always disrupt our participation or
interaction, can always disrupt the agreement of concepts and our give-and-take exchange in
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order to call what we think we know and our activity of sense-making into question. The other,
then, has a kind of authority even in a reciprocal interaction if the question is precisely the
understanding of the other or her world. This applies to the discovery of ethical principles
understood as rationalistic propositions – we might apply utilitarianism to determine how we
treat the other, but the other can always protest our determination and demand otherwise – as
well as to determining states of affairs.
Conclusion
Experience of others is distinct from experience of objects precisely insofar as the former
and not the latter is constituted by an asymmetric relationship characterized by expression,
address, or demand; it is our responsibility to others that distinguishes them from objects. Ethical
responsibility is thus a fundamental dimension of intersubjectivity that cannot be derived from
purportedly prior states, such as already established norms or particular orientations towards the
other such as compassion or care; it is as already responsible that emotions and norms gain their
significance, an ambiguous term signalling both sense and importance, and that we come not
only to understand norms but also to create them. Insofar as enactivism attempts to make sense
of ethics in terms of a reciprocal relationship that privileges autonomy it misses this ethical
dimension and as such cannot satisfactorily account for responsibility, ethical experience, or the
possibilities of altruism and self-sacrifice.
Ethical asymmetry founds learning, as argued in the previous chapter, but also
satisfactorily accounts for the shortcomings of current enactivist thought mentioned above.
Importantly, such a dimension can (and should) be embraced by enactivism. Most readily, ethical
asymmetry can be incorporated into an enactive account of motivation as well as learning
(including of norms and normativity); can serve as a standard for or check against sense-making,
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that is, can make sense-making accountable to someone outside the ego (thus making sense of
non-normative/counter-culture experience, including pathology phenomena for which a familiar
analogue in one’s own experience is lacking); and can help us better understand the
establishment of mutual doxic sense, i.e., how rationality is based on a different kind of nonrational experience (recall Chapter 2, where it is shown that expression is largely a matter of
affectivity, though an affectivity conceived as a radical passivity to the other), which is
something enactivist approaches to sense-making and ethics alike are interested in pursuing.
In the final chapter, I go on to specifically explore the implications of these Levinasian
insights for psychopathology.
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Chapter 5
Levinasian Psychopathology:
Embodiment, Substitution, & Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I juxtapose phenomenological and 4e concepts of embodiment, self and
intersubjectivity with Levinasian concepts of embodiment as sensitivity, substitution as a distinct
form of perspective-taking, and self as produced in response to the other. I then propose three
types of disturbances corresponding to what have been traditionally known as “self” disturbances
or disorders, and apply these to depression, grandiose narcissism, and certain symptoms
associated with schizophrenia. This typology has therapeutic implications, which I touch on only
briefly. Finally, I consider a related, Levinas-inspired position: the Seattle School approach to
psychotherapy. I argue against the approach’s characterization of mental illness as ethical
deficiency and emphasize that Levinas’ challenge is specifically to the responsibility of his
reader: it is the therapist’s responsibility that is in question, not his patient’s.
Embodiment, Self, and Intersubjectivity
Phenomenological and 4e approaches to psychopathology have recently begun to stress
the importance of the body for understanding not just cognitive phenomena generally but also
pathology phenomena. Many of the latter are accounted for in terms of disruptions to some form
of embodiment – either one’s tacit, embodied being in the world, i.e., living one’s body as a set
of motor dispositions and coordinations that allow one to competently navigate the environment
without themselves becoming thematic, or in terms of one’s body image or the body as an object,
that is, one’s perceptual, emotional, epistemic representations of one’s own body.
The body is also closely connected to the idea of the self, and there are numerous debates
surrounding this connection. First, it is contentious whether embodiment constitutes a form of
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selfhood or, on the other hand, is pre-personal. Second, it is maintained that the body and the self
alike – whatever their relation – are implicated in the question of intersubjectivity: we seem to
encounter others as bodies with our own bodies. Miriam Kyselo (2014) raises what she calls the
body-social problem, which is a question of resolving the tension between bodily and social
aspects of individuating the self: does the self exist in some sort of individual form prior to social
encounters with others – perhaps in virtue of mere embodiment – or does the coordination of
bodies within social encounters constitute the identity of the self?
Aligning with these overlapping concerns, pathological disruptions of embodiment are
typically taken to either be or to imply disruptions of self and/or intersubjectivity. Levinas’
conceptions of embodiment and selfhood are helpful here. Recalling Chapter 2, embodiment
constitutes a kind of ego, but there is also a simultaneously social and personal self achieved not
by the body itself but by a relationship with the other.
Embodiment-Substitution-Self
Levinas’ conception of embodiment, as explicated in Chapter 2, refers to one’s
vulnerable sensibility: the body is exposure to the elements, and therefore to force, hunger,
ageing and death. Sensibility is not a strictly causal notion, since it is also characterized by an
affective, phenomenal dimension: what is encountered by a sensible body matters to that body
not only in terms of its own survival (and this is where the autopoietic notion of affective sensemaking hits its limit) but also in terms of its enjoyment; the body’s needy exposure to the world
becomes a site for enjoying those very things it needs. It is even enjoyable to the body – and this
is perhaps the fact that leads Plato and John Stuart Mill, for example, to distinguish higher from
lower, i.e., bodily pleasures – to consume that which is antithetical to survival: we sometimes
enjoy over-eating, unsafe sexual practices, and substance abuse. Importantly, there is a kind of
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“for-me-ness” present here, insofar as what is given to the body in sensibility is given for the
body to enjoy. The body constitutes a certain kind of ego or self, but this is not the same as the
“minimal self,” conceived of as a perspectival owner of experience. The sensitive body does not
yet sharply distinguish that which is given to it from itself, since what is given to it is given
precisely in terms of its own self-interest. Embodiment therefore does not yet get us out of
subjectivism or apparition (again, see Chapter 2 above), and bodily interest is not best
characterized by a re-production or survival but, rather, enjoyment.
A full-fledged “I” or self, capable of disentangling itself from the world it inhabits, comes
on the scene, for Levinas, “first in the accusative, then in the substantive.” This means that the
self is not accomplished by the body as a kind of subject of appearances, but rather exists first as
the body called into question by the other: the body as disrupted. In our dealings with objects, the
body is disrupted by objective force, meaning that we cannot readily appropriate worldly things
and must sometimes adapt our methods or move on. The other, however, presents the body with
ethical resistance: what is called into question is not my ability to overpower something in the
world through my own action but, rather, to justify that action, to answer for myself to the other.
Thus, called into question by an other (in the accusative rather than substantive), the self exists as
a kind of accounting for the body’s existence as a naïve enjoyment of its world. This “accounting
for” somewhat resembles Varela’s conception of the “I” as an “ongoing interpretative narrative”
(Varela, 1999, p. 61), the crucial difference being that it is not I who call myself into question,
but the other who establishes my identity by demanding an account of me.
Henceforth, I refer to the kind of self constituted as bodily sensibility as “ego” or “me,”
because it refers to a kind of egoist enjoyment and is the thing called into question by the other:
an account is demanded of me. I refer to the self constituted by the other’s demand, which
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disrupts me, as the “I” or, since it is that to which our normal ascriptions to the self most readily
apply, the personal self or, simply, the self: an account is demanded of me; I respond.1
The moment at which the other who expresses herself calls me into question is the
moment in which the world, rather than simply appearing for the body, begins to appear to the
body as having appeared for the body and, simultaneously, as for-the-other that calls this body
into question. The world is no longer simply for-me; the for-me-ness of the world can no longer
be taken for granted. It is by occupying one’s body as oriented by the expressions of the other,
that is, occupying one’s body through the other’s perspective despite one’s own, that I become
constituted precisely as he who must respond to her expression. This displacing of my own
perspective in response to the other, according to which I take on their needs and desires as my
own, is called substitution.
Levinas formulates substitution as substitution “of one for the other”, in association with
language, responsibility, “and the condition (or the uncondition) of being hostage” (Levinas,
1981, p. 6). He also writes that “substitution is signification” (ibid.), that is, putting oneself in the
place of the other is the first instance of significance in the sense of the intentional structure, X as
Y. As outlined in Chapter 3, it is in an encounter with the other that we come to account for
ourselves, the other, and the world by thematizing that which is given to sensibility as signifying
something beyond myself. In addition to the significatory sense of substitution, substitution also
has a material-responsive sense: to substitute oneself for the other is to respond according to their
needs, desires, expressions. If the other calls into question my right to food, substitution is not
only an understanding of what I have as food, but also an understanding of that food as for-the-

These terms do not necessarily line up with Levinas’ own. His uses of “ego,” “me”, “self,” and “I” are somewhat
slippery throughout his works. The terms I apply here are simply those that make sense in context and will allow the
discussion to move forward.
1
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other rather than for-me. Calling my right to food into question, then, involves not just thought
but also the possibility that I actually give my food to the other.
When I refer to substitution here, I am referring to a kind of perspective-taking. I do not
mean the acknowledgment that the other is a perspective on the world like me to be weighed into
my epistemic judgments, and I do not mean to take on the other’s perspective primarily in terms
of understanding what they understand, or taking on their point of view. What I mean by
perspective-taking, when I give it the name “substitution,” is the orientation of my body towards
the world not according to my own self-interest (which can still dominate any practice of seeing
from the other’s point of view), but instead according to the needs, desires, and – more generally
– expressions of the other. Substitution is a taking up of the world as for-the-other, rather than as
for-me. This does not primarily refer to understanding the world as the other does, but to putting
oneself in a position to respond to or for the other’s needs, desires, and so on. However, in order
to materially respond to the other, the significatory role of substitution is indispensable.
Expression, as calling me to account for myself and, thus, to substitute myself for the
other, is a principle of signification, the possibility of intentional experience characterized as
being directed towards X as Y, that is, as something beyond my own sensible grasp on it. No
amount of sensation may give to us a perfectly adequate understanding of the other’s expression;
it is by communication and co-operation, allowing any conception we form to be tested by the
other and possibly disrupted – overturned, rejected, reinterpreted – that we come to understand.
In summary: Levinas’ conception of embodiment refers to a pre-personal but egoic
sensibility exposed to a world (and therefore to the possibility of an encounter with others). The
self or I comes into being in the encounter with another who calls the ego’s naïve existence into
question and reorients one’s attention by demanding the ego account for (or justify) itself and the
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world. The self is embodiment thrown back on itself by responsibility. The Levinasian account
therefore agrees that the body is pre-personal and perspectival but goes further by
disambiguating for-me-ness and selfhood: the bodily ego experiences the world as for-me, but
selfhood emerges from the disruption of that for-me-ness. Crucially, the self can and often does
collapse back into egoism and an orientation towards the world as existing for-me, but this
occurs precisely where one puts their own enjoyment above responsibility. That is to say that the
ego and the self, mediated by substitution, exist in a dynamic relationship; one can overcome
egoism by orienting themselves to the world according to the other’s needs, but one can also fall
back out of such an orientation into a hedonistic search for sensible pleasure.
This relationship between embodied ego, substitution, and personal selfhood also carves
out an answer to the body-social problem by proposing the social mechanism that accomplishes
the transition from individual embodied existence to a simultaneously bodily and social self.
Kyselo’s main concern in raising this question is to avoid choosing between embodiment
conceived as a solipsistic ego separated from sociality, on the one hand, or as entirely lost in
social immersion, on the other. This account navigates the dilemma by proposing a specific role
for embodiment while requiring an ambiguous social relation for a full realization of the self.
Substitution is the transition from a bodily ego to a social self, and it involves a social ambiguity
or immersion in the sense that it involves disrupting (though never completely overcoming) my
experience of the world as for myself by taking up the world as for-the-other.
Moving forward, except where noted, I use the following terms interchangeably:
embodiment, ego, me; substitution and intersubjectivity; self, personal self, I.
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Some Results: Disruption, Pathology, and Threat
Disturbances of self and intersubjectivity in pathology phenomena can be classified in
two ways, according to Thomas Fuchs and Jann Schlimme. The first kind of disruption refers to
the lived body or body schema – which for them includes an embodied sense of self and a tacit
understanding of the world and inclusion in “common sense”; this is the kind of disruption
posited in relation to schizophrenia and depression. The second kind of disruption refers to the
object body or body image, one’s explicit awareness of oneself; this kind is posited in relation to
“body dysmorphic disorder, hypochondriasis, somatoform disorders or eating disorders such as
anorexia nervosa” (Fuchs & Schlimme, 2009, p. 571).
The first important result of following a Levinasian approach is that disruption of
embodiment is not necessarily pathological. Indeed, the constitution of the self presupposes a
disruption of naïve embodiment by a social encounter with the other. According to Fuchs &
Schlimme (2009, p. 571), the lived body becomes experienced as the object body – the schema
becomes available as a set of images – precisely where the implicit functioning of the lived body
breaks down. I agree, with two caveats. First, if this is so, we must ask what kinds of breakdowns
distinguish the ordinary transition from lived body to object body from the kinds of breakdowns
that characterize pathological phenomena. Second, we must include in our considerations not just
interruptions of autonomous motor functionality, involving body schema, even those instituted
by an encounter with the other, but also ethical interruptions, i.e., interruptions of the body’s
egoistic, hedonic naïve existence defined by content enjoyment of the elements.. It is not just
when I trip over a rock or when my body becomes unhealthy that I conceptualize my own body
in such a way as to differentiate myself from the world, but rather when I am called to respond to
an other and thus thematize the world, myself, and the other as significant – epistemologically
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and ethically – beyond myself. The point here is that disruptions to embodiment are not
automatically disruptions to the self, and that such self-disruptions already include a non-motoric
and non-perceptual salience: the I exists insofar as I am responsible to and for others.
The second major result is a new way of thinking about pathology phenomena. In
particular, the distinction between ego and self, and the idea of substitution that accomplishes the
transition from one to another, might help us think about a nexus of seemingly contrasting
symptoms all associated with schizophrenia. Schizophrenia seemingly involves: (1) disruptions
of self, such as alienation from one’s own body or mind, separation between one’s own body and
mind, and the dissolution of one’s personal identity associated with experiencing oneself as
empty or void; (2) disruptions of intersubjectivity such as anomalous or inappropriate responses,
disturbances in understanding the other’s expressions, a sense that others are oppressive or
otherwise threats to one’s own identity, and divergence from commonly accepted meanings; (3)
self/other ambiguity, fusion, or con-fusion, that is, ambiguity as to whether a given experience or
action is one’s own or, instead, attributable to an other. (2) and (3) represent certain forms of
separation from others and a lack of separation respectively. Froese and Krueger (2021) focus on
the latter, and suggest that a self/other ambiguity is actually inherent to intersubjectivity. They
maintain that the self arises as a differentiation from this prior ambiguity. This jives with
enactivism and extended cognition in general: if my own processes involve or depend on
interactions with others, then some of my processes are genuinely ambiguous. To lose this
ambiguity altogether is tantamount to being separated from intersubjectivity, and they call this a
loss of the socially extended mind. On the other hand, to fail to differentiate oneself from this
ambiguity is to be lost in the socially extended mind: to fail to constitute an identity for oneself
out from the ambiguous processes that constitute my own processes. This distinction echoes
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concerns raised by Kyselo (2014): solipsism (or “quasi-solipsism”, in Parnas and Sass’ (2001)
terminology), on the one hand, and dissolution of the self on the other.
On the Levinasian account, we can understand this self/other ambiguity as the transitional
stage between embodiment and the emergence of the self. Ambiguity, then, can be understood in
terms of substitution, or taking the other’s perspective. This already has an ethical significance: it
is already a response to the presence of the other. To lose the socially extended mind, or
self/other ambiguity, is not necessarily to suffer a disruption of embodiment, but could
alternatively be to remain thoroughly within it, i.e., to maintain the ego against the others. This is
one reason why a perceptual account of intersubjectivity cannot always make sense of
intersubjective disruptions: one might perceive the other in all the ordinary, sensory ways, but
without being disrupted by their address there may be no real contact at all. In this way, Levinas’
conception of intersubjectivity diverges from Husserl’s (see Chapter 2): for both it is an
encounter with the other that motivates a sense of the world as objective, that is, as shared, but
for Husserl this is a perceptual relation with an other taken as analogous to myself, whereas for
Levinas it is an ethical relation through which the other calls me to take on their own perspective,
and that can only be accomplished by a communication that disrupts my perception.
To put the point another way, the shared world comes about not only by a sensorimotor
coordination between bodies; that very coordination must be taken as something produced
between bodies in communication, where one is motivated to respond to the other. Just as a
Levinasian position requires us to redefine primary intersubjectivity (see Chapter 4), it also
requires that we rework the idea of genuine intersubjectivity. For Froese and Krueger (2021),
genuine intersubjectivity consists in co-regulated experience. But there is already
intersubjectivity prior to co-regulation, in the asymmetric encounter out of which co-regulation
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arises. First there is disruption, and then only in response to disruption of our own embodied
processes does co-regulation emerge. I thus agree with the enactivist claim that “reality is not
something predetermined and external” but we must complicate the idea that it is instead
“brought forth by a living being’s sensorimotor interaction with its environment” (Fuchs, 2020,
p. 63; italics his). The sensorimotor alone is inadequate for the constitution not only of a shared
reality but of a significant reality at all, as well as the formation of a personal self; disruption in
the social sense is necessary for the constitution of a non-body-centered “reality,” even if not yet
a reality of “common sense.”
On the other hand, to lose oneself in the socially extended mind is already to be disrupted
by others without that disruption resulting in the formation of a personal identity. This kind of
disorder of self is not first and foremost disruption of embodiment nor even intersubjectivity
(though self-disturbances could feedback on embodiment and intersubjectivity): a certain
disruption to embodied existence is a necessary condition of the self on this account, and there is
also already an intersubjective relationship entailed by the possibility of being lost in the socially
extended mind. Instead, the matter is the transition from the embodied interaction through the
intersubjective relationship to the constitution of the self. This will become especially important
in the following discussion of the Seattle School of Psychology. For now, I note only that this
account could help to explain reports by persons diagnosed with schizophrenia that the other
manifests as a threatening presence, particularly that others threaten their identity (Lysaker,
Johannesen, & Lysaker, 2005). The interaction with the other, beyond the ambiguity captured by
the extended mind hypothesis in terms of co-regulated processes, is indeed a threat to one’s prereflective mode of being, and even in ordinary cases is a threat to the self. What I am describing
as disruption is not ended with the formation of a personal self, or with substitution being carried
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out once and for all. When I can think of myself as a self and account for myself and the world in
responsibility to others, that identity is nevertheless always called into question by the
expressions of others: the call to responsibility can always disrupt my own existence. That is, the
self is always a fluid navigation between my embodied existence and my responsibility for
others. I propose, then, that not only is a self/other ambiguity central to intersubjectivity, as
argued by Froese and Krueger, but that this ambiguity also involves a (sometimes felt but always
operative) threat to one’s identity: one’s identity is established and re-established only by a
disruption of ordinary being that institutes such an ambiguity. Experiences of the other as
threatening can therefore be thought of in the same way as Froese and Krueger think of self-other
fluidity, as “not indicative of hallucinations without any basis in reality, but of a heightened
sensitivity and vulnerability to processes of interpersonal alignment and mutual incorporation
that form the normal basis of life” (2021, p. 318). That is, the experience of the interpersonal
relationship as threatening is just another sensitivity to a fact of normal interpersonal relations:
the other does indeed threaten my identity. Some pathological cases consist of a pernicious
thematization of this fact.
Self-Disturbances
To recap, the self is a product of an encounter between one body, enjoying a seemingly
individual existence in the world, and another body that disrupts it. In the face of disruption, my
body becomes substituted for the other, entering into an ambiguous relationship that blurs the
distinction between us. Substitution is a simultaneous distinction and blurring of distinction: not
only is my sensorimotor activity caught up with the sensorimotor activity of the other, but my
attentional processes and the ethical significance of the world are all redirected by the other. It is
in response to this redirection that I am constituted as a personal self, accounting for my role
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played in the encounter and for my right to the things now apparently existing not only for-me
but for-the-other. That is, it is in response to the other who disrupts my bodily existence that I
first differentiate myself from the ambiguity that disruption institutes. This is not a
developmental story that is completed once and for all: in any encounter with the other,
responsibility to and for the other can disrupt my own existence (thus there is salience beyond
my own survival, which accounts for the possibility of altruism; see Chapter 4). Specific
disturbances to embodiment will translate to disturbances in intersubjectivity and selfhood;
likewise, a disturbance to one of these latter dimensions will feedback on the others.
Embodiment as sensitivity, substitution, and the constitution of the self stand in dynamic
relations such that anything that affects one will affect the others.
Based on the preceding discussion, what are commonly known as disruptions of “self”
may pertain to:
(1)

embodiment as vulnerable sensibility; (bearing in mind that what is often called
the embodied self may simply refer to pre-personal embodiment)

(2)

the transition from embodiment to substitution, or self/other ambiguity

(3)

the transition from substitution to self, differentiated from ambiguity as response.

The question, then, is trying to understand for any given self-disturbance, what kind it is. I
propose that certain phenomena, like those associated with major depression or Cotard delusion,
involve something like type-1, while others, such as narcissistic personality disorder or, perhaps,
psychopathy, are better understood in terms of type-2, and still others, such as certain symptoms
of schizophrenia, as type-3. (Admittedly, schizophrenia is an especially difficult case.) Each type
of disturbance will involve a nexus of characteristic phenomena relating to embodiment,
intersubjectivity, and self. For example, a type-1 disturbance – “insensitivity”, as I call it – will
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have implications for intersubjective relations and the constitution of the self; type-2
disturbances, likewise, will have implications for both sensitivity and the self; likewise for type3. The following is a cursory attempt to put this typology to use in relation to various pathology
phenomena. I will accordingly use the terms “primary” and “secondary” disturbance, depending
on which type seems to be at the core of each set of phenomena.
Type-1 Disturbances: Embodiment (Depression)
It is of course the case that all human selves (as far as we know) are indeed embodied.2
But, this is not necessarily reflected in experience. It is possible for one’s body to be given as
insensitive, inert, or passive. This is possible in one’s image of the body (body image) or their
style of embodiment (body schema) but also in terms of sensitivity. This is sometimes reported
by persons suffering major depression (Colombetti & Ratcliffe, 2012; Doerr-Zegers et al., 2017;
Fuchs, 2005). In Cotard delusion the experience of disembodiment can go as far as feeling one’s
body to be dead. These phenomena would be type-1 disturbances, and I will also call them
insensitivity phenomena.
We should expect type-1 disturbances to be associated with certain disruptions to
intersubjectivity. If the body is experienced as inert, that is, as no longer sensitive, then it may
become difficult for the other – whom we encounter with our body as a body – to impress upon
one’s sensibility. If the site of encountering the other is sensibility and one’s body becomes, in
various ways and degrees, insensitive, then there would also occur an insensitivity to the other.
In a sense, if one’s embodiment is already disrupted, the disruptive encounter with the other can
become less impactful. Indeed, one might understand that they are faced by an other, even a
demanding other, and perhaps further that they ought respond in some way, yet nevertheless not

Husserl (1989) goes as far as to claim that even ghosts (considered as an empty, a priori possibility) have their own,
ghostly bodies, that is, individuation in space.
2
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be motivated to do so. This seems to correspond with depressive experiences in which guilt is
still operative, implying that one is aware of one’s own responsibility, yet nevertheless
motivation to act – or even action itself – might seem impossible. Furthermore, if self/other
ambiguity arises from a disruption of ordinary embodiment as a kind of taking on the other’s
perspective, an insensitivity to the other should correspond with diminished ambiguity. This
would partly explain the close association between depression and loneliness: one may feel less a
part of the world – even if one can see it, it might appear inaccessible – and detached from a
sense of community; one may feel as if on their own. Varga and Krueger (2013) describe the felt
loss of interpersonal connectedness as an important aspect of depression.
On the other hand, paralysis and uncoordinated movement would likewise correspond to
an inability to co-regulate in the normal ways associated with self-other ambiguity. It is here
where body schema and the present sense of embodiment come apart: disruption of body schema
does not imply insensitivity. So long as the body remains sensitive, such circumstances might not
hinder one at all from substituting oneself for the other, that is, from nevertheless being disrupted
by others in such a way as to have one’s attention redirected according to their perspective (even
if in abnormal ways). That is to say, although it is still useful in these cases to talk in terms of
body schema and image, it is not sufficient; along with sensitivity they cannot be doubted as
legitimate aspects of embodiment. I cannot pretend to speak expertly on the intersubjective
implications of these latter conditions – e.g., paralysis or uncoordinated movement – though I
suspect they will differ from insensitivity disruptions.
It is often difficult if not impossible to tell if someone is experiencing depression,
sometimes even in severe cases. This is one reason why laymen, at least, are often shocked to
discover the severity of a depressed person’s condition. Communication, rather than perceptual
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observation, is crucial for determining whether someone is undergoing depression. Granted, the
person herself may not realize that what she is experiencing is what we would call depression,
but nevertheless it through a communicative expression of her experience and the dialogue that
foments around that experience that we come to make such an ascription. According to Fuchs
(2005), melancholic depression involves corporealization, in which the body feels weighty and
rigid, an obstacle to the world rather than an exposure. This also corresponds with weakened
sense perception. Motor function is disrupted but disfunction can be overcome (except in severe
cases) by an “effort of will.” Nezlek, Imbrie, and Shean (1994) and Nezlek, Hamptom, and
Shean (2000) find that depressed persons in general have the same quantity of interactions as do
non-depressed persons, but that these interactions are less enjoyable and that depressed persons
perceive themselves as less responsive, influential, and confident when interacting with others.
On my account, depression involves a disruption of sensibility understood not only as body
schema and image but also as exposure to the environment and enjoyment. This is one reason
why it is useful to think in terms of sensibility, as well as body schema and image: it helps us to
capture this element of enjoyment.
Furthermore, even if insensitive to the other, one remains open viz coupling to
intersubjective sense-making – even if this requires an effort of will – and, as seen in Chapter 4,
this means that one can nevertheless learn common morality and understand responsibility
(although schematic and image issues may result in abnormal sense, too). Understanding has its
own affective force: knowing one is responsible does matter. But insensitivity of the body can
flatten this affect as much as any other. This understanding of morality but general insensitivity
might feed into the guilt that is often associated with depression, of which I say more below.
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Standing in a dynamic relation with the intersubjective disturbances associated with
insensitivity, type-1 disturbances will also correspond to certain forms of self-disturbances
proper. If the ordinary self/other ambiguity that constitutes intersubjectivity is sufficiently
lessened, as in insensitivity phenomena, this will also affect the kind of self constituted out from
such an ambiguity. One might experience oneself as guilty, even if not for any particular reason.
This corresponds to what Ratcliffe (2010) calls “deep guilt” in depression: rather than feeling
guilty about this or that particular thing (though, this can also occur), guilt becomes a way of
experiencing the world. This makes sense if insensitivity can coincide with an awareness of
responsibility to others without a sensitivity to those others for whom one is supposed to
respond, or even a sensitivity to that very responsibility of which one is aware. One could feel
inadequately responsive to the other regardless of their actual responses (again, Nezlek et al.
1994 and Nezlek et al. 2000 suggest this is indeed the case), and so the self that is constituted is
experienced as a guilty self. We could also expect that this kind of disruption to embodiment and
the corresponding disruption to intersubjectivity would result in a certain kind of self-centeredness. This should not be confused with caring only about oneself, but rather I mean that one
might emphasize or focus on themselves, since self/other ambiguity plays a decreased role in
delimiting or displacing the self. Again, this is reflected in the kind of guilt experienced by
persons with depression, which Ratcliffe describes as involving “a more profound sense of
estrangement from all other people,” thus foreclosing “our guilt” in favor of a deeply personal
guilt. Where I disagree with Ratcliffe, however, concerns whether this kind of personal guilt
implies a relation to others; I think that it does, and that the relationship is one that makes me
aware of my responsibility while simultaneously thematizing the inadequacy of any possible
response.
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It might be thought that this kind of disruption to embodiment can also occur in
schizophrenia, but this is not obvious. Afterall, persons diagnosed with schizophrenia also report
self-other fluidity or ambiguity, which has been described by Froese and Krueger (2021) as a
heightened, not diminished, sensitivity or vulnerability to others. To con-fuse oneself with the
other presupposes a certain degree of sensitivity. This approach can also account for the
commonly held position that what is really disrupted in such cases is common sense, or the
common world: The person with schizophrenia experiencing such con-fusion remains sensitive
and vulnerable to the environment and makes some sense or other of that environment. Perhaps
that sense is rightly construed as idiosyncratic, even akin to the “ídios kósmos of the dreamer”
(Fuchs, 2020, citing Heraclitus), but is sense and sensitivity nonetheless, and to such a degree
that the very vulnerability of the body may become thematized in experiences of threatening
relationality (I’ll say more about this when considering type-3 disturbances below).
One might suspect that the well-documented “anomalous perceptions” associated with
schizophrenia, including abnormal perception of space and objects (Silverstein, Demmin, &
Škodlar, 2017), visual and auditory distortions (Silverstein, 2016), and object recognition and
naming (Gabrovska et al., 2002), are another kind of disruption to embodiment. On my account,
however, such perceptual phenomena are not necessarily indicative of disruptions to
embodiment. It is in relation to the other that we thematize objects for themselves, allowing X to
become salient in our attention, recognizing X as Y and naming it. These symptoms might then
be better classified as type-2 or type-3. Schizophrenia, however, involves such a diversity of
symptoms – some maintain that it really names no one single condition at all – that we should
not rule out type-1 disturbances altogether. I can here conclude only that the phenomena
presently under consideration do not seem to fit the bill.
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Type 2 Disturbances: From Embodiment to Substitution (Narcissism)
While type-1 disturbances were characterized in terms of embodiment – one’s basic,
sensitive exposure to the world, setting up an affective phenomenal field– types-2 and -3 refer to
transitions. Type-2 deals with substitution, which refers to the way that, faced by an other who
expresses herself, one’s embodied enjoyment is called into question, and attention is thereby
redirected towards the other and the world, so as to allow the body to take on a perspective other
than one’s own. Substitution is not only a perceptual perspective taking, though it is also that; it
is through the modulation of attention that one comes to tend to a shared world thus thematized.
It is also a displacing of the interests of bodily enjoyment in response to the demands made by
the other.
Ordinarily, substitution achieves a kind of self/other ambiguity as well as a differentiation
out of that ambiguity in virtue of having to account for one’s own embodied being. The other
directs my attention to herself, myself, and the world, in such a way as to bestow what was
previously mere sensible appearance with a significance beyond myself. I account for myself by
thematizing myself, and the world that appears to me, and allowing these thematizations –
guided by the other’s demand – to orient my response.3 (This is not entirely distinct from
Varela’s conception of a narrative account, though rather than such an account being occasioned
by myself and only accomplished in language, it is occasioned by language and accomplished
intentionally; intentionality flows from an encounter with the other). Expression establishes
ambiguity by substituting my own perspective with that of the other, and accounting for myself

Diane Perpich (2008, p. 93) writes of account: “The face invites the ego or commands it – and the difference is difficult
to determine on Levinas’s account – to enter into a rational discourse, meaning a discourse that puts the world in
common between us and demands of me an account recognizable by you.”
3
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differentiates me from that ambiguity.4 In a type-2 disturbance, however, that ambiguity is not
established. That is to say, one’s own bodily enjoyment of the world is not displaced in the
encounter with the other. This might loosely correspond to Froese and Krueger’s ‘loss of the
socially extended mind’, but with a significance beyond sensorimotor co-regulation,
understanding, or knowledge. Indeed, remaining a sensitive body, it is entirely possible for a
type-2 disturbance to nevertheless coexist with not only sensorimotor co-regulation but also
common sense (or “doxic symmetry”, in the terminology of Chapter 4). The loss of the socially
extended mind, here, refers to a lack of the displacement of my own bodily interest in favor of
the other. Remaining in egoism, I remain a sensitive body that nevertheless does not substitute
itself for the other. The other may appear as an object, or even as another perspective, but,
crucially, not as one that usurps my right to enjoy the world. Thus it is primarily the affective
dimension of sense-making (recognizing that this is not sharply distinguishable from cognition in
general) that is called into question here, specifically value and emotional connection.
Type-2 disturbances seem to be a good fit for characterizing grandiose narcissistic
personality disorder. If self/other ambiguity is not even pre-reflectively recognized, then one’s
concern would primarily remain with oneself and the world will be experienced as for the ego.5
In a sense, narcissists can certainly recognize that the other is a person besides them, but they do
not recognize them as valuable despite oneself. Though a grandiose narcissist will be able to
If I am dealing only with myself and there is, in consciousness, no awareness of the other at all, then there is no
differentiation to be made between myself and the other; it is only in communion with the other that I can be
differentiated as I. In that sense, the ego is not yet differentiated from the other: it is a differentiation of me from the
world that appears for me, but only a differentiation in terms of the activity required to appropriate that world; it is not a
differentiation of me from the other since, in egoism, I am “deaf” to the other (rather than “against” them).
4

I am here assuming that self/other ambiguity is closely connected to the idea of the socially extended mind in general.
Self/other ambiguity refers to the fact that our own agency, identity, and also what matters – even the value of the other
mattering to me despite my own self-interest – is bound up with the agency, identities, and concerns of others. The
socially extended mind hypothesis is roughly this idea, though it has emphasized agency and identity, as well as my own
concern, over the possibility of usurping my own concern not for the sake of an interaction but for the other as such.
Chapter 4 explored these themes.
5
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inhabit or understand a common world, in virtue of the broadly epistemic functions of
sensorimotor coupling, in terms of value one will experience oneself as a center of the world. A
lack of substitution helps to explain the “interpersonal dominance” (Zajenkowski et al., 2018)
and interpersonal exploitation (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 669-70)
characteristic of grandiose narcissists.
The dimensions of embodiment and self corresponding to a narcissistic type-2 disruption
are closely connected. The kind of self constituted in such a case will be one given (mistakenly)
as independent of others. As Otto Kernberg notes, “pathological narcissism is always
characterized by the crystallization of a pathological grandiose self” (2014, p. 866). Rather than a
responsive self which might be described as being-for-the-other, the narcissistic self will see
others as being-for-the-self. This results not only in delusions of grandeur and self-importance
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 669-70), but also a lack of felt responsibility for
others; the grandiose narcissist is primarily self-serving and resentful even of being associated
with people seen as beneath them (which, as it so happens, is most people). In terms of
embodiment, there is never a departure from experiencing the world in terms of enjoyment. The
narcissist learns that there are other perspectives on the world, but not that these perspectives
matter as much or more than his own. The type (2) disruption corresponds with what Levinas,
citing Pascal, describes as the “usurpation of the whole world”: one sees the world as “my place
in the sun” (Levinas, 1981, p. viii, citing Pascal’s Pensées, p. 404). The narcissist does not allow
his place in the sun to be called into question but is, instead, content in his own enjoyment of the
world.
Claire Katz, in “Education east of Eden: Levinas, the psychopath, and the paradox of
responsibility” (2010) suggests that something like a type (2) disturbance also occurs in
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psychopathy: the psychopath does not “see” the face of the other, which in one sense means they
do not feel themselves to be responsible for the other and in another sense means that the face of
the other does not call the psychopathic person out of oneself. This amounts to a claim that such
a person does not substitute themselves for others. She uses the example of Cain and Abel,
naming Cain the first psychopath, who does not put aside his own interests in service or
responsibility to and for Abel. Persons diagnosed as psychopathic, according to Katz, do know
right from wrong, but are simply not motivated by the distinction. This suggests that they can
indeed entertain perspectives other than their own in the ordinary epistemic sense, but do not
recognize the irreducible value of those perspectives. (The psychopath is perhaps a prototype for
intersubjectivity without ethics. When discussing the Seattle School below, we ought keep in
mind the implications of suggesting that someone does not stand in an ethical relation to the
other.)
This description of psychopathy is remarkably similar to the description of grandiose
narcissism I offered above, and there are reasons to think the former involves the same type (2)
disturbances as does the latter. Psychopathy, like narcissism, involves a manipulative or
exploitative orientation towards others, egocentricity or self-indulgence, and grandiosity
(Widiger, 2006; he also provides a useful overview of comorbidities of and other connections
between psychopathy and other pathological experience, including narcissism). Stone (1993, p.
292) maintains that psychopathy entails narcissism, with Hart and Hare (1998, p. 429) calling the
former a higher-order construct involving narcissism as one aspect. It may be, then, that type (2)
disturbances can explain the narcissistic dimensions of psychopathy, though psychopathy might
involve other aspects as well.
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On the other hand, the self/other ambiguity reported by some persons diagnosed with
schizophrenia – the con-fusion between oneself and the other such that boundaries become fluid
and the two seem to fuse or merge within experience – seems to resist a type (2) analysis. Not
only is naïve embodiment disrupted by an encounter with the other, but such encounters can also
be experienced as a threat to one’s own identity. Furthermore, some persons who experience
schizophrenia report the intersubjective encounter as the end of the world, which I can interpret
as an end to the world of naïve embodiment, as well as a feeling of supporting the world or being
responsible for the world in a cosmic sense (more on these reports later). It is thus not the case
that persons who experience schizophrenia remain in a world unperturbed by the other nor that
they necessarily feel irresponsible to others.
Type-3 Disturbances: Transition from Substitution to Self (Schizophrenia)
Type-3 disturbances pertain to the constitution of the self, which occurs in response to the
other. Ordinarily, the self is a way of accounting for my embodiment and activity; the
thematization originating in an encounter with the other applies to my body as much as it does to
the world and others. In this sense, the self is embodiment thrown back on itself in responsibility.
A disruption to the constitution of the self from out of a self-other ambiguity instituted as
substitution correlates loosely with Froese and Krueger’s notion of being ‘lost in the socially
extended mind,’ but again the Levinasian perspective allows us to articulate another dimension
of significance to such phenomena. A type-3 disturbance refers to an undifferentiated or
otherwise unstable self, that is, difficulties accounting for oneself and determining one’s own
boundaries, limitations, powers, etc. These disturbances will thus carry with them disruptions to
the sense of ownership and agency well explored in relationship to certain schizophrenia
phenomena, such as thought insertion (see, for example, Gallagher, 2015): indeed, schizophrenia
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is often considered a self-disorder because it undermines one or more such senses commonly
associated with the concept of a self. If one cannot account for oneself in relation to others and
the world, then it will be unclear what belongs to or is properly myself, and which actions are my
own agentive productions. If 4e approaches and participatory sense-making can teach us
anything, it is that our own agency is tied up with material and social realities, such that my own
agency is not to be located exclusively “in me” (given some notion of “in”). Yet, we draw certain
lines in order to account for ourselves and it is this accounting for oneself that is called into
question in type-3 disturbances.
Type-3 disturbances will of course relate back to substitution and embodiment. At the
level of self/other ambiguity, a type-3 disturbance will be associated with salient con-fusion:
without differentiating oneself from others, I will experience myself as fused, merged, or
confused with others. It is only self-differentiation that allow self and other to be intentionally
distinguished. Otherwise, there is merely a sensitive body wrapped up in its relations with the
world, and not yet a self constituted as an account of that body and not others. The threat that
others pose to my identity – on my reading, to my naïve embodiment – would be heightened if
not mitigated by the formation of a self that would limit that ambiguity. Responding to others
would become difficult, that is, action or executive function becomes difficult (Orellana &
Slachevsky, 2013), which would feed-back to further disrupt the sensorimotor coupling
necessary for making sense of the world and others, exacerbating these difficulties. Thus, we
would expect cognitive/affective impairments in social encounters in general. Importantly, then,
a type-3 disorder, unlike a type-2 disturbance, will make the inhabitation of a joint world much
more difficult, since in type-2 (and even, sometimes, type-1) disturbances, sensorimotor coupling
and therefore sense-making might remain relatively in-tact. Lastly, if one is unable to account for

198

their own identity – that is, for their own embodiment, activity, thoughts and emotions – and if,
furthermore, one’s perspective remains submerged (or “lost in”) self/other ambiguity, we should
expect for the demands made by others to be experienced as overwhelming. It is normally the
sense of self that can serve not only as a basis for planning and initiating a response, but also as a
basis for re-asserting to some extent one’s own interests as a countermeasure to the demands
made by others.
In terms of embodiment, type-3 disturbances are associated with alienation. There is
some debate concerning whether schizophrenia is best understood as primarily a disruption of
the social self (see, for instance, Kyselo, 2015) or a disruption of embodiment (e.g., Fuchs &
Schlimme, 2009). While I here side with the former, there are undeniably significant aspects of
schizophrenia corresponding to embodiment. Fuchs and Schlimme describe schizophrenia as
involving a “weakening of the basic sense of self, a disruption of implicit bodily functioning and
a disconnection from the intercorporeality with others” (2009, p. 571). If there were some
disturbance to the differentiation of the self out from self/other ambiguity, we might expect all of
this: if the self is not adequately differentiated from others, then we should expect a disruption to
sense of self as well as a disruption of implicit bodily functioning, since the body has been
disrupted in substitution but has not been accounted for in terms of oneself. There will also be a
disruption to intercorporeality, since there will be a disruption to one’s bodily responses.
Stanghellini (2009) describes schizophrenic persons as “living and behaving like a soulless body
or a disembodied spirit.” Of course, the schizophrenic person literally has a body: they remain
exposed to the world and to others. The point is that they do not identify with the body in the
normal way, which is to say that they are not differentiated as a stable identity among the myriad
sensations delivered to their body. The term “soulless body,” while problematic, perhaps is more
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accurate, if we understand the soul to correspond to personal identity. But, again, the
schizophrenic person does embody the world sensitively; they are just alienated from that
sensitivity as it is not necessarily incorporated into a sense of self.
Type-3 accounts could easily be seen as consistent with approaches that focus on the
disruption of ownership and agency in schizophrenic thought insertion and delusions of control,
since in both cases what is in question are aspects of one’s own identity. Delusions of control
pertain to both bodily movements as well as mental states (see Martin Riemer, 2018), and
describe an experience, associated with schizophrenia, where one’s own acts or states are
experienced as controlled not by oneself but, rather, by another. It is highly contentious whether
the difficulty here is a matter of sense of agency – these are my movements and mental states,
but I did not bring them about – or sense of ownership – these movements are not my own.
Type-3 disruptions could be spun either way: what is called into question is the self as an
account of bodily activity and experience alike; the self as responsive to the world around it. One
lesson learned from dynamical systems theory and the extended mind hypothesis is that our
actions and identities are entangled with forces external to us; failing to differentiate oneself
from those sources could easily lead to an experience of alien control. Thought insertion often
follows a similar analysis, including the debate between agency and ownership (see Gallagher,
2015).
Summary of Types 1-3
I have proposed that Levinas’ conceptions of embodiment as vulnerable sensibility,
substitution as a kind of perspective taking that institutes an experiential self/other ambiguity,
and the self as constituted in response to the other, help us to think of certain pathology
phenomena in new ways. A type-1 disturbance refers to bodily insensitivity, that is, a

200

modification of the enjoyment relation characterizing bodily existence in the world. As
articulated in Chapter 2 above, enjoyment does not only refer to pleasure but rather to an entire
affectivity. If one enjoys the world abnormally, we will expect a different relationship to self as
well as others. The Levinasian conception of embodiment as sensitivity (or vulnerable exposure,
characterized in terms of enjoyment) is irreducible to either body image or body schema, as it is
through being open to a world that we enjoy that we come to develop any sort of bodily style,
habitus, or self-conception at all. As such, this conception constitutes another tool to be used
alongside those formulations of image and schema, and I have proposed that we can understand
some important symptoms of depression as type-1 phenomena, including not only insensitivity
but also intersubjective alienation, guilty self-consciousness, and self-narrative.
A type-2 disturbance refers to substitution, or the way that my own enjoyment of the
world is called into question by the presence of the other, such that I become for-the-other rather
than for-myself. This helps us to understand the constitution of a sense of objectivity, in a way
partly analogous to Husserl’s position, but also to understand how we come to stand in relation
to an other who matters independently of oneself. To talk about a disturbance regarding
substitution is to invoke the idea of one who does not exist for-the-other, but for-the-self;
ordinary bodily enjoyment remains a privileged mode of existence. As such, I propose that we
can understand grandiose narcissism and psychopathy (to the extent that it involves narcissism)
as involving type-2 disturbances, which are related to delusions of grandeur, a sense of
entitlement, exploitation of others, and embodying the world in terms of one’s own enjoyment.
Type-3 disturbances are the most difficult to formulate, and for this reason I rely on
Froese and Krueger’s formulations of being lost in and losing the socially extended mind.
Substitution enacts a kind of ambiguity into experience, whereby I relate to something outside of
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me through responsibility. Yet, ordinary existence in a society consisting of many others
nevertheless requires that I construct my own identity and, to some extent, protect my own
interest as well. One way to formulate this idea is to refer to the transition from ethics to justice,
characterized by a violent generalization that constitutes me as one among the others. To be
overwhelmed by one’s relation to others is to be lost in the socially extended mind, so to say. A
type-3 disturbance refers to this being lost, that is, to a non-differentiation of self out from the
ethical self-other ambiguity constituted by substitution. What I add to Froese and Krueger’s
account is an articulation of the ethical aspects of such a relation. I propose that certain
phenomena associated with schizophrenia – admittedly a very difficult case – can be in part
understood in terms of type-3 disturbances, relating to the constitution of the self; without
emerging from the self/other ambiguity instituted by substitution, others will be experienced as
threatening both one’s world and identity, response becomes difficult, and we should expect
self/other con-fusion as well as phenomena like delusions of control and thought insertion, which
can be construed as kinds of self-alienation. Importantly, the idea of being a “support for the
world,” and the idea of the other as profoundly threatening my own agency and existence, can
easily be understood in terms of the overwhelming position represented by a type-3 disturbance.
I must stress that, on this account, while embodiment is meant to refer to a basic fact of
human existence – we exist as sensitive bodies (even if this sensitivity can be diminished) –
substitution and the constitution of the self are not individualistic achievements or
accomplishments. Rather, they are inherently social achievements that refer to but are not
produced exclusively by one’s own capacities: it is the other who directs our attention, and it is
in response to the other that the self is constituted.
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Therapeutic Implications
I can only briefly cover some implications for therapeutic intervention here. We should
expect type-1 disturbances to respond well to interventions that foster bodily sensitivity and
sensitivity to others. This is born out by the efficacy of dance therapy, for example, in
depression. According to Michelle Maiese, dance/movement therapy (or DMT) “centers on the
use of movement to further physical and emotional integrity and looks to body movement as a
primary means of communication” (2018, p. 14). She goes on to describe that
Typical treatment sessions might include rhythmic dance, spontaneous and creative
movement sequences, thematic movement improvisations, unconscious symbolic body
movement, group dance, and a range of relaxation exercises. (2018, pp. 14-5)
On our account, DMT works because it engages the body in an activity that requires attunement
to sensitivity (Maiese might describe this as “revitalization”). This involves moving one’s body
in a sensitive way and, especially in group dance, responding sensitively to others. The emphasis
on the body on communication highlights the relevance of the Levinasian framework, where
rather than serving a primarily perceptual function, bodily movements serve as address and
response; they make salient demands made on me and my responses to those demands. Koch,
Kunz, Lykou and Cruz (2014), Krueger (2018), Martin, Koch, Hiriak, and Fuchs (2016),
Röhricht & Priebe (2006), and others, have suggested that DMT might be useful in treating
certain forms of schizophrenia as well. Due to the embodied aspects of some schizophrenic
experience, that might be so, and connecting with one’s body might plausibly condition the
constitution of the self. But I emphasize that DMT would only be a partial intervention, as it
addresses type-1 disturbances which are secondary to the type-3 disturbance I take as primary in
schizophrenia.
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Type-2 disturbances would require intervention that would decenter the self in relation to
the other, and impose on the self the independent value of others. Freudian approaches to
narcissism naturally focus on the subject’s relationship with their parents and the question of
having the narcissist’s needs met. One proposed therapy, for instance, is called “reparenting,”
and involves “identifying core unmet needs” and “working to help the patient get those needs
met” (Behary & Dieckmann, 2013). I have suggested, however, that an important aspect of
narcissism is not the relationship to any particular other but to others in general: the grandiose
narcissist (noting that “reparenting” might be ideal for vulnerable narcissism) sees themselves as
unique and independently valuable, while denying these traits in others. Something like the
proposal offered by the Seattle School of Psychology (explored in detail below), i.e., to restore
responsibility for others to the patient, might be apt here.
Type-3 disturbances would require intervention that helps someone to account for
themselves, that is, to differentiate oneself – including one’s agency, thoughts, etc. – in response
to others; to responsively differentiate oneself from others and the world, and to present this
account to others. The constitution of the self is a complex matter mediated not only by one’s
embodiment but also one’s social positioning. Indeed, very different selves are appropriate in
very different circumstances, and the difficulty of accounting for oneself – what to account for in
what ways, what to attribute to myself at what time, and what to exclude – is demonstrated by
the idea of the socially extended mind: I am bound up with the world and others. On the
participatory sense-making framework (and I agree), one is not even individuated as a self except
through an encounter with others. Furthermore, persons diagnosed with schizophrenia vary
widely in their symptomology; any accounting of oneself must be accountable to these
differences. Thus, the constitution of the self cannot be seen as an individualistic
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accomplishment, cannot be determined in character ahead of time, and should be focused only on
allowing one to strive in their social and material relations. It may turn out that one instance of
such a self would be quite minimal indeed, while others more robust.
The Seattle School: Ethical Deficiency
I now turn to consider the Seattle School approach, which I have alluded to above. The
Seattle School takes Levinas to be a central figure, and focuses on the responsibility of the
person who enters into therapy. In Chapter 1, we saw that the deficit method, by which we
understand others across difference by supposing that an otherwise ever-present feature of
consciousness is, for those persons considered, absent, is epistemologically and ethically
problematic: it can only conceive what phenomena are not rather than what they are, reduce
people to less than normative consciousness, and, in the case of structural phenomenology,
illicitly apply individual structures that can only be verified intersubjectively. If the deficit
method considered there involves ontological deficiency – a deficit in the being of one’s
conscious experience (a lack in some fundamental structure constitutive of ordinary experience),
then some thinkers in the Seattle School of Psychology proffer, instead, ethical deficiency. The
proposed type-1 through -3 disturbances above might be seen as lending themselves to this kind
of interpretation.
I must note that I here distance myself from the deficit method in general because what I
am exploring are not individualistic (or “transcendental subjective”) structures, but rather
relational accomplishments the absence of which do not necessarily imply deficiency on the part
of any one individual.
If ontological deficiency was problematic, it is even easier to see the trouble with ethical
deficiency. The claim is, effectively, that persons suffering mental illness are irresponsible or
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unethical, and that the job of the therapist is to return such persons to responsible relations with
others. This position follows from a particular supposition, made explicit by George Sayre: “we
are assuming that it is psychologically healthy to be ethically good” (Sayre, 2015, p. 161).
Ethical responsibility is thus taken as the standard of mental health, with the consequence that
mental illness involves a departure from ethical responsibility. Kunz draws this consequence,
writing that
Pathology is isolation from ethical responsibility. Health is getting outside oneself in
responsibility to others. Therapy comes when the client becomes responsibly responsible
toward others in his life. (Kunz, 2015, p. 230)
This sentiment is shared by Sayre, for whom “therapy [is] not about their [the client’s] needs but
about the needs of another person – but not myself” (Sayre, 2015, p. 167), against “the traditional
ethic of therapy [as] an ego-logical one in which the client is self-centered” (Sayre, 2015, p.
164). Likewise, David Goodman and Brian Becker agree with C. Fred Alford that “the
therapeutic goal is not to refound or reground or integrate the self. The goal is to find productive
– that is, involved with other humans – ways to give oneself away” (Alford, 2002, pp. 73-74).
They go further, however, in questioning the client’s preparedness for such practice and thus
“posit that psychotherapy has as its goal an awakening of the self to the Other” (Goodman &
Becker, 2015, p. 156). This view is also shared by Richard Williams who, noting that the client
comes to therapy in “neediness and the quest for satisfaction,” implies that psychotherapy has to
move beyond such a quest, i.e., must respond instead return the client to responsibility for others
(Williams, 2015, p. 137).
The idea that mental illness involves a departure from responsibility – the return to which
is the goal of therapy – is problematic for at least three reasons. First, it is dangerous and
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stigmatizing to conceive of persons who suffer mental illness as irresponsible or unethical. I take
this point to be so obvious as to not warrant further attention here. Second, it is apparently false:
at least some – probably most – persons who experience pathology phenomena do stand in
ethical relationships to others, even if those relationships are not without their difficulties.
(Inversely, some people we might view as mentally healthy are unethical. One could consider the
case of Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which the eponymous Nazi leader and one engineer of their
atrocities was deemed mentally healthy and even to possess many desirable traits. That such a
diagnosis might only be possible in a sick society is, today, of little comfort.) Third, proponents
of a Levinasian position, such as that of the Seattle School, must hold in tension the seemingly
contrary insights that we are responsible even for others’ responsibility, and yet whether the
other is responsible to me is “his affair,” i.e., none of my business. The second and third points
require elaboration.
Pathology and the Ethical Relationship
For Levinas, recall that the ethical relationship is one in which the other makes a demand
on me through her expression, which de-centers or displaces my own naïve existence. Anyone
experiencing self/other con-fusion already stands in a relationship to the other that can properly
be called ethical, even if it does not yet rise to the level of constituting a responsive self. In the
case of self/other ambiguity, it seems that the issue is precisely the differentiation of an I from
out of the ambiguity – one is lost in the socially extended mind, to use Froese and Kruger’s
terminology, rather than emerging as a self, (or “I”) from it.
There are other reports of pathology phenomena that speak against the formulation of
mental illness as irresponsibility. In schizophrenia, for instance, much has been made of reports
that the person affected experiences herself as the center of the world or universe, supporting it
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all (Fuchs, 2020; Payne, 2012; Sass, 2001). On the one hand, Thomas Fuchs argues that such
reports indicate a break with the common world and enactment of a solipsistic world in which all
sense originates subjectively rather than intersubjectively. There is an inability, according to
Fuchs, to take up an “excentric” perspective, i.e., to decenter oneself relative to the world or, put
another way, to relativize one’s own experience as just one perspective among others (Fuchs,
2020). On the other hand, Sass argues that such reports do indicate a kind of excentricity,
specifically the ability to step outside of a social “common sense” and be open to new,
unanticipated possibilities (Sass, 2020).
I have implied that even the “solipsistic” world of schizophrenia is one already disrupted
by others; others are not entirely absent from such a world at all (and this is one more way that
such a solipsism must be qualified as “quasi-solipsism”). Self/other con-fusion demonstrates the
point, but other examples are possible. In schizophrenia, others are often reported as threatening
figures, figures that threaten one’s own identity (Lysaker, Johannesen, & Lysaker, 2005). This
threatening atmosphere is not localized to experience of others but even to the whole of one’s
world. Jaspers, on the topic of “cosmic experiences”, cites self-reports and analysis by A. Wetzel
to the effect that the world is sometimes experienced as the end of the world, as collapse,
annhilation, or catastrophe (Jaspers, 1997, pp. 294-5).
The resonances to Levinasian thought are significant. The encounter with the other – the
ethical relation – must bear with it precisely the possibility to break with common sense. That is,
our responsibility to the other is not exhausted by any established norms, practices, or even the
common meanings and significances we impose onto the world. The break with common sense
found in certain pathology phenomena, then, might be a prolonged, intense, even problematic
version of something crucial to ethics: the possibility of acting outside of established
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possibilities. Insofar as this break is established within the face-to-face encounter, no matter how
disturbing the break may be, that relationship may for that very reason be characterized as
“ethical,” even if it is combined with suffering. This lends itself to a further resonance: the faceto-face encounter with the other is not just described by Levinas as peace (“Peace and
Proximity” in Levinas, 1996) but also as violence, persecution, and trauma (Levinas, 1969, p. 25;
Levinas, 1981, p. xii, throughout). The other, in a sense, heralds the end of my world.
Intersubjectivity is the end of the subjective world, the overcoming of hedonistic, naïve being.
The other threatens my own identity – I am substituted for the other in an inescapable
responsibility – and this threat seems reflected in some reports of schizophrenic insecurity in the
face of the other (Lysaker, Johannesen, & Lysaker, 2005). I support the world by being he who is
called to thematize the world not for myself but for all the others. Levinas reminds us of the
ethical significance of this support with his favorite quote from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers
Karamazov: “We are all responsible for everyone else – but I am more responsible than all the
others.” On this account, some delusions of persecution may not be delusions at all, but rather
reflect an aspect of the intersubjective relationship as such.
I am not suggesting here that there are not intersubjective difficulties experienced by
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia (as detailed above) but, rather, that the enactment of any
thematizable world whatsoever, no matter how solipsistic it may appear, already refers to others
who call us out of a naïve embodiment in which significance – experiencing X as Y,
experiencing X as something beyond its immediate appearance for me – is not yet possible. The
very fact that the person diagnosed with schizophrenia engages in speech implies or is a relation
between that person and he to whom she speaks, him for whom she formulates her world and
expresses it. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas considers a silent world, one in which others do not
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respond to my inquiries and argues that this world nevertheless refers to an other conceived of as
an evil genius: the very presence of signs, the significance of sensible things precisely as
signifying something behind their mere appearances for me, refers to an other lurking behind the
signs; the appearances must signify for some other beyond me for them to signify beyond their
own appearances at all. But if the other does not respond to my formulations, the world is
transformed into a kind of apparition and the presence of the other becomes menacing and
ridiculous; the other becomes a threatening presence that threatens the world and my own
identity (Levinas, 1969, p. 94). The silent world is a world of calamity, a world of unstable or
idiosyncratic appearances, but a world set-up in relation to an other nonetheless.
That is all to say, there may be an issue when it comes to response and to constituting a
stable, differentiated identity out from an ambiguous relationship with others, but an ambiguous
relationship with an other is still an ethical relationship in the sense that it is still a calling out of
oneself towards what one is not. That one experiences the world differently than do others, and
that one knows this, already presupposes a relationship to others. But it is not the epistemological
relationship of confirmation and correction taken to characterize intersubjectivity since Husserl.
To elaborate the issue with another example, consider depression. In depression, there is
often reported a perceived inability to do or change anything at all (Ratcliffe, 2014). In such a
case, one is not avoiding responsibility but reporting a foreclosure of certain possibilities of
response to the other. Furthermore, for many people who experience major depression, their
incapacities are associated with guilt and shame (Ratcliffe 2010). This further demonstrates that,
in at least some forms of psychopathology, there is already an ethical relationship to others,
already a relationship even of responsibility, but also an inability (not avoidance) to act on that
responsibility well.
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Dual Insights: Responsibility for Responsibility, and Asymmetry
Let us return to the third point, i.e., that a Levinasian position must account for the
seemingly contrasting insights of responsibility for the responsibility of the other and the
asymmetry insight, that whether the other is responsible to me is his affair. In some ways, the
Seattle School does a good job here, in respect to both insights but especially the first. They take
seriously the responsibility for the other’s responsibility, taking therapy to be a fostering of
responsibility in the other. Sayre is most explicit about these simultaneous insights when he
writes that “therapy [is] not about their [the client’s] needs but about the needs of another person
– but not myself” (Sayre, 2015, p. 167). However, the motivating claim is problematic, namely
that in describing ethical subjectivity Levinas is providing a model for psychological health.
Levinas is writing precisely for his audience, that is, for those who read Levinas. It is the reader’s
own self-interest and freedom he wishes to challenge, for the sake of the claims made against the
reader by others. Levinas is challenging the reader, not those others with whom the reader
interacts. He is not arguing that ethical responsibility is equivalent to or necessary for
psychological health (at times he even describes responsibility as obsession, a term we would not
necessarily associate with health), and therefore that psychological illness amounts to ethical
irresponsibility. Williams (2015) goes astray, then, when he argues that instead of directing
ourselves to the needs of the other we address their responsibility for still other others.
Reminding us, by quoting Rabbi Israel Salanter, that “the Other’s material needs are my spiritual
needs” (Cohen, 1986, p. 24), Levinas calls us to respond to both the other’s responsibility and
their needs. Accordingly, the task of psychotherapy is not only to foster responsibility but also to
act out of one’s own responsibility for the client’s needs, as varied they may be. A corollary of
this idea is that a truly Levinasian psychiatry requires the ability to change the socio-material
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situation of those who come for help; this may be impossible without radical changes to existing
social organization.
Edwin Gantt has produced excellent work on this topic (Gantt, 2000). For Gantt, the
purpose of therapy is to suffer-with and -for the other. That is, the other comes to therapy in
suffering, and the therapist’s job is not first and foremost to understand, nor to return the other to
responsible relationships, but rather to take on the suffering of the patient as one’s own. This
means to allow that suffering to matter to the therapist, to allow their suffering-for-the-other to
disrupt their preconceived theoretical constructs and to orient therapy towards what actually
matters to the suffering person. Gantt thus takes seriously the Levinasian challenge to selfinterest by accepting that Levinas’ challenge is leveled at him, the therapist himself, rather than
universalizing the challenge by conceiving of ethical responsibility as a universal structure of
(healthy) consciousness and imposing the challenge on she who enters therapy looking for help.
The demand that is relevant to (incumbent upon) the therapist is precisely the demand made on
the therapist.
Conclusion: From the face-to-face to community
My goal here has been twofold: use Levinas to better understand psychopathology, and
use psychopathology to better understand Levinas. I begun by juxtaposing some
phenomenological and 4e conceptions of embodiment, self, and intersubjectivity with Levinas’
notions of embodiment (as sensitivity), substitution (instituting self/other ambiguity through a
certain form of perspective-taking), and self (constituted in response to the other). I then moved
to consider some implications of the latter: disruption is not inherently pathological, and these
concepts allow us to rethink a nexus of seemingly contrasting symptoms associated with
schizophrenia. I also point out that sensitivity and intersubjectivity are not exhausted by the idea
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of sensorimotor coupling, alluding to the possibility that the latter remain in-tact while the
former be disrupted. I then provided a 3 types of disruption that Levinasian terminology allows
us to articulate. That list is not meant to exhaust pathology phenomena or displace body
image/schema oriented discussions wholesale, but rather to complement and complicate those
analyses. My focus in that section was on depression, grandiose narcissism (and psychopathy),
and certain symptoms associated with schizophrenia. The 3-part characterization of disturbances
has some natural implications for therapeutic intervention, which I was only able to consider
briefly. I then considered and argued against the Seattle School position that mental illness
involves ethical irresponsibility, i.e., an ethical deficit, on three grounds. First, this a stigmatizing
and dangerous position to hold; second, it is false in the sense that persons who experience
pathology are not, simply qua mental illness, irresponsible; third, the view results in a
therapeutic orientation away from the material needs of the other in favor of what could be
described as proselytizing.
I now want to make two, final points. The first is to note that, for Levinas, substitution
may already be responsibility – it is certainly at least an affective response to substitute oneself
for the other. The transitionary phases I have articulated between embodiment and substitution,
on the one hand, and substitution and the self, on the other, are therefore perhaps artificial. There
are a few ways that we can interpret this. One is that psychopathology shows us that these
elements can indeed come apart – that the transition from embodiment to self is not necessarily a
smooth one. This is an appealing possibility, since it demonstrates a give-and-take relationship
between Levinas and psychopathology out of which may emerge new, useful sense. Another
possibility is to consider (which we can now only do most briefly) Levinas’ thoughts on
symmetry, principle, justice, or community. For Levinas, the face of the other is also the face of
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all others. That is, that the other appears to me as other – as entirely beyond me – means that the
other also signifies the relation with alterity in general. This is one reason why thought always
collapses into systematic ontology.
As Richard Cohen expresses in his foreward to Otherwise than Being, “To give all to
one, is to leave all others destitute” (Levinas, 1981, p. xvi). That is, I cannot be indifferent to the
relationships between those who manifest themselves as my others. As soon as the “third” –
another other – appears, I must take a stance on relations between multiple others. I cannot wash
my hands of injustices between them. This generalizing move whereby I must weigh the interests
not only of one other against myself but of each other against all others is a move that ultimately,
if it is to consider all others, must result in universal (though never a priori) principles that, as
such, apply to me as well. To quote at length:
In proximity the other obsesses me according to the absolute asymmetry of signification, of
the-one-for-the-other: I substitute myself for him, whereas no one can replace me, and the
substitution of the one for the other does not signify the substitution of the other for the one.
The relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity
in which the face is looked at. There is a weighing, thought, objectification, and thus a decree
in which my anarchic relationship with illeity is betrayed, but in which it is conveyed before
us. There is betrayal of my anarchic relation with illeity, but also a new relationship with it: it
is only thanks to God that, as a subject incomparable with the other, I am approached as an
other by the others, that is, “for myself.” “Thanks to God” I am another for the others.
(Levinas, 1981, p. 158)
Translating the theological terminology into a quasi-theology, he immediately continues:
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God is not involved as an alleged interlocutor: the reciprocal relationship binds me to the
other man in the trace of transcendence, in illeity. The passing of God, of whom I can speak
only by reference to this aid or grace, is precisely the reverting of the incomparable subject
into a member of society. (Levinas, 1981, p. 158)
For those suspicious of theology, God is spoken of only as absolute alterity, as an idea of infinity
to which all concepts are inadequate, revealed to thought only by the ethical relationship of faceto-face encounters. But as a general concept of otherness, asymmetry is betrayed and I myself
am considered an other to others. The responsive I is incomparable, irreplaceable; this just is its
identity. But in reciprocity – which, as noted in the previous chapter, does indeed characterize
participatory sense-making or coming to understand one another – the responsive I is further
transformed into a member of society.
I suggest, then, that in addition to types-1 through -3 above, we might also locate selfdisturbances in terms of situating oneself with respect to one’s community.6 If one does not feel
oneself supported by one’s community, if one is legitimately excluded from that community,
then this not only affects the sense of who one is and the way that one embodies their
relationships with others in the world, but it correspondingly disrupts (or at least significantly
conditions) participation in communal processes of sense-making. Therapy and theory alike,
then, must account for one’s community-situation, and thus not only must therapy respond to the
concrete needs expressed by she who enters therapy, but a successful therapy would also have an
eye to community level intervention, e.g., interventions that directly target one’s social, political
conditions.

This kind of consideration might fit into type-2 and -3, but those types were considered here primarily with face-toface encounters with individuals in mind.
6
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Second, a major objection must be admitted: am I not just offering a new structural
phenomenology, a new ontology by which to think these concepts? Am I not betraying the spirit
of Levinas? Am I not totalizing the other by offering general concepts by which to understand
the experience of individuals? Yes and no.
Yes, I am offering general concepts and I am constructing a kind of system through
which to interpret others. However, as Levinas confesses himself, this is unavoidable. No,
however, insofar as what matters is that whatever our systems might be, we base them first on
the asymmetric ethical relationship with the other, are open to their rupture by others, and in the
name of ethics disrupt such systems ourselves. In critiquing deficient methodology of every kind
and in recognizing that what I provide here is in no way a total system (and certainly not a
structure of transcendental subjectivity, understood in an individualistic sense), nor should it ever
be privileged above the concrete expressions made by others, I believe I am doing the best that
can be done if we nevertheless want our concepts to be useful for concrete human endeavors. We
must generalize to meet the demands of justice, even if this betrays our anarchic face-to-face
relationship with the other. The latter must be and remain she for whom we generalize: all others,
for each of whom we seek justice. Furthermore, my concern is first and foremost with the
demands made on me, and the demands made on interested parties, particularly those in a
position of power over those making demands. That is, what I offer here are some tools to aid the
therapist and the theorist in responding to the demands made on them by those who suffer. It is
an incomplete system, open to rupture, oriented by responsibility expressed in demands made
across seemingly radical difference.
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Conclusion
Throughout this dissertation, I have pointed out limitations in contemporary
phenomenological and enactivist approaches to psychopathology, and have offered correctives
based primarily on Levinas’ ethical conception of expression. The position offered here is
broadly complementary to 4e and phenomenological approaches to cognitive science and
psychopathology, though it is only partly compatible with the latter. The major addition is the
articulation of an asymmetric, ethical significance to human interaction that is not exhausted by
the epistemic, perceptual, or ontological, or participation-based conceptions – including direct
perception theory, interaction theory, and participatory sense-making – that characterize
phenomenological cognitive science and enactivism today. Recognizing this distinct form of
significance allows us to conceptualize intersubjective understanding on the basis of
communication with others across differences that may initially be – and perhaps even threaten
to remain – incomprehensible. First we communicate, and only on that basis can we understand.
For this reason, the position articulated here can make sense of understanding in the
context of psychopathology and can also provide us with a number of methodological and
conceptual tools for theory and practice in that domain. Psychopathology is a field that
thematizes seemingly radical differences: we try to understand others who experience the world
very differently than ourselves. Rather than presupposing similarities taken to characterize
human experience in general, or even some specific subset of human experience, our approach
begins with taking seriously the demand placed on us by people who suffer. Response to
suffering is the only adequate test of a psychopathological theory or practice, and thus should
orient the field.
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I have tried to distance the claims of this work from considerations of transcendental
subjectivity, instead endorsing the position that identity and experience in general, as well as
understanding, are produced in the encounter between persons. I have thus proffered some
general insights into the ways that we seem to respond to one another, while reminding the
reader to bare in mind the asymmetric nature of those relations. The theory of natural pedagogy
and 4e approaches to sense-making, especially interaction theory and participatory sensemaking, help us to bridge the gap between intersubjectivity as a primarily ethical relationship
and understanding one another in terms of concepts and categories held in common.
Our concepts can be applied for understanding specific pathology phenomena, but it must
be remembered that these insights can always be ruptured by the other; they refer to generalities
and not universalities, and they must be responsive to individual differences. It must be noted
that embodied existence, the expression of the other that interrupts that existence, and the self as
constituted in response to that expression stand in dynamic relations to one another; the concept
of naïve embodiment does not refer to a state temporally or developmentally prior to contact
with others, but rather refers to the mode of being we would occupy without such contact. It is
also a common and familiar occurrence to slip back into naïve embodiment, in which to some
extent or other we orient ourselves to the world in terms of our own enjoyment rather than beingfor-others. Even the therapist or pathology theorist can easily content himself with pre-fabricated
concepts that do not serve the concrete demands made on them by others.
Throughout, I have taken a distinctive Levinasian inspiration, and have – especially early
on – rendered Levinas’ concepts and insights as faithfully as I could. However, when applying
these concepts to any concrete human endeavor that relates itself to a plurality of persons, certain
concessions must be made. I have at times, therefore, remained Levinasian only in my most basic
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concepts and inspirations, and have bent derivative concepts to my purpose. This is especially
clear in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 1, I explicated the foundational concepts of interpersonal understanding in
phenomenological psychology by reviewing the work of Karl Jaspers, Edmund Husserl, and
Edith Stein. For them, empathy is the primary intentional act directed towards the other, and so is
either necessary for or identical with interpersonal understanding. Empathy, however, relies on
similarities and familiarities that cannot be presupposed in general, let alone in the context of
psychopathology. This conception of understanding leaves open the possibility of
incomprehensibility and recommends, as a limited countermeasure, what I have called deficit
methodology. That method was shown to be inadequate to contemporary demands. While
transcendental phenomenology can enhance the method, it does not overcome all its
shortcomings, and also carries out an illicit inference by applying structures of one’s own
consciousness to another person for whom those structures are precisely what is called into
question; it presupposed understanding where understanding is precisely at issue.
In Chapter 2, I articulate Levinas’ ethical conception of expression. Rather than defining
expression in terms of recognizable bodily movements constituted as articulating co-existing,
personally familiar mental states – as do Jaspers and the phenomenologists – expression is
defined in terms of a disruption to one’s embodied sensitivity. As a body, one is exposed to a
world and this exposure sets up an affective, phenomenal field with its own morality: the body is
content to enjoy the world without seeking a deeper significance outside this enjoyment. But the
expression of the other acts as a disruptive force, calling me out of contentment by demanding a
response. As placing a demand on me for which I am responsible, expression is an inherently
ethical phenomenon.
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In Chapter 3, I demonstrate how the dynamic of demand-and-response contributes to the
production of understanding in the traditional sense. I co-opt the theory of natural pedagogy,
interpreting pedagogical cues specifically as address in the disruptive sense, to connect the
ethical conception of expression with understanding general features of the world, oneself, and
others. I also suggest that dynamical systems theory approaches in cognitive science should
emphasize the affective responses that one undergoes in the presence of the other so as to allow
our lived and attentive sensitivity to the other to direct research. In this chapter, I rethink the
notions of incomprehensibility and understanding introduced in Chapter 1. Understanding is not
a default relationship that collapses into incomprehensibility only when something goes wrong.
Instead, understanding must be produced as a response to the demands placed on one by the
other; incomprehensibility, then, is a ground for understanding, even though we often find
ourselves in familiar situations that already go a long way toward covering up that ground.
In Chapter 4, I pursue the production of understanding in relation to enactivist
conceptions sense-making. This discussion is oriented by a concern with ethical experience: I
want to account not only for responsibility but also the experience of responsibility and the
extreme possibilities of altruism and self-sacrifice. That is, I want to understand interest despite
oneself and, relatedly, sense despite self-interest. I begin with autopoietic accounts of the
organism and move to interaction theory and participatory sense-making in order to set up a
discussion of the enactivist literature on ethics. I argue that current attempts at ethical theory in
enactivism have only considered ethics from the perspectives of normativity and affectivity, and
in problematic ways that have either not sufficiently called into question the freedom or activity
of individuals, or otherwise cover up ethical asymmetry and therefore unduly deflate the idea of
responsibility. Understanding expression as disrupting organismic, autonomous, or symmetric
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modes of sense-making, however, complements these approaches by providing a ground on
which to make sense of ethical experience while nevertheless benefitting from those approaches’
ability to account for higher-order, ethically relevant phenomena, e.g., the intersubjective
production of norms and emotions.
In Chapter 5, I attempt a Levinasian contribution to phenomenological psychopathology.
I begun with a brief explication of the connections between embodiment, intersubjectivity, and
self in phenomenological and 4e approaches, before introducing my preferred versions of these
concepts: embodiment as sensitivity, substitution as a certain form of perspective-taking
(embodying the world according to the other’s demands), and self as constituted in response to
the other. I propose three “disruptions” that correspond to what have traditionally been known as
“self-disruptions,” noting that none of these three dimensions of experience are solipsistic
accomplishments. I then apply these three disruptions to consider depression, grandiose
narcissism (and, to some extent, psychopathy), and certain symptoms associated with
schizophrenia, e.g., alienation from one’s own body and experiencing the other as a threatening
presence. I then consider a Levinas inspired approach known as the Seattle School of
Psychotherapy. According to the Seattle School, mental health is characterized as a kind of
ethical deficiency and the task of the therapist is to return patients to responsibility. Though there
is much that is right about the approach in general, I reject the characterization of mental illness
as ethical deficiency and note that Levinas, far from proposing a model of psychological health
to be applied to oneself and others alike, is instead reminding his readers of their own
responsibility.
Putting Levinas in contact with the literature on psychopathology is a challenge. There
have been only a few attempts to do so. The challenge is specifically a challenge to established
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psychopathology. I consider this project to be successful if any theorist or therapist learns to
better respond to those who come to them in suffering because of it, or if any reader of Levinas
can make better sense of certain of his concepts, even if only partially.
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